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ABSTRACT 
This is a critical cultural and political economic analysis of the video game as an engine of 
global anxiety and desire. Attempting to move beyond conventional studies of the video game as 
a thing-in-itself, relatively self-contained as a textual, ludic, or even technological (in the narrow 
sense of the word) phenomenon, I propose that gaming has come to operate as an 
epistemological imperative that extends beyond the site of gaming in itself. Play and pleasure 
have come to affect sites of culture and the structural formation of various populations beyond 
those conceived of as belonging to conventional gaming populations: the workplace, consumer 
experiences, education, warfare, and even the practice of politics itself, amongst other domains. 
Indeed, the central claim of this dissertation is that the video game operates with the same 
political and cultural gravity as that ascribed to the prison by Michel Foucault. That is, just as the 
prison operated as the discursive site wherein the disciplinary imaginary was honed, so too does 
digital play operate as that discursive site wherein the ludic imperative has emerged. 
 To make this claim, I have had to move beyond the conventional theoretical frameworks  
utilized in the analysis of video games. Though I am indeed indebted to these popular traditions 
of textual, ludic, and platform analysis, too often, I argue, they work to delimit the domain of the 
video game form, thereby obscuring our ability to grasp the “non-gaming” political force of 
digital play. Hence, the first two chapters operate to develop the historical perspective and 
theoretical framework needed for understanding how digital play has come to operate beyond the 
confines of conventional gaming. In establishing this rough historical perspective and theoretical 
framework, I am indebted to the best of what game studies has to offer, as well as to the works of 
James Carey, Michel Foucault, Paul Virilio, and Raymond Williams, for their conceptions of 
technologies as cultural practices that operate to codify the particular formation of various 
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populations. If I am successful, my hope is that this dissertation might operate as part of an 
emerging tradition of critical game studies scholarship, willing to take seriously the totality of 
digital play. In this vein, I see my work as operating alongside the recent and ongoing works of 
Ergin Bulut, Patrick Crogan, Nick Dyer-Witheford, Aphra Kerr, Stephen Kline, Greig de Peuter, 
Roger Stahl, and others. 
 My contribution, then, to this emergent field of critical game studies is that the video 
game form has come to operate as an engine of global anxiety in terms of its political economic, 
environmental, military, social, and cultural processes. Gaming practices carry with them a 
political and cultural gravity that has worked to mobilize various economic and military sectors, 
and though this has enriched some, so too has it brought about horrific results for various 
laboring populations, regional ecologies, and those on the wrong end of the militarized border. 
To those who might be turned away by the prospect of such a pessimistic take on the history and 
state of contemporary gaming politics, understand that I am neither a luddite nor an outsider to 
the gaming industry. I was born in 1982, and remember fondly looking forward to each new 
issue of Nintendo Power so that I might have the latest news on the most exciting upcoming 
games. Even today, I am implicated in that my gaming collection is possibly more vast than 
most, and I would argue passionately that Óscar Araujo and Nobuo Uematsu are amongst the 
most beautiful music composers, and that Hideo Kojima and Soraya Saga are amongst the 
greatest storytellers. And yet, as beautiful, inspiring, and moving as gaming can be, there is much 
that is horrific, revolting, and terrible about the industry as well. We cannot smile with good 
conscious at the pleasures afforded for us through the experience of digital play and 
simultaneously remain ignorant of the significant suffering undertaken on our behalf. It is my 
hope that this dissertation is a move towards good conscious. 
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PREFACE 
 
How does one write of video games during a moment of economic turmoil, political trauma, 
environmental crisis, and persistent warfare? To write of video games, it would seem, would be 
to participate in a misguided, banal mode of cultural studies: that misidentification of the cultural 
artifact as itself of sociopolitical significance (Bérubé, 2009; Bodroghkozy, 2005; C. Nelson, 
1991).i If we conceive of video games as a thing in itself, then by all accounts this dissertation is 
open to criticism for perpetuating a detached, disembodied, and depoliticized form of 
scholarship. And yet, video games matter, especially in this moment. 
 Video games matter, as they have come to function as sites for thinking, or rather 
playing, through the problems of our contemporary moment. Many immensely popular and well-
received video game franchises are busy representing our sociopolitical world through 
representations of some combination of our current political, economic, environmental, or 
military moment, for example: Call of Duty, with its re-creation of major military operations 
from World War II to Vietnam to hypothetical contemporary scenarios (Activision, 2003b, 2005, 
2006, 2007a, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011b); Fallout, with its imaginings of a new social order 
emerging from out of a post-nuclear fallout scenario, complete with new economies, political 
systems, and environmental challenges (Bethesda Softworks, 2008, 2010; Interplay 
Entertainment, 1997, 1998); and Resident Evil, with its exploration of the political economics of 
biological manipulation (Capcom, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000/2001, 2002a, 2005a, 2009); et cetera. 
 Some may contend that the “poor” quality of the video game form when compared with 
more “refined” print and film media categorically preempts it from serious critical analysis.  To 
critique a video game, transitively, is to grant it legitimacy it does not warrant (Postman, 
1985/2005). The value of the video game form for critical analysis, however, comes from its 
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ability to serve as a provocative and productive site for thinking through the challenges of the 
historical moment. Indeed, many have looked to video games in order to: develop new 
pedagogies (Gee, 2001; S. Jones, 2006); understand how contemporary identity practices work 
(Boellstorff, 2008; Turkle, 1995/1997); revitalize popular culture (Bissell, 2010; Kohler, 2005) 
and more. Others have looked to these same games and found reasons to be concerned for video 
games': widespread reliance upon violence (Dietz, 1998; Scharrer, 2004), racial stereotyping 
(Hess, 2007; Nakamura, 2009; Shiu, 2006), and hypersexuality (Lalley, 2005; Martins, Williams, 
Harrison, & Ratan, 2009), amongst other issues. The appeal and/or concern over the video game 
form is to be found precisely in its function as a sociopolitical lightning rod for thinking through 
the challenges of this historical moment (D. Williams, 2003). 
 It would be a mistake, however, to disentangle video games from the political, economic, 
and cultural forces from which they emerge. Technology and society are not separate entities, but 
rather mutually constituting forces (Boellstorff, 2008; R. Williams, 1974/2005), or as Paul Starr 
(2004) puts it, technology is “politics by other means” (p. 6). Hence, when we speak about video 
games, we are also talking about the sociopolitical forces articulated to the monitoring of their 
production and consumption, such as the military-industrial complex (Halter, 2006), patriarchy 
(Lalley, 2005), and other political interests. 
 And yet, the video game is frequently treated as a self-contained technology at the very 
same moment as its sociopolitical effects are said to extend beyond the technology itself. For 
instance, some have claimed that the status of comic book film adaptations, never known for 
being high culture, has been tarnished by an encroaching overemphasis on video game aesthetics 
(Moore, 2011; Phillips, 2011; Roeper, 2011). Academics as well, while typically more nuanced 
in their criticism, frequently treat video games in isolation (e.g., through exclusive reliance on 
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close textual readings, as opposed to historically, culturally, politically, socially situated 
analysis), thereby limiting what can be said about both video games and the contemporary 
culture. For instance, Aaron Hess (2007) writes that “since fully representing war is impossible, 
the limited participation of Rising Sun gamers leads to a critical blindness regarding modern 
warfare” (p. 352). Is this burden of full representation not an impossible task (Baudrillard, 
1994b; Benjamin, 1974; Jay, 1992; White, 1990a)? And is this critique not true of all forms of 
contemporary remembrance? If we continue to live in an “age of amusement” (Postman, 
1985/2005), it is only because there is a larger story to tell about how contemporary technology 
has been marshaled together toward this end and not because one technology has come to 
contaminate all others.  
 But, again, if it is true that video game technology has contaminated other media forms 
through its support of a depoliticized, sexist, racist, capitalist culture, why study video games? 
Are there not more productive sites of culture for thinking through the problems of our 
contemporary moment? Against the urgency of people dying in the streets, what in God’s name 
is the point of studying video games? What is the point if there is no response to the question of 
what you say to someone who wants to know if they’ll have a job tomorrow and if it means 
they’ll have enough money for rent or even food to eat?ii As Stuart Hall (1992/2001) noted, “if 
you don’t feel that as one tension in the work that you are doing, theory has let you off the hook” 
(p. 1907). Has theory let me off the hook? 
 We live during a moment fraught with economic turmoil, political trauma, environmental 
crisis, and persistent warfare; and yet, “Where the danger is, grows / The saving power also,” as 
Heidegger (1954/1977a), citing Hölderlin, was apt to say (p. 27). How could we say that the 
questions of the present are not also questions of who gets represented and who does not?iii 
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Indeed, as Heidegger (1938/1977) argues, the question of the present is how the real is 
represented. And to the extent this is true, the question concerning technology ought to be at the 
fore. Hence, in order to evaluate the sociopolitical significance of the video game form, one must 
understand what subject positions it offers to the gamer, why it does so, and how it does so 
within the constraints of a given historical context. Such questioning is a necessary for opening 
up the impossibility of our fully confronting and coming to terms with the widespread reality of 
economic exploitation, political oppression, environmental destruction, and rabid militarism, and 
“turning” an understanding of this fact into a service of a politics for life (Heidegger, 1950/1977, 
1954/1977a). In essence, I am arguing that the struggle to transform contemporary politics must 
be concerned with understanding (and transforming) the technologies that produce the 
subjectivities that sustain its very politics.iv 
 Indeed one assertion of this dissertation is that video games have increasingly worked to 
animate and then mobilize remembrances of the past, the politics of the present, and the hopes 
and fears for the future, so as to produce the subjectivities necessary for sustaining the politics of 
the present (as well as bring about those for the future). My contribution in writing this 
dissertation is to search for the sign of a messianic zero-hour within the video game form:  that 
“revolutionary chance in the struggle for the suppressed past” (Benjamin, 1974, Sec. XVII). It is 
my belief that it is only through the telling of a historical otherwise—a form of history that 
speaks truth to power—that we have any hope of granting legitimacy to the subjectivities needed 
for a more equitable future.  
 To undertake this task, my theoretical approach is a blend of historiography and 
technology studies, as both fields have much to offer toward developing an understanding of the 
sociopolitical construction of the real: historiography in terms of how conceptions of the past 
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come to serve as (de)legitimation for the politics of the present (Langer, 1991; Lowenthal, 1998; 
Ono, 2009b; Weber, 1958; White, 1990b); technology studies in terms of how the production 
and consumption of a technological ethos works to reconfigure the real (Ellul, 1954/1964; 
Heidegger, 1977; Manovich, 2001; R. Williams, 1974/2005). By combining these two theoretical 
perspectives, I am in essence arguing that the video game form produces a particular subjectivity 
better suited to the sustenance (and potential subversion) of present circumstances. 
 To undertake this project with the care and attention it deserves, the first two chapters of 
the dissertation, “Games in Crisis” and “Hardcore Subjects / Hardcore Technologies” are 
dedicated to the two major historiographical and methodological frameworks that inform my 
analysis: the concept of Empire (Chapter One) and technology studies (Chapter Two). In the first 
chapter, I aim to situate the emergence of digital play within the history of contemporary Empire. 
Hence, I am indebted to Hardt and Negri (2001) and Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter 
(2009) for their work on the theorization of Empire. Likewise, I am equally indebted to the video 
game histories produced by J.C. Herz (1997), Steven Kent (2001), and David Sheff (1993/1999). 
In the second chapter, I aim to make a case for how the technological substructures of a given 
age produce the subjectivities necessary for its continued sustenance (and potential subversion). 
Important theorists include: [Media Studies] James Carey and Raymond Williams, for their 
documentation of how shifts in the means of communication have worked to reorganize society; 
and [Technology Studies] Jacques Ellul, Martin Heidegger, Lev Manovich, and Paul Virilio, for 
their work on understanding how technology, in terms of its rhetorical and material effects, 
works to reconstruct society alongside the logic of the machine. This chapter will serve as the 
theoretical foundation for the subsequent three chapters. 
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 The following three chapters are organized around the relevant political themes engaged 
by the video games selected for analysis: Chapter Three, “The Economics of Play”; Chapter 
Four, “The Logistics of Play”; Chapter Five, “The Ecologies of Play.” For each chapter, I will 
attempt to link the development of each video game franchise with the corresponding political 
economic and sociocultural events of the moment. For instance, Lisa Keränen (2011) argues that 
the anthrax mailings following the events of 9/11 worked to amplify U.S. cultural anxiety in 
clandestine biological warfare. During this very same period, the Resident Evil franchise began 
to shift from a narrative of corporate abuse at the hands of the Umbrella Corporation (a ruthless 
pharmaceutical company) toward that of catching indigenous terrorists seeking to spread a 
homegrown disease. Since it is widely acknowledged that 9/11 resulted in a shift in global 
politics (Agamben, 2004/2008; MacCabe, 2008; Ono, 2009c), it is not surprising that the 
transformation would affect the production and consumption of video games. The question then, 
however, is how do these various video games take up the challenge of this historical moment 
and what stance do they offer to the player in terms of understanding the cause of the event and 
the appropriate response to it? Answering this question requires a methodology built from 
historiography, the philosophy of technology, the political economy of communication, and 
rhetorical criticism. 
 The games selected for this study have been chosen due to the iconic status they hold 
within the video game industry, amongst both developers and players alike.v They are: Chapter 
Three, the Civilization franchise; Chapter Four, the Call of Duty franchise; and Chapter Five, the 
Resident Evil franchise. While other games could have been selected, I believe the reverence and 
influential status of those chosen are enough to encapsulate the rough contours of the 
subjectivities offered by the video game form. Should this project succeed, the work for future 
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scholars will be toward that of sharpening the critical edge of this rough approximation; likewise, 
my hope is that recommendations for future design decisions will emerge so that future 
developers can work toward putting these frameworks to the test. 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
i It is perhaps ironic that this mode of cultural criticism is exactly what the early founders of British Cultural Studies, 
in particular, sought to guard against:  
 
‘Mass communication’ [is used] by almost all its agents and advisers as well, curiously, as by 
most of its radical critics. [….] But then this new form of social communication – broadcasting – 
was obscured by its definition as ‘mass communication’; an abstraction to its most general 
characteristic, that it went to many people, ‘the masses’, which obscured the fact that the means 
chosen was the offer of individual sets, a method much better described as ‘broadcasting.’ (R. 
Williams, 1974/2005, pp. 16-17) 
 
Or as E.P. Thompson (1966) wrote: 
 
By class I understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly 
unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness. I emphasis that it 
is an historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a “structure”, nor even as a “category”, but as 
something which in fact happens […] in human relationships. (p. 9) 
 
What scholars operating under the rubric of cultural studies do, when they ignore these earlier warnings, is to 
confuse a product produced for popular consumption as constituting the popular audience itself. The goal, hence, is 
not to understand the internal workings of a cultural artifact in itself, but to understand how that selfsame artifact 
emerges from a historical process and carries with it cultural effects (C. Nelson, 1991). 
 
ii These sentences are clearly taken from Stuart Hall’s (1992/2001) revered article, “Cultural Studies and It’s 
Theoretical Legacies.” I left the sentences unmarked in the text for the sake of emphasizing the tension experienced 
in the doing of this work, a tension that perhaps would have been undermined by the marking of the citation itself. 
For the sake of ethical scholarship, however, the citation is included in its totality here: 
 
AIDS is one of the questions which urgently brings before us our marginality as critical 
intellectuals in making real effects in the world. And yet it has often been represented for us in 
contradictory ways. Against the urgency of people dying in the streets, what in God's name is the 
point of cultural studies? What is the point of the study of representations, if there is no response 
to the question of what you say to someone who wants to know if they should take  a drug and if 
that means they'll die two days later or a few months earlier? At that point, I think anybody who is 
into cultural studies seriously as an intellectual practice, must feel, on their pulse, its ephemerality, 
its insubstantiality, how little it registers, how little we've been able to change anything or get 
anybody to do anything. If you don't feel that as one tension in the work that you are doing, theory 
has let you off the hook. On the other hand, in the end, I don't agree with the way in which this 
dilemma is often posed for us, for it is indeed a more complex and displaced question than just 
people dying out there. The question of AIDS is an extremely important terrain of struggle and 
contestation. In addition to the people we know who are dying, or have died, or will, there are the 
many people dying who are never spoken of. How could we say that the question of AIDS is not 
also a question of who gets represented and who does not? AIDS is the site at which the advance 
of sexual politics is being rolled back. It's a site at which not only people will die, but desire and 
pleasure will also die if certain metaphors do not survive, or survive in the wrong way. [....] It 
[cultural studies] has to analyze certain things about the constitutive and political nature of 
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representation itself, about its complexities, about the effects of language, about textuality as a site 
of life and death. Those are the things cultural studies can address. (p. 1907-1908) 
 
iii See comment regarding Stuart Hall above. 
iv This need not be the explicit project of all concerned with combating oppression, as there is much work to be 
done, but it is an important element nevertheless, and hence my proposed contribution. 
v The list of industry awards received, sale records set, and fan praise received by the games selected for analysis are 
too numerous to list in detail here. That said, all the games under analysis have received Game of the Year awards 
from respected video game magazines/websites and/or professional organizations: Civilization IV (2K Games, 
2005a); Call of Duty: Modern Warfare (Academy of Interactive Arts & Sciences, 2008); and, Resident Evil 4 
(GameSpot, 2005).  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION: GAMES IN CRISIS 
 
March 11, 2011, visitors of the Australian YouTube were greeted with the breaking news that 
North Korea had attacked the United States’ mainland. Embedded within the news report was an 
image of an intercontinental ballistic missile and a news crawler stating “World Leaders in 
Shock… UN in Crisis Meetings over Korean Attacks… ‘Act of Unjustified Aggression’” (Luke, 
2011). Scrolling over the “News Today” banner expanded the report to initiate a sequence of 
footage announcing that Kim Jong-il had passed away, and that his son, Kim Jung-un, had taken 
over leadership, and that the Korean Peninsula had subsequently voted for reunification 
(Bradford, 2011). Throughout the footage, images of civil unrest and evidence of an emerging 
police state were shown as a reporter commented that “across the nation, civil unrest has 
intensified with the demise of the U.S. dollar” (THQ, 2010). 
 By this point, if not earlier, attentive viewers would have noticed the “Close Ad” 
command in the top-right corner of the “News Today” banner and realized that the so-called 
report was actually part of a massive marketing campaign by THQ for its upcoming video game, 
Homefront (THQ, 2011b). The realization, however, did not remedy the visceral reaction many 
viewers had towards the fictional report: “HOLY SHIT I thought North Korea ACTUALLY 
Launched a nuclear ATTACK! FUCK YOU YOUTUBE AND YOUR SHITTING GAMING 
ADVERTISINGS” (Luke, 2011). Described as “tasteless,” “offensive,” and “misleading,” THQ 
itself was critiqued for “producing an inflammatory game based upon a current political problem 
that could result in the deaths of many South and North Koreans” (Bradford, 2011). The 
reference being made here is to the heightened political tension on the Korean Peninsula, 
following North Korea’s sinking of the ROKS Cheonan (March 2010) and bombardment of 
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Yeonpyeong Island (November 2010), of which the former was referenced prominently within 
THQ’s (2010) advertisement. Despite being a fictional scenario, one designed as a vehicle for 
selling a videogame, the reference to real-world national tensions, which called upon fears some 
might have genuinely felt about U.S./North Korea tensions in 2011, promotes a discourse that 
does more than simply sell a product. 
 Though gamers came to the defense of THQ, commenting that “It isn’t supposed to be a 
serious scenario; it is a plot for a video game. Get a life” (Bradford, 2011), those familiar with 
the work of John Milius, Homefront’s writer, would have found reason to think otherwise. 
Perhaps most known for his having co-written the script for Apocalypse Now (Coppola, 1979), it 
is Milius’s work on the film Red Dawn (1984) that is of most interest here. Released in 1984, the 
film depicts a near-future scenario in which the United States is invaded by the Soviet Union and 
its Cuban and Nicaraguan allies. The sudden invasion has left the United States government and 
military in disarray, thus forcing the citizenry to fend for themselves. Though the plausibility of 
the narrative remains questionable—in that a handful of high school students successfully repel a 
capable military force—the scenario itself tapped into the fears and desires of the cultural milieu 
known as the Cold War. For those involved in the development of Homefront, the plausibility of 
John Milius’ speculative fiction, as captured in Red Dawn, served as a source of inspiration 
(THQ, 2011c); Milius’s subsequent service as the game’s writer only served to concretize the 
already profound influence he had on the cultural formation of those involved in the production 
of the game. 
 Homefront may serve as a more explicit example of the ability for video games to capture 
and speak to the fears and desires of a cultural moment, but one need not stretch the imagination 
to compile a formidable list of other digital games dealing with historical and/or politically 
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salient subject matter; the following sample is illustrative: 1942 (Capcom, 1984), Rush’n Attack 
(Konami, 1985), Desert Strike: Return to the Gulf (Electronic Arts, 1992), Medal of Honor 
(Electronic Arts, 1999b), Command & Conquer: Generals (Electronic Arts, 2003a), Battlefield 
Vietnam (Electronic Arts, 2004a), to name a few. That this list is dominated by military-based 
game content is not surprising considering the close proximity of the video game industry to the 
military-industrial complex, in terms of its origins and ongoing working relationship (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Halter, 2006). 
 Perhaps prophetically, the first video game, Tennis for Two (Higinbotham, 1958), was 
developed by William A. Higinbotham, a member of the original Manhattan Project, as an 
exhibit for the U.S. Department of Nuclear Energy’s Brookhaven National Laboratory’s Open 
House day (Halter, 2006; Kline, Dyer-Witheford, & de Peuter, 2003; Lalley, 2005). These public 
events were designed to lessen the apprehension the average American held toward nuclear 
energy and research (Halter, 2006). Higinbotham had hoped his invention would prove more 
inviting to the public than the typical Open House fare of “cold, imposing banks of ineffably 
blinking lights” (Halter, 2006, p. 78). Though we can only imagine as to how the public of 1958 
received the invitation that was Tennis for Two, evidence exists regarding how these electronic 
invitations have been received by contemporary audiences: in 2005, forty percent of new U.S. 
military recruits reported playing the pentagon-funded America’s Army prior to enlisting 
(Barnes, 2005). Though this game functions as part of the U.S. military’s larger shift from print 
and TV advertisements to more cost-effective recruitment methods, such as event co-
sponsorships (J. Edwards, 2004), the use of digital media, particularly digital play, worked to 
reconfigure warfare as a “real-time” site of play, for soldiers and citizens alike; creating what 
Roger Stahl (2006) calls, “the virtual citizen-soldier.” That is, a subject who’s “integration into a 
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sanitized fantasy of war is a seduction whose pleasures are felt at the expense of the capacity for 
critical engagement in matters of military might” (R. Stahl, 2006, p. 126). 
It is ironic that decades after it was dismantled and its parts recycled for other projects 
(Halter, 2006), and after Higinbotham had long served as a prominent member of the Science for 
Peace movement (Chaplin & Ruby, 2005; Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009), that the legacy of 
Tennis for Two is that the video game would continue to serve as perhaps the most successful 
ambassador of the military-industrial complex—and by extension, Empire. The story of how this 
came to be, that is, how video games were able to move beyond the military-industrial complex, 
but not the reaches of Empire, is one worth knowing if we are to critically intervene upon the site 
of power we call gaming.  
An Apparatus of Empire 
The video game is more than a mere apparatus of the military-industrial complex. It is one of 
Empire (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). Empire, according to Hardt and Negri (2001) refers 
to that vast political economic regime that operates through a mixed-constitution of entities (e.g., 
nation-states, city-states, non-governmental organizations), interests (e.g., economic, political, 
cultural), and processes (e.g., reinforcement, resistance, resignation). Though Empire is governed 
by the political economic interests of powerful nation-states and non-governmental 
organizations, these selfsame entities are made-up of a vast multitude of peoples. This 
assemblage of bodies, which at once enable the system to function, holds out the possibility for 
its disaggregation—and is hence the essence of the mixed-constitution of the global apparatus 
that is Empire. Operating as a global apparatus whose functioning cuts across an array of 
interests and practices, Empire is therefore vulnerable to subversion at each point in its 
application, and therefore must constantly remake itself; and in this remaking of itself, the 
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possibility exists that a conscious, ethical intervention at various points in the system could 
transform the subsequent functioning or overcoming of Empire (Hardt & Negri, 2001). 
Operating at the level of Empire, then, means that the video game both extends and exceeds the 
reach of military interests (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). 
In contrast to the political power of transnational financial capital and the military might 
of a global policing power, the conception of an entertainment technology, the video game, as an 
apparatus of Empire may appear to be a bit much—let alone as a viable site for transforming its 
functioning. And yet, Hardt and Negri (2001) saw all new communication technologies, from the 
computer and the internet to the satellite and cellular telephone, as technologies “embedded 
within and completely immanent to the” practices of Empire (p. 298). These new communication 
technologies extend the penetration and reach of Empire, transform the means of production and 
consumption, as well as produce the subjectivities necessary for these new political economic 
practices (Hardt & Negri, 2001, 2004). Considering the vastness of the internet, the processing 
power of the personal, commercial, and military computer, the ubiquity of cellular telephony, 
and the global surveillance system of the satellite, the fun factory that is the video game industry 
would seem to be a relatively innocuous site of imperial practices. And yet, the video game 
industry does indeed traverses the body of Empire in that digital gaming constitute a multi-
national industry controlled by various corporations working together to establish and maintain 
markets. These transnational corporations, such as Nintendo and Sony, have established a vast 
political economic network of console assembling sweatshops, air-conditioned programming 
facilities, and complex advertising processes, so as to extend the reach of what constitutes an 
electronic gaming audience. Moreover, as explicit sites for playing through one’s fears and 
desires, the video game offer a provocative site for thinking through the biopolitics of Empire. 
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  The conception of digital play as an important apparatus of Empire, however, is stymied 
by the veil of interactivity that shrouds the video game. It would seem that perhaps more so than 
older forms of media, books, radio, film, or television, the video game controller offers a 
mechanism by which the user can affect the content of the narrative.vi We must remember, 
however, that there is a difference between “playing a creative role within an authored 
environment and having authorship of the environment itself” (Murray, 1997, p. 152). Failure to 
acknowledge this distinction—a failure that is actively encouraged through the vast apparatus of 
video game advertising—means that we have mistaken the anxieties and desires of “somebody’s 
else mind for our own” (Manovich, 2001, p. 74). This is not to say that psychological 
correspondence cannot exist between the gamer and game developer, but rather that mistaking 
one’s self to be the author of one’s digital environment is to extend modern conceptions of 
identity, which are already tenuous (Butler, 1993; Foucault, 1975/1995, 1976/1990), into an 
environment that is explicitly postmodern by design; if we cannot claim to have created our 
physical and psychological selves, then we definitely cannot claim to have authored our digital 
manifestations. That said, to say that consoles promote misrecognition “is not to deny that they 
are pleasurable; it is to say that pleasure itself channels power” (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 
2009, p. 92). But, the affects of video game playing do not stop there. Pleasure is not the only 
emotion invested into the act of play; in operation are other emotions as well, such as fear and 
frustration, and perhaps earlier work on popular culture emphasized “pleasure” at the expense of 
these other affects. Thus, as the example with Homefront illustrates, the experience of fear is also 
undoubtedly met not necessarily with pleasure alone (though it may indeed be in operation), but 
also with the production and circulation of fear as well—in that North Korea is received as a 
plausible and legitimate threat. 
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The spectacle of the annual Entertainment Electronics Expo (E3) in downtown Los 
Angeles serves as an excellent example of the functioning of the video game industry as an 
apparatus of Empire, and thus an ideal vantage point from which to view the strands of affects 
ranging from pleasure to fear operating within digital play. Housed within the 720,000 square 
feet Los Angeles Convention Center, the Expo attracted over 200 exhibitors and 46,800 
attendees from over 100 countries for the 2011 convention (Entertainment Software Association, 
2011b). With participants ranging from console makers, such as Nintendo, whose promotional 
workers wore the company’s new Wii U controller tethered around their waist (Figure 1.1), to 
GameChurch.com, whose book, Jesus, For the Win (2010), features a game-playing Jesus on the 
cover (Figure 1.2), the event certainly sought to live up to its theme of “Exceeding Imagination.”  
Figure 1.2. Cover of Jesus, For the Win Figure 1.1. Nintendo Promotional worker with 
Wii U controller tethered to waist. 
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Figure 1.3. Banners of Warhammer 40,000: Space Marine lining a connecting hall at E3 2011. 
The excess of the spectacle does not mark the convention in contestation with the 
imaginings of Empire, however; rather, the excess is one of the extension and ever deepening 
penetration of the imperial imagination: business development directors from Creata (the 
promotions company behind McDonald’s, Kellogg’s, Coca Cola and others) looking for new 
merchandising opportunities; military personnel promoting the booth for Pro vs. GI Joe, a 
nonprofit organization, whose mission is to boost troop morale and raise public support for the 
military (Pro vs. GI Joe, 2011); massive banners for the game, Warhammer 40,000: Space 
Marine (THQ, 2011d), with testimonials such as “when you absolutely, positively got to kill 
every Ork in the room—accept no substitutes” (Figure 1.3), which reads like an endorsement for 
anti-bacterial soap. The pageantry of financial speculation, the seamless presence of military 
force, and the fantasy of overcoming sanitary anxiety; three pillars of contemporary Empire 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001; Virilio, 2004/2005) made manifest, even pleasurable, through the fun 
factory that is the video game. When financial security is itself a site of constant insecurity 
(Harvey, 2007; Palm Beach Post, 2002), when states of exception are no longer exceptional 
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(Agamben, 2004/2008; CNN, 2010), when the means for overcoming sanitary anxiety produce 
new sanitary anxieties (Keränen, 2011; Rather, 2011), the video game industry offers the 
promise of relief. 
The Precarious World of Imperial Play 
That video games are recession proof has been said so often that one cannot help but be 
skeptical, and even believe otherwise. Sales of video game software in terms of both monetary 
value and units sold has actually declined in the United States since peaking in 2008 
(Entertainment Software Association, 2011a). Complicating matters is the increasing cost of 
producing video game content due to the development of ever more complex consoles, which 
subsequently produce expectations of highly-detailed gameplay environments, fully orchestrated 
soundtracks, talented voice acting, and other associated modern expectations. These expectations 
have made the cost of developing competitive game content for the contemporary generation of 
home consoles skyrocket, so much so that production costs now commonly fall in the range of 
$10-40 million (Take-Two Interactive, 2009). Combined with development cycles that generally 
last 1-3 years, the industry has become increasingly "hit" driven—a source of anxiety for many 
of the mid-sized to smaller publishers within the industry (Take-Two Interactive, 2009; THQ, 
2011a). Game companies hope for that one big hit around which all of their other games can be 
tethered, a major game that stabilizes the corporation's profits. Though the precarious economic 
environment has not seemed to concern some of the larger publishers (See Activision-Blizzard, 
2010), even industry giants are not immune to the effects of fiscal anxiety: Electronic Arts, 
amongst the largest game publishers in the world, has generated a net loss of $454m (2008), 
$1,088m (2009), and $677m (2010), for the last three years respectively (Electronic Arts, 
2010a); in the case of Nintendo, merely confirming the development of an unconventional new 
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console—an announcement that had been in anticipation for two months prior (Reilly, 2011a)—
resulted in a 4.6% stock decline, despite relatively optimistic consumer and developer support 
for the system (Thorsen, 2011). Welcome to the precarious world of play. 
 The world of play, however, has long been tenuous. Extending back further than the 
current period of fiscal uncertainty that has shaken the industry as of late, a high degree of 
economic anxiety has saturated digital play from the beginnings of the industry (Kent, 2001; 
Stone, 1995/1998). For an industry established with the myth of a laissez-faire, anti-corporate, 
working atmosphere, aspects of exploitation, if not outright exploitation, in terms of euphemisms 
such as “crunch” (unpaid and/or mandatory overtime), has come to be a common feature of the 
workplace (Bonds, et al., 2004; Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; EA Spouse, 2004; Stross, 
2004). As the authors for the International Game Developers Association’s (IGDA) white paper, 
Quality of Life in the Game Industry, wrote: 
The workplace is a stressful one everywhere, more so in the game industry than in most others. 
Long hours are endemic. Most projects fail in the market place. High-profile studio closures are 
announced every month. And while the work we do is stimulating and rewarding in its own right, 
there is no reason not to make our working conditions a lot better than they are today. 
 
For young career-oriented people fresh out of school, our industry’s shortcomings, with its 
endemic long hours and 95% marketplace failure rate, may not always seem obvious or crippling. 
But after a few years, all-nighters fuelled by coffee and pizza lose much of their appeal. Most 
come to want significant relationships, a more balanced life, and sometimes, children as well. 
None of this is easy to achieve in the typical game company. (Bonds, et al., 2004, p. 5) 
 
In the seven-years since the white paper was written, reports continue to suggest that the quality 
of life for those laboring in the workshops of the video game industry continues to be precarious: 
in 2008, Electronic Arts began to increase the size of its workforce in countries with lax labor 
laws as it simultaneously eliminated jobs in countries with greater workplace protections (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009); in 2011, controversy stemming from the omission of over 100 
employees from the official credits of L.A. Noire (Rockstar Games, 2011) led to an exposé on the 
exploitive working conditions at the game’s developer, Team Bondi (FullAhead & Pollock, 
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2011; McMillen, 2011); and recently, Kaos Studies, the developer responsible for Homefront, 
was closed by its parent company, THQ, as part of a “strategic realignment” (Reilly, 2011b)—
even as THQ proudly reported that strong sales of the game contributed to company net sales of 
$802.3 million, and now has plans to turn it into a franchise (THQ, 2011a). It would seem that 
though work within the video game industry may be “stimulating and rewarding in its own 
right,” the forces of global capital are quickly evacuating any semblance of fun from actually 
working within it. As one gamer, bigdaddy7378, however, commented regarding the working 
conditions at Team Bondi, “good thing it [L.A. Noire] didnt suck” (comment in McMillen, 
2011). Insensitive as the comment may be, perhaps within the precarious economies of play, all 
one can hope is that Empire at least continues to grant us the dignity that, if nothing else, at least 
the products we purchase will continue to remain pleasurable. 
 Though the development of enjoyable gaming experiences continue to be had, 
unfortunately, the pressures and interests of global capital have made it so that often players are 
increasingly paying more for less pleasurable content. This is not to say that the games of today 
are less fun than the games of yesterday, as that is a complicated debate beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but rather that the risk management of global capital has dictated that it is more 
profitable to extend already existent intellectual properties, in terms of sequels, ports, and add-on 
content, than it is to develop original, experimental content (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; 
Snider, 2011).vii Like other industries (e.g., film), the production of sequels for a popular 
franchise is a given; however, other than the comic book industry, it is arguable that the video 
game industry relies on sequels much more so than perhaps any other major entertainment 
industry. Commenting on this widespread practice of regular sequel production, EA Spouse 
(2004), the individual who initiated the 2004 exposé on exploitation in the industry, wrote: 
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EA’s bright and shiny new corporate trademark is ‘Challenge Everything’ [since retired]. Where 
this applies is not exactly clear. Churning out one licensed football game after another doesn’t 
sound like challenging much of anything to me; it sounds like a money farm. 
If, however, franchises are the money farms of video games, then the products known as add-on 
content are the hotdogs of the video game industry: everyone knows the content is excess 
material leftover from creating the original product, but still we consume it. The practice of add-
on content, like hotdogs, extends the life of the previous product, as well as minimizes the cost of 
production as existing character models, music, and other gameplay elements can be reused.viii 
This gap between the exchange-value and use-value of the add-on content is frequently much 
greater than that which exists in the original content. For example, the standalone game of 
Castlevania: Lords of Shadow (Konami, 2010) cost $60 and contains about 15-20 hours of 
gameplay related content (Hatfield, 2010); it’s add-on content Reverie (Konami, 2011b) and 
Resurrection (Konami, 2011a) cost $10 each and contains about 2-hours of additional content 
combined (Bocanegra, 2011a, 2011b). Pleasure costs more and is exhausted more quickly as a 
result. 
Though the demise of the blatant serial offender, the Guitar Hero franchise, which 
produced a series of 10 sequels for the franchise from 2006 to 2010 (Activision, 2007b, 2008c, 
2008b, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2010b, 2010c; RedOctane & Activision, 2006, 2007), would seem 
to serve as a warning of the exhaustion of pleasure brought about at the hands of global capital, 
the move toward add-on and supplemental content suggests gaming is no longer about pleasure 
but a whole way of life.  
Toward a Whole Way of Life 
In the no longer brief history of the video game, historians of the medium have highlighted 
several periods as significant: the creation of Spacewar! (S. Russell, 1962), which activated the 
hacker foundation of the industry, and thus has subsequently come to be deemed the first video 
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game in spite of Higinbotham’s Tennis for Two (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Herz, 1997; 
Kent, 2001)ix; the founding of Atari and mass success of Pong (Atari, 1972) in 1972, marking 
the video game industry as a site of legitimate economic activity (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 
2009; Kent, 2001; Kline, et al., 2003); and, the industry crash of 1983, which allowed for the 
subsequent reconfiguration of the video game industry as a platform driven, techno-monopoly in 
1986 (Herz, 1997; Kent, 2001; Kinder, 1991/1993; Kline, et al., 2003). Important as these dates, 
and others, surely are to the current course of the industry, it is the year 1989 that deserves our 
attention. Not only did this date mark when the industry shifted from a Nintendo led monopoly, 
toward one anchored by a Nintendo-Sega led oligopoly, the year marks the moment when video 
games transitioned from that of a place-based entertainment system (i.e., the arcade or home) 
toward that of a global entertainment supersystem—and thus, the industry took its first baby 
steps towards becoming a whole way of life.x 
 From the release of the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) in 1986 up to the 
Christmas of 1989, Nintendo had little reason to worry about its status as the most coveted toy 
maker within the United States. The NES had been amongst the most desired, if not most 
desired, toy for the past three holiday seasons (Feuer, 1988; Karp, 1989; Reuters, 1989; 
Rosenberg, 1987; Tibbits, 1989). New media technologies have often resonated as a source of 
cultural anxiety, especially when placed in relation to children; it is no surprise, then, that the 
widespread popularity of the NES would quickly become a lightning rod for social criticism 
(Adler, Rogers, Brailsford, Gordon, & Quade, 1989; D. Williams, 2003). Concern about the 
moral and physical effects of video game play meant that, in 1989, Nintendo was in a precarious 
situation, as concerned parents were believed to be looking for alternative forms of children’s 
entertainment (Reuters, 1989)—and that Nintendo was a Japanese company, at a time of 
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heightened anti-Japanese sentiment, only added to this cultural, political, and economic anxiety 
(Ono, 2009a; Sheff, 1993/1999). As such, the immense popularity with children of the Teenage 
Mutant Ninja Turtles (TMNT) franchise, with its Playmate Toys’ produced action figures, meant 
that for the first time, Nintendo faced a serious challenge in its ability to capture the support of 
not only parents and politicians, but the imaginations of children (Kinder, 1991/1993).xi  
The challenge was one of a home entertainment system (the NES) confronting the 
cultural might of this diffuse entertainment supersystem (the TNMT). The difference between an 
entertainment system and an entertainment supersystem has more to do with the ability for a 
political economic network to transcend its existent cultural space than it necessarily does with 
its political economic size—though the two are related (Kinder, 1991/1993). Marsha Kinder 
(1991/1993) defines a supersystem as “a network of intertextuality constructed around a figure or 
group of figures from pop culture who are either fictional […] or ‘real’” (p. 122). Prior to 1989, 
Nintendo, and video games more generally, lacked this intertextual transcendence and remained 
confined to their sites of consumption, arcades and living rooms. This is not to suggest that 
earlier attempts to delink video game culture from video game technology had not been 
undertaken but rather that earlier attempts had been undercut by the industry crash of 1983. 
Moreover, these earlier attempts merely sought to share in the profits of, and not necessarily the 
form or content of, video game consumption. In other words, Tron (Lisberger, 1982) and Chuck 
E. Cheese’s (established by Atari founder, Nolan Bushnell) have as much to do with video game 
practices as William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) does with the internet; sure, Tron, Chuck E. 
Cheese’s, and Neuromancer, have each captured the imagination of both consumers, producers, 
and cultural critics alike, for their respective mediums; however, none constitute a whole way of 
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life, but rather offer commentary upon it. For the video game, in 1989, this absence existed no 
more. 
 The foundations for a coming video game cultural revolution were established with the 
delinking of video game culture from video game technology with the establishment of 
Nintendo’s entertainment supersystem in 1989 (Kinder, 1991/1993). Crystalizing a process that 
had begun in 1988, with the establishment of the magazine Nintendo Power and the licensing of 
Nintendo characters for products such as lunch boxes (Sheff, 1993/1999), 1989 saw the 
development of the television shows The Super Mario Bros. Super Show! (Riba, 1989), Captain 
N: The Game Master (Maliani, 1989-1991), and Todd Holland’s film, The Wizard (1989). 
Though the quality of these programs were lacking and often amateurish in design, and poorly 
received by critics and general audiences alike, the productions were never meant to be anything 
more than glorified commercials for Nintendo products (Kinder, 1991/1993; Sheff, 1993/1999). 
Advertising for The Wizard, for instance, featured a huge number of Nintendo product 
placements, most notably the first video images of the heavily anticipated game, Super Mario 
Bros. 3. (Kinder, 1991/1993; Sheff, 1993/1999) (See Figure 1.4); as David Sheff (1993/1999) 
noted, “The Wizard was less a piece of art than a one-hundred-minute advertisement for 
Nintendo that millions of families paid to see (it grossed $14 million)” (p. 4). More than mere 
commercials, however, this multimedia supersystem, spread across licensed toys, magazines, 
television, film, and, yes, video games, extended the world of video game play beyond the 
 confines of the video game system. Hence, in 1989, we first witnessed the production of a 
subject known as a “Nintendo Kid” (Adler, et al., 1989).  
The construction of the subject known as the “Nintendo Kid” in 1989 meant that the 
video game form had become an anchor for the desires and anxieties of a whole generation of 
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Figure 1.4. A full-page advertisement for The Wizard in the November/December issue 
of Nintendo Power (1989). 
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game playing participants, mostly children. At the height of Nintendo’s monopoly on the video 
game market, it was estimated that one out of every four to five homes in the United States had 
an NES (Karp, 1989; Kinder, 1991/1993; Tibbits, 1989). Over the course of the next two-
decades, though the dominance of Nintendo would falter due to competitors entering the 
videogame marketplace, the video game industry would grow in size from an estimated $3.4b in 
1989 (Tibbits, 1989) to $25.1b in 2010, with video games played by 72% of U.S. households 
(Entertainment Software Association, 2011a). The breadth and depth of the video game, 
however, cannot be understood solely in political economic terms, as the cultural formation has 
long since come to extend beyond the technology itself. With the “Nintendo Kid” having long 
since become an adult, the children of the Nintendo generation are now in their mid-twenties to 
thirties, with the average age of the present-day game player being thirty-seven years old 
(Entertainment Software Association, 2011a). This maturation of the industry and its consumer, 
mostly in terms of economics and age, respectively, if not always ethically, has had an effect on 
an array of various cultural forms: from the design and content of various films, such the 
critically acclaimed Avatar (Cameron, 2009) and the equally panned Sucker Punch (Snyder, 
2011); to the increasingly popular field of video game music and musicians, such as the indie 
rock sound of The Megas (See Get Equipped, 2008) and the classical sound of Video Games 
Live (See Newman, Tallarico, & Wall, 2010); to the conceptualization of new pedagogies (Gee, 
2001; S. Jones, 2006; Stuart, 2010); and more. With this maturation, however, has also come an 
erasure of whatever innocence may have surrounded the original subject known as the “Nintendo 
Kid.” Beyond the economic gravity of an entertainment supersystem (e.g., Nintendo Kid or Sega 
Fanboy), the subsumption of gaming culture as an apparatus of Empire, as brought about by the 
political economic involvement of major transnational entities, such as Microsoft, Sony, and the 
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United States military, has made it so that while we may not all be “hardcore” gamers, we do all 
live in an increasingly “hardcore” world. This is the political economic face of cultural 
convergence; beyond the pleasures of a converging cultural text (Jenkins, 2006), one must 
account for the legitimate anxieties and desires that are being created—that is, converging— 
through the material and ideological reconfigurations of an increasingly imperial world. 
Subjects of Empire 
The events detailed in the prior section, were important, and continue to be important insofar as 
the production of the “Nintendo Kid” made it possible for the video game to become an ordinary 
aspect of one’s life. From then on, for other video game companies to successfully compete, so 
too would the content they offered have to hold out the promise of constituting a whole way of 
life—that is, the promise of a life worth living. This is why, even after Nintendo had to forgo its 
monopoly privileges and relax its licensing agreements due to a series of antitrust investigations 
in 1990 (Kent, 2001), a video game oligopoly did not truly emerge until 1991, when Sega made a 
breakthrough with the development of Sonic the Hedgehog (1991b) (Kline, et al., 2003). Though 
the creation of the blue hedgehog with attitude had surprising brand appeal with adolescent 
males, and helped to solidify its marketing campaign of “Genesis Does What Nintendon’t,” 
Sega’s political economic strategy remained markedly similar to Nintendo’s insofar as the desire 
was to construct an entertainment supersystem capable of capturing a larger share of the $3b 
video game industry (Cray, 1990). In essence, Sega sought to produce the “Fanboys” necessary 
to function as a viable challenger to Nintendo’s industry dominance. Powerful as both companies 
may have been, however, neither had the political economic means necessary to create the 
“hardcore” subject necessary for contemporary global capital. As entertainment supersystems, 
Nintendo and Sega could only activate their respective audiences to consume a narrow 
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commodity across a broad spectrum of entertainment media and commodities—e.g., Mario 
games, Mario cartoons, Mario lunch boxes, et cetera—but could not activate that selfsame 
subject to reshape the world according to the logic of the video game. In other words, as 
entertainment supersystems, Nintendo and Sega could create worlds for gamers (but not non-
gamers) to live within. Sega’s frantic campaign to set itself apart from Nintendo—producing 
thirty-five commercials over a period of four months (Kline, et al., 2003)—did, however, 
accelerate a process of imperial subsumption that had been with gaming from its beginnings as a 
military-funded—if not necessarily endorsed—technology.xii And if Sega and Nintendo could 
not create the hardcore subjects necessary for contemporary Empire, other powerful interests 
could and would. 
 Indeed, the construction of a “hardcore” world, here defined as apprehending and 
reconstructing the world according to the logic of digital play, and “hardcore” subject, here 
defined as that subject capable of desiring and bringing about this hardcore world, emerged 
nearly simultaneously with the development of the video game. Unlike Higinbotham’s Tennis for 
Two (1958), which was accepted due to its being part of an open house installation, and Steve 
Russell’s Spacewar! (1962), which was encouraged as part of a non-military computing 
subculture, Ralph Baer, inventor of the first home video game console during the late-1960s, had 
to explicitly justify his device according to the framework of military interests (Halter, 2006). 
Though he would later state that these justifications were mere window dressing meant to allow 
for him to continue working on “TV Games,” the military took notice, and in the late 1970s, 
Baer would begin to develop video game weapon-training systems for the military (Halter, 2006, 
p. 85). Moreover, as Allucquère Rosanne Stone (1995/1998) observes, the military-industrial 
complex has always taken notice: the earliest research in the field of virtual technologies were 
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undertaken for explicitly military purposes. For example, the Rand Corporation, a non-
governmental military think tank, has long been using “politico-military games […] as an 
educational tool for understanding possible outcomes in various global situations,” and then 
promoting these simulated outcomes as objective possibilities of future political developments 
(Halter, 2006, p. 92). Though the military took interest in the establishment of a hardcore world, 
through the deployment of digital play as a warfare simulation technology, however, the active 
construction of a hardcore subject, one who found living in a hardcore world pleasurable, would 
be undertaken primarily via another branch of Empire, global capital.  
Sony’s inadvertent entry into the video game industry in 1995 (Kent, 2001), initiated the 
beginnings of a massive political economic convergence of various media technologies (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). The surprising success of Sony’s PlayStation (PS), emboldened 
the company to reconfigure the gaming machine as a multimedia platform; the PlayStation 2 
(PS2) was marketed and enthusiastically received as a home entertainment system capable of 
playing both video games and movies (DVDs), thereby functioning as a gateway entertainment 
technology for many households (DVD Report, 2000; Guy, 2000; Hancock, 2000; Inside 
Multimedia, 1999). Indeed, consumer demand for the PS2 was believed to be so great that trade 
magazines anticipated that the U.S. DVD-player install base would grow significantly (DVD 
Report, 2000; Inside Multimedia, 1999). This meant that whether playing a video game or 
watching a DVD, the comfortable PS2 startup screen—of blue and white cubes floating in space, 
accompanied by a soft, synthesized futuristic sound and an image of “Sony Computer 
Entertainment”—would become a familiar sight to millions of households. Realizing that Sony’s 
game console could function as not just a powerful branding device, but also a mechanism by 
which to influence the production and consumption of other commodities and technologies, 
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Microsoft entered the industry shortly thereafter, in Fall 2001 (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 
2009). The entrance of these two transnational giants moved video gaming beyond that of the 
entertainment supersystems of Nintendo and Sega toward that of an imperial apparatus; the 
objective of which was to create the hardcore subjectivities necessary to bring about the realities 
of a hardcore world.  
Living in a Hardcore World 
The transformation of the video game industry as an apparatus of Empire is markedly different 
from its days as an entertainment supersystem. The video game has come a long way from the 
days of speculating whether it would be the most popular Christmas toy. Today, the question is 
how will Sony’s decision to remove Linux support from the PlayStation 3 (PS3) impact the 
United States’ military—in 2009, the U.S. Air Force began purchasing and transforming PS3s 
into powerful, cost-effective super computers (Betts, 2009; Federal News Service, 2010; 
McElroy, 2010). Digital play is no longer about digital play; rather, the video game has come to 
be a powerful model upon which to apprehend and reconfigure reality. The massive political 
economic mobilization of gamers now drives the adoption and development of technological 
standards, from Blu-ray and high-definition television to broadband internet and the development 
of ever more advanced microprocessors. The demand for these electronic devices, especially 
video games, has activated a vast global political economic network: linking together the 
pleasure of digital play with the maquiladoras and other global sweatshops that produce video 
game hardware along with the coltan mines of the war-torn and disease ravished Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009), not to mention the frequently 
exploitive working conditions of software production itself (as mentioned earlier in this chapter). 
Entangled within this global economic apparatus is the video game content itself; which, as the 
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Homefront example touched upon in the beginning illustrates, is increasingly invested in the 
production and consumption of crisis as well. Thus, having emerged during a time of crisis, the 
Cold War, the video game has gone on to become crisis manifest, in terms of both its production 
and consumption, as well as content itself.  
                                                 
Notes: 
 
vi This notion of interactivity is something that has been ascribed to our understanding of new media technologies in 
general, from Web 2.0 applications (e.g., wikis, blogs) to mp3 devices (as in creating our own playlists). 
vii The terms sequels, ports, and add-on content refers to three different approaches to extending the value of 
intellectual property within the video game industry. The concept of sequels is well-known through the practice of 
other entertainment industries. Ports and add-on content, however, is a relatively unique form of content production 
for the video game industry. Porting refers to translating the video game code for one platform (e.g., Castlevania: 
Lords of Shadow for the PS3) so that it can be understood and played on by another machine (e.g., Castlevania: 
Lords of Shadow for the Xbox 360). Add-on content refers to the practice of unlocking and/or releasing additional 
game content to an already existing game at some later date.  
viii As Lev Manovich (2001) notes, this modularity of new media artifacts, in terms of being able to cut-and-paste 
previously used objects and/or insert new content without disrupting destroying the original, as a key difference 
between old and new media. I’d like to suggest, on this note, that this increasingly modular consumption of video 
game content, in terms of sequels, add-ons, and downloadable content, etc., suggests an altogether different 
economy of scale is in operation in regards to new media technologies—particular video games—and, hence, ought 
to be taken into consideration when analyzing processes of new media production and consumption; this point will 
be taken up throughout this dissertation. 
ix That Steve Russell’s game, Spacewar, would come to play a more significant role in the mythos of the video game 
industry has as much to do with political economic desires as it does with gendered notions of technology and 
identity. Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter (2009) touch upon this gendered resonance when they write that 
Spacewar “was such an integral expression of the culture of computer-science ‘freaks’” (p. 8). Due to the gendered 
dynamics of the “’second shift’ of unwaged work [….] Women had less free time at home for hacking,” and thus 
faced structural barriers to joining these hacker communities (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). The hacker 
community, and by extension video game community, has come to be a site of masculine desire (Dyer-Witheford & 
de Peuter, 2009; Lalley, 2005). 
x Since the hardware crash of 1977, console manufacturers have long sought to exercise monopolistic power—often, 
though not always, successfully. For instance, in 1980, Atari unsuccessfully took the first third-party game 
developer, Activision, to court as a means of protecting its financial interests, which was built upon a razor and 
blades business model (Kent, 2001). After the software crash of 1983, Nintendo would implement a “lock-and-key” 
device as a means of technologically enforcing its licensing system (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009, p. 72). 
Though start-ups, such as Sega, could successfully compete in the market—though Sega is a special case in that it 
had years of arcade manufacturing experience—the industry is littered with a plethora of market failures, such as the 
CDi (1991), 3DO (1993), Atari Jaguar (1993) and Sega Dreamcast (1998), to name a few. Today, monopolistic 
power is exercised through the procurement of third-party software exclusive licensing deals and/or outright 
acquisition of third-party developers so as to ensure that some gameplay experiences, in terms of content, are only 
possible via certain consoles—such as the Halo series for Microsoft platforms (Microsoft, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2009, 
2010), the Metroid Prime series for Nintendo Platforms (Nintendo, 2002, 2004, 2007), and the Uncharted series for 
Sony Platforms (Sony Computer Entertainment, 2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). A comparative media experience would 
be if one were only able to watch Modern Family, as a third-party exclusive, on Sony television sets, whereas 
American Idol, as a multiplatform release, could be watched on any television set. In essence, though alternative 
models can and do exist to the dominant video game industry model, the monopolistic power of the industry makes 
it difficult for outside success to be achieved.  
xi Though the extent of the actual threat represented by the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles franchise and Nintendo’s 
precarious longevity may have been overstated, and seem laughable in retrospect, analysts from prominent financial 
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service companies, such as Standard & Poor’s and Bear Stearns, believed that the video game industry was set for a 
decline (Reuters, 1989; Tibbits, 1989). Indeed some felt as though Nintendo’s continued dominance was a result of 
illegal business practices that allowed it to monopolize the market (Christensen, 1989; Welch, 1989; Vranizan, 
1989).  
xii Evidence of the accelerated subsumption of video games by Empire, can be witnessed in the “Genesis does what 
Nintendon’t” campaign, which granted significant screen time to the following games: James “Buster” Douglas 
Knockout Boxing (Taito, 1988/1990), Joe Montana Football (Sega, 1991), Michael Jackson Moonwalker (Sega, 
1991), and Pat Riley Basketball (Sega, 1991). The prominent display of these, particularly at the time, national and 
international celebrities documents an increased interest in the video game as a lucrative site for global capital. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
HARDCORE SUBJECTS / HARDCORE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
The lifecycle of a video game console is an important referent when considering the formation of 
what we can call a particular regime of truth surrounding digital play. This is because the birth of 
a given console marks a contestation—and continuation—of prior modes of play: contestation, 
because, were nothing new offered, than why would anyone invest in this new mode of play (as 
opposed to continue with the old regime); continuation, because, in order to remain legible as a 
site of digital play, certain conventions must be recognized (though the conventions selected are 
sure to change over time, and thus defy any ahistorical essence of video games). By means of 
example, for instance, the Magnavox Odyssey (1972), which is credited with having initiated the 
first-generation of home video games, established several conventions that are still in use 
today—most notably the reliance upon the television for visual output and use of physical 
controllers for player input. In contrast, the Atari 2600 (1977), which was the dominant console 
of the second-generation of home video games, differentiated itself from prior-generation 
consoles by utilizing removable cartridges to store game information (as opposed to built-in 
circuitry or game-modifying jumper cards), but still made use of first-generation conventions 
such as the television and physical controllers, amongst other things. And today, with the 
widespread adoption of the Nintendo Wii (2006) and introduction of Sony’s Playstation Move 
(2010) and Microsoft’s Xbox 360 Kinect (2010), this seventh-generation of video game consoles 
marks a move away from conventional physical controllers and towards motion controllers 
whether physically held (e.g., Wii and Move) or motion-captured (e.g., Kinect); thus illustrating 
the point that we should not interpret a specific video game convention as an ahistorical truth, 
but rather as the particular articulations of a given regime of truth regarding digital play. To be 
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clear, then, by regime of truth regarding digital play, I mean to adopt Foucault’s (1978-
1979/2008) contention that a regime of truth is a “particular type of discourse and a set of 
practices” that can bind together a particular set of practices as constituting an “intelligible 
connection and […] can legislate on these practices in terms of true and false” (p. 18). A video 
game console, then, is the material manifestation of and claim upon what constitutes a legitimate 
set of gaming practices. 
As I write, we find ourselves bearing witness to the rise and fall of a new regime of truth 
regarding gaming. This is evidenced by Nintendo lowering its economic outlook by 80% on July 
28, 2011 to a level last seen in 1986 (Yasu & Fujimura, 2011). And recently, sales for the video 
game industry as a whole fell 21% in December 2011 when compared to December 2010, from 
$5.07b (December 2010) to $3.99b (December 2011) (Savitz, 2012), and saw even further drop 
off in January 2012, down 40% from $1.14m (January 2011) to $775m (January 2012) (Mazel, 
2012). With the political economic foundation of this generation of digital play on shaky ground, 
speculation has arisen regarding the political economic and technological configuration of the 
next generation of video gaming (M. Dyer, 2011; George, 2012; IGN Staff, 2012b; Lowe, Sallee, 
Nelson, Davis, & DeVries, 2011; Morphy, 2011). Missing from this conversation, however, is 
that of game studies scholarship. This matters for what has manifest as a political economic 
struggle (in terms of the financial decline of this generation of home consoles) points to the 
inability for the current generation of video games to continue to operate as a legitimate regime 
of truth regarding digital play. In other words, though still highly effective in some regards, the 
current generation of consoles and the software developed for them is no longer able to 
adequately manage the circuits of production and consumption that operate within contemporary 
digital play; hence, the need for a new generation of video game consoles, that is, the 
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establishment of a new regime of truth. And one would imagine that game studies scholarship 
would be in a unique position to speak to—and potentially intervene upon—this moment. 
 This has not been the case, however; despite the complex circuits of production and 
consumption involved in gaming practices, thereby suggesting that contemporary gaming is 
about more than play—in the narrow sense of the word—much of game studies scholarship has 
positioned the end-user/producer experience of the console as the privileged site of gaming itself, 
thus remaining ignorant of the biopolitics of play. That is, limiting the analysis of video games to 
the experience of the programmer and/or player is to take for granted both the political economic 
reorganization of various populations according to the circuits of consumption and production of 
a global video game knowledge economy and the cultural reconfiguration of specific populations 
according to the political anxieties and desires associated with contemporary capital. Because 
much of game studies scholarship has primarily concerned itself with whether gaming can best 
be understood according to literary theory or the formal structures of play (Frasca, 2003; 
Galloway, 2006; Jenkins, 2003; Juul, 2001; Murray, 1997), the field has found itself limited in its 
ability to understand how digital play operates as a site of global subject formation: 
reconfiguring third- and first-world subjects according to the political economic desires and 
anxieties of a global knowledge economy and positioning those selfsame subjects within a global 
hierarchy of the right to life and death. To be clear, I do believe that game studies has been 
productive and important, and consider myself to be indebted to many of the various scholars 
working within this domain; and yet, I find the field’s premature foreclosure of the terrain of 
game studies primarily around the question of narratology (i.e., literary theory) or ludology (i.e., 
play) to have hindered game studies’ ability to speak beyond the limited domain of the end-
user/producer experience. So though productive tensions have been produced within game 
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studies scholarship, with ludologist, for instance, pointing to the limits of textual criticism within 
a medium in which ideology is embedded within the form (e.g., algorithm) as well as the content 
(Crogan, 2003; Galloway, 2006; Manovich, 2001), the intervention proposed often remains the 
same: more complex modes of representation and improved media literacy (Cassell & Jenkins, 
1999; Galloway, 2006). 
 As important as media literacy and issues of representation are and continue to be, 
however, the field of game studies has largely ignored the complex whole of digital play that 
works to reproduce and extend itself regardless of content; or rather, just as ideology is 
embedded within the algorithmic logic of play—so that the fetish of tyranny, for instance, would 
exist in “god” games whether the narrative content was progressive or conservative (Galloway, 
2006)—so too is ideology embedded within the complex circuit of production and consumption 
itself. And, to the extent that much of game studies scholarship ignores the complex circuits of 
production and consumption involved in the practice of digital play, then so too do we remain 
limited in our ability to intervene upon this particular regime of a truth—a regime of truth that I 
argue, throughout this dissertation, is working in conjunction with global capital to reconfigure 
the world along the lines of Empire. For though it matters what the content of a given game is, it 
also matters: if the content of the game is produced upon the backs of exploited workers; if the 
experience of play (as conventionally conceived) blurs the lines between military and consumer 
technologies; and, if the practice of play accelerates global consumption; amongst other 
concerns. Hence, I argue, if we wish to disrupt the operation of contemporary Empire, for those 
operating within game studies, we must be sure to situate our analysis within the totality that is 
digital play—even if our intervention remains elsewhere (e.g., narrative or ludology).  
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Otherwise, we risk misinterpreting the overlapping and sometimes contradictory layers of 
anxiety and desire operating with the complex whole that is digital play. 
 What I aim to do in this chapter—and dissertation more generally—is to expand our 
conception of digital play beyond that of mere end-user/producer and rather to position the 
experience as a historically and geographically situated practice. Though some have already 
begun the work of understanding digital play as an ongoing, developing historical and 
transnational phenomenon (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kerr, 2006; Kline, et al., 2003), 
more frequently this analysis has been provided so as to position certain times and spaces as 
being the prehistory of contemporary video games (See: Galloway, 2006; Halter, 2006; Herz, 
1997; Kent, 2001), as opposed to documenting these permutations as important genealogies of 
digital play. Moreover, even the pioneering work of those such as Ian Bogost, Nick Dyer-
Witheford, Aphra Kerr, Stephen Kline, Nick Montfort, and Greig de Peuter have had difficulty 
speaking about digital play as a practice that extends beyond an explicit connection with the 
gaming machine itself (See: Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kerr, 2006; Kline, et al., 2003; 
Montfort & Bogost, 2009). So even though these aforementioned scholars have done fantastic 
work illustrating the importance of conceiving of political economy and technology studies as an 
essential—and often understudied—element of video games, there has been an aversion towards 
conducting a totalizing analysis of digital play in the scope of, for example, Paul Virilio’s 
(1984/2009) War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception or Michel Foucault’s (1975/1995) 
Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. That is, there has been aversion within game 
studies to an analysis of video games that attempts to show how we cannot understand our 
contemporary moment unless we remain cognizant of how digital play has come to operate as an 
important site of global anxiety and desire (Crogan, 2011)—much as the prison operated as an 
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important site for the production of modern modes of governance (Foucault, 1975/1995) and 
cinema technologies dramatically transformed military science (Virilio, 1984/2009).xiii 
 The task, then, is to begin with the premise that the thing we call gaming does not exist. 
Such a premise is needed, for in taking the essence of gaming for granted—that is, in mistaking 
the site of end-user production and/or consumption as being coterminous with the essence of 
play itself—game studies has left uninterrogated how digital play has been structured in its 
totality to operate as an important site wherein which global capital is working to reconfigure the 
world along the lines of Empire. Hence, the supposition that gaming does not exist can offer a 
fruitful means for moving the discussion of this complex phenomenon beyond the stumbling 
block that is the thing in itself (e.g., the conventional understanding of digital play); for as 
Michel Foucault (1978-1979/2008) has argued, “If we suppose that it does not exist, then what 
can history make of these different events and practices which are apparently organized around 
something that is supposed to be madness [disease, delinquency, sexuality, or for our purposes, 
gaming]?” (p. 3). To answer this question, our analysis, thus, must shift away from the thing 
itself and instead towards those set of practices which exist to suggest that “gaming,” “video 
games,” “digital play,” or whatever other privileged term we might use, does indeed exist. That 
is: (1) what practices have come into existence so as to ensure that contemporary digital play is 
possible? And, (2) what practices have emerged which depend upon a particular configuration of 
digital play for its existence? Answering these questions is the key to exposing the regime of 
truth which has set itself up surrounding the question of digital play; for shifts in definitions 
regarding the proper domain of gaming work to reconfigure the lived experiences of those who 
not only play games but those who do not play as well. This is because gaming is no longer, if it 
ever was, about the producer and consumer existing within a closed system of play, but rather 
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that of a complex network of production and consumption wherein the political economic and 
cultural configuration—that is ontological configuration—of various populations are, and have 
been, reconfigured so as to respond to the anxieties and desires of the regime of truth that we call 
digital play—and by extension, its underwriting agency, contemporary Empire. 
To undertake this attempt at grasping the totality of contemporary digital play, for the 
sake of understanding its historical relation to modern global politics, the framework I am 
proposing, of which I believe is capable of being up to the task, is that of a fusion of Foucault’s 
(1978-1979/2008) notion of regimes of truth and Heidegger’s (1954/1977a) concept of 
enframing. Though these two approaches have much in common, in that both are concerned with 
how the real comes into existence (what Heidegger refers to as Aletheia and Foucault as 
veridiction), the differences between them make holding these two frameworks in tension 
productive: Foucault’s notion of regimes of truth contains an element of fluidity lacking in 
Heidegger’s more categorically rigorous concept of enframing. In other words, I will be relying 
on Heidegger’s categorical rigor so as to orient Foucault’s ability to make sense of seemingly 
contradictory practices (without resorting to dialectical, true or false, reasoning). In this regard, 
Heidegger ensures that I do not forget my first objective (grasping the totality of gaming) 
whereas Foucault compels me to remember the second (understanding the contradictions of 
gaming). Though this theoretical blend, I hope to produce a methodology capable of: (1) 
grasping a totality of digital play that does not define gaming a priori; and, (2) making sense of 
the contradictions that have emerged within contemporary game studies without being forced to 
resort to an unproductive either/or, non-contradictory stance. For the challenge in unmasking any 
regime of truth is not to begin with a universal concept and then put “it through the grinder of 
history,” but rather to ask what are we to “make of these different events and practices which are 
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apparently organized around something that is” supposed to exist (Foucault, 1978-1979/2008, p. 
3). To this end, this chapter is structured as follows: (1) I conceive of digital play as operating 
across an array of practices and modes of occasioning; (2) I suggest that the overriding logic of 
digital play is that of the production of what I call hardcore subjectivities (i.e., lovers of digital 
play); and, (3) I argue that the political economic and cultural logic of digital play is 
overdetermined (though not absolutely irresistible) by virtue of the multiple channels through 
which it operates.  
Grasping the Totality of That Which Does Not Exist 
What the term “gaming” references is not a thing, but an ongoing set of contested practices 
organized around the production of a particular regime of truth called gaming. That is, the proper 
referent for the thing we call gaming is not that of a particular act (e.g., playing a game), specific 
technology (e.g., a console), or even an economic field (e.g., the video game industry), but rather 
a particular constellation of practices and discourses that function together to uphold a particular 
configuration of global—but not universal—subject formation. Hence, the lifecycle of a video 
game generation is an important referent point for this analysis because the introduction of a new 
video game console operates not as another step in the teleology of digital play—from prehistory 
to the present and future beyond—but rather functions as an intervention upon the existent 
formation of the totality of digital play. In other words, the substructure of the video game 
console is not that of mere technology but rather that of a particular political economic and 
cultural assemblage. The significance of the PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360, for instance, is not that 
they ushered forth a new generation of high-definition gaming, thereby making photorealistic 
video game graphics possible, but rather that to make it so that high-definition gaming itself was 
even possible and desirable, a whole assemblage of political economic and cultural practices had 
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to come into existence that had not hitherto existed; for instance: photorealism—as opposed to 
cel-shaded, hand-drawn, or other aesthetic styles—had to be positioned as offering the most 
compelling mode of visual representation, which has the effect of linking realism to a particular 
threshold of visual fidelity; and, a political economic network of high-definition production and 
consumption—in terms of television sets, Blu-ray disks, and more—had to be established so as 
to keep the system flowing smoothly; et cetera. It is this ontological gravity of technology, its 
ability to reconfigure political economic and cultural systems, that Heidegger (1954/1977a) is 
referencing when he warns that we do not understand technology if our primary means of 
conceptualization remains bound to that of an apparatus. And, I argue, we do not understand 
video games if we remain ignorant of this larger political economic and cultural gravity that 
extends beyond the domain of digital play as conventionally understood. 
 This criticism aside, however; though I mean to shift the attention of game studies away 
from the stumbling block that is gaming itself—insofar as the term obscures the totality of the 
phenomenon it proposes to analyze—this does not mean that the field has failed to produce 
provocative insights. Indeed, contemporary game studies has produced substantial work within 
the domain of five overlapping practices (though most scholars privilege one area or another): 
reception/operation, interface, form/function, code, and/or platform studies (Montfort & Bogost, 
2009). These various domains will be discussed in what follows, but it is sufficient for now to 
point out that though Montfort and Bogost (2009) note that these five practices of digital play are 
always situated in culture and context, this sixth domain is marked as external to the proper 
analysis of digital play. To the extent that Montfort and Bogost (2009) are representative of 
much of game studies scholarship, this marks an inability for the field to conceive of digital play 
as a set of political economic and cultural practices that extend beyond the site of the video game 
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as conventionally conceived. That is, culture is not the context of digital play, but rather digital 
play comes into existence only through political economic and cultural circuits of production and 
consumption. This is not a matter of mere rhetoric (as if rhetoric were ever merely rhetoric), but 
rather in conceiving of the video game as standing apart from culture, the field of game studies 
reproduces the inadequate binary of “technological determinism” and “symptomatic technology” 
that Raymond Williams (1974/2005) had critiqued so long ago (p. 4-8). In either case, as 
Raymond Williams (1974/2005) argued, each perspective obscures the cultural politics invested 
in the production of technology, so that one is left with only two choices regarding the seemingly 
inevitable progression of technological development: either embrace it (Jenkins, 2006; 
McGonigal, 2011) or approach cautiously (Hess, 2007; Postman, 1985/2005).xiv From both 
perspectives, then, technological development is defined as an inevitable, linear trajectory, 
thereby both limiting the possibilities for intervention and failing to understand how this 
particular technological configuration was activated in itself (R. Williams, 1974/2005). 
 Hence, for the sake of distilling into manageable units of analysis the various practices 
upon which contemporary digital play comes into existences, I make use of Heidegger’s 
(1954/1977a, 1950/1977) conception of technology as being spread amongst a constellation of 
five modes of deployment, what he calls occasioning—that is, site of operation/emergence. 
These fives modes of occasioning are: the material, the form, the purpose, the producer, and the 
technological real (Heidegger, 1954/1977a, pp. 6, 11-12). Of these, Heidegger (1954/1977a) 
places most emphasis on the fifth element, the technological real, as it represents the context 
which makes the four other forms possible. The real is that which has been granted the 
legitimacy of the possible (Boellstorff, 2008; Foucault, 1978-1979/2008); and hence, all other 
modes of occasioning are granted legitimacy in correspondence to their relation to that which 
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already exists (Foucault, 1978-1979/2008). That said, the four other elements of occasioning 
possess particular political power as the possibility exists for their redeployment under the 
regime of the imaginary—the necessary means for the creation of an ontological otherwise 
(Boellstorff, 2008; Foucault, 1978-1979/2008). What these analytical concepts of “occasioning” 
offer, then, is a productive means of separating the various discourses and practices associated 
with a given regime of truth into manageable parts—and thus, serve as a reminder to the critic of 
the totality that is that selfsame regime of truth. In other words, to extend Galloway’s (2006) 
ludic critique of narratology—that ideology reproduces itself at the level of the algorithm, so that 
narratology without ludology is incomplete—so too could we argue that ideology reproduces 
itself at every point within the system, in terms of: the materials used to manufacture video game 
consoles and software; the form of gameplay conventions and purpose of stories told; the raced, 
classed, gendered, and national composition of the producers (and consumers) of digital play; 
and, the reliance upon already existent circuits of production and consumption of digital play so 
as to remain legible—for countergaming is still gaming. Hence, we could argue that the 
countergaming movement so eagerly sought after by Galloway (2006) and others, for instance, 
would reproduce the same political economic and cultural structures as the dominant video game 
industry—with some variation of course—if it remains ignorant of the other significant modes of 
occasioning involved in the production and consumption of digital play, that is: what is the 
material threshold for contemporary forms of digital play (i.e., the material); what is the 
ideological effect/desire that is embedded within the narrative and algorithmic code of the video 
game (i.e., form); who serves as the producer and consumer, and why (i.e., producer and purpose 
of play); and what is the historical and geopolitical moment that gives meaning to this particular 
configuration of digital play as a site of anxiety and desire (i.e., the technological real). These are 
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the questions one must remember to ask if one is interested in grasping the totality of the regime 
of truth we call digital play.xv Hence, the following paragraphs will: (1) discuss in greater detail 
all five modes of occasioning as offering useful analytics for understanding and intervening upon 
the regime of truth that is contemporary gaming; and (2), simultaneously redeploy the existing 
game studies scholarship along the lines of this proposed framework. 
The Material of Play 
The material components of a particular technology are perhaps the most inert and seemingly 
least capable of possessing an affect upon the upholding of a particular regime of digital play. It 
is no surprise then that unit of analysis has remained relatively neglected by game studies 
scholarship (for an exception, see: Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kline, et al., 2003). 
Indeed, the most comprehensive work currently to be found on the history of the material form 
of gaming can typically be found not in academic game studies scholarship, but that of popular 
press, amateur game historians, such as that of David Sheff (1993/1999), J.C. Herz (1997), and 
Steven Kent (2001). The reasoning for this dearth of academic attention to the materiality of play 
may be explained in that, outside of political economists such as Klein, Dyer-Witheford, and de 
Peuter (2003), the materiality of play makes for good institutional and interpersonal drama, but 
seems to speak little to the actual experience of game production and consumption, in terms of 
content, code, or interface. Other than the amusement of knowing that Atari dumped millions of 
Pac-Man (Atari, 1982) and other cartridges in a New Mexico landfill or that an alleged 
worldwide microprocessor shortage caused significant friction between Nintendo and it’s non-
Japanese publishers (Herz, 1997; Kent, 2001; Sheff, 1993/1999), what do such histories have to 
teach us about game production and consumption, other than that the video game industry is as 
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cutthroat and competitive as any other capitalist enterprise? An important insight into the totality 
that is gaming, I argue. 
 The materials needed to manufacture a given technology, let alone video games, are not 
distributed nor consumed and disposed of evenly or even properly across the surface and depths 
of the earth. To the extent that the manufacture, consumption, and disposal of video game 
technology is a necessary and material requisite to any experience of gaming, then the act of 
gaming prefigures a particular ontological relationship between resources to people and people to 
people.xvi By this, I mean first, that the act of gaming has an effect upon the relationship between 
people and their environment, regardless of whether one is a gamer or not. For instance, the 
original PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360 models, and to a lesser extent their revised newer editions 
(PS3 Slim and Xbox 360 S), consumed a relatively high amount of energy—five times and three 
times as much as that of a medium-size refrigerator respectively (Duncombe, 2008)—when 
compared to other sources of electronic entertainment: 189w (PS3), 172w (Xbox 360), 88w 
(Xbox 360 S), 85w (PS3 Slim), 22w (Blu-ray player), and 16w (Nintendo Wii) (Hittinger, 2011; 
Moskovciak & Katzmaier, 2009). Though this environmental cost, in terms of energy 
production, can be mitigated by engaging in proper gaming practices (such as limiting console 
idle time) (Hittinger, 2011), end-user practice is not the only source of energy consumption 
involved in the practices of gaming, as we must also account for the energy consumption 
involved in the production of the game itself: the computers in which the games are designed 
upon; the production of the hardware and software for each gaming device; the packaging and 
advertising material supporting each game and platform; et cetera. The waste created in the 
production, consumption, and disposal involved in each of these various practices to is part “of 
the extraordinarily toxic e-waste that is regularly shipped to mountainous dumps around the 
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world, especially in Africa, India, and China” (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009, p. 224). 
Though I do not mean to claim that gaming alone is responsible for the contemporary politics of 
energy production, consumption, and disposal—a complex whole that involves environmental 
concerns, economic policy, and international politics, amongst other things—I do mean to 
suggest that gaming practices are a necessary site for understanding how Empire works to create 
surplus pleasure through the extraction and disposal of displeasure from first- to third-world 
countries (See Lewis, 2011). In other words, game studies scholars are unethical if they praise 
the possibilities of play while leaving unremarked the environmental and political economic 
impact of digital play aside—that is, praise first-world outcomes while ignoring third-world 
consequences.  
 This leads to my second point, in that the production, consumption, and disposal of video 
game technology prefigures a particular ontological relationship between resources to people and 
people to people through the economic practices that have sprung up around gaming production 
and consumption. In terms of production, increasing scrutiny has been directed towards the 
procurement of the materials used within contemporary video game devices. For instance, it is 
believed that the global demand for tantalum, a rare, dense, and highly conductive metal used in 
the production electronic components, has contributed to the political and economic instability of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is home to a large reservoir of the world’s 
coltan deposits (the mineral from which tantalum is derived) (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 
2009; Hayes & Burge, 2003; Peckham, 2008). Though coltan extraction initially paid relatively 
well in DRC terms—from roughly USD $7 in 2001 to approximately USD 50¢ as of 2011—the 
mining camps were and continue to be “notorious centers of the area’s rampaging HIV epidemic, 
[…] overseen and protected from rivals by militias, often composed of juvenile soldiers toting 
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AK-47s and rocket launchers, who [are] in turn paid from coltan revenues” (Dyer-Witheford & 
de Peuter, 2009, p. 223; See also: Dizolele, 2007; Domoney, Taylor, Tait, & Bennett, 2011). 
Though these practices technically ended in 2003 following a peace accord between the DRC 
and Rwanda (and by extension the western-based mining companies that partnered with the 
Rwandan government), reports from the DRC continue to document ongoing violence, labor 
exploitation, and widespread sexual assault against women (Dizolele, 2007; Domoney, et al., 
2011; Peckham, 2008). Horrible as this is, the mines of the DRC represent just one spot along the 
circuit of production, consumption, and disposal that includes hardware assembly sweatshops in 
places such as Guadalajara, Mexico, Zalaegerszeg and Sárvár, Hungary, and Doumen and 
Shenzhen, China (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; B. Weir, 2012). 
 Though the examples cited above do not necessarily impact the content that appears 
within the moment of gameplay itself, as do decisions in the form of play (e.g., coding and 
platform design), how can this material infrastructure not constitute an important site of 
occasioning for the practice of gaming itself? For it is only when defining gaming in the narrow 
sense, as that which happens between the player and the screen or the programmer and the 
screen, can game studies scholarship proclaim, “Game On! Or How I learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Xbox” (Postigo, 2009). The material practices that constitute one mode of the 
regime of truth called gaming may not define the totality of gaming itself, but it nevertheless 
remains an essential constraint upon the essence of the act. Far from being a site of pure 
immaterial labor, the material fact of gaming, in terms of production, consumption, and disposal, 
means that the regime of truth called gaming has consequences beyond those who sit in front of 
the screen—whether as consumer or producer. One does not play at the mines of the DRC, the 
toxic landfills of e-waste, nor the sweatshops where hardware is manufactured, and yet these are 
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concrete sites of gaming. Game studies scholarship, however, has remained largely ignorant of 
these circuits of production and consumption, and thus inadvertently contributes to the 
obscuration of these substructures of digital play; as Kent Ono and Derek Buescher (2001) have 
argued, our overattention to narrowly defined sites of production and consumption “distracts 
attention from the processes that those [sites have] drawn on to create social meanings” (p. 38). 
As will be discussed further in the upcoming chapters of analysis, this tension between play and 
labor, pleasure and exploitation, life and death—that is, the question of global subject formation 
and population management, what Foucault (1978-1979/2008) called biopolitics— is a necessary 
site of analysis that can only be acknowledged if we expand our conception of gaming to include 
the material in addition to the immaterial. This is not merely a question of intellectual 
completeness, but rather an ethical obligation, for how can we speak to the state of contemporary 
digital play if we remain ignorant of how gaming constitutes a site wherein our pleasure, way of 
life, is guaranteed by virtue of their displeasure, their forfeiture of life. 
The Form of Play 
The form of a particular technology is perhaps more easily understood as possessing an 
ontological investment because of the presence of intentionality that exists at both its moment of 
production and consumption. For this reason, it is of little surprise that this element of gaming 
has given birth to an array of divergent, if not increasingly overlapping, critical approaches to the 
study of games dependent upon whether one seeks to understand how form (whether conceived 
as text, platform, and/or experience) influences practices of production or consumption: 
psychoanalysis, media effects, and audience studies tends to focus on the consumption side; code 
and platform studies tend to be concerned with the production side; and, those concerned with 
the “game itself,” in terms of narrative (i.e., narratology), game rules (i.e., ludology), and/or 
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interface, frequently take up critical residence in the internal world of play itself (e.g., the 
narrative, rules, and/or interface of the machine) (Montfort & Bogost, 2009).xvii These divergent 
approaches to game studies all operate under a concern for the form of play to the extent that 
they are all interested in what Heidegger (1954/1977a) defines as the “shape into which the 
material enters” (p. 6), and to which we could add exits. This concern for the form of play has 
dominated game studies, and hence has been a productive and important site of scholarship. And 
yet, perhaps precisely due to its productivity, this research has generated significant tensions and 
contradictions within this area of study—of which the debate between narratology and ludology 
is perhaps most popular within the field, whereas the contradictions between media effects is 
most commented upon outside the discipline. For this reason, it is worthwhile to briefly attempt 
to make sense of these various approaches to the study of the form of gaming, and the 
implications these tensions and contradictions have for the notion of gaming itself. 
 Of the various approaches to the study of the form of gaming, those concerned with the 
moment of gameplay itself have been most popular (Montfort & Bogost, 2009). This means that 
the analysis of consumption, in terms of reception, interface, narrative, and the rules of play, has 
dominated the study of form. The tensions between and within these various approaches have 
been productive on their own terms, in addition to drawing attention to the need for alternative, 
complementary approaches that may be able to make sense of these tensions; for instance, the 
need for an analytic capable of situating the phenomenon of digital play as part of larger social 
ecology—and thus capable of seeing audiences (i.e., reception) as capable of possessing desires 
similar to those already embedded within the cultural logic of video game play, so that the 
question is not necessarily what effect do video games have on audiences, but rather how is it 
that this form of cultural desire (i.e., the video game) has come to be legible at this particular 
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moment. Though this question is frequently beyond the scope of conventional game studies, this 
ought to not hinder our ability to mobilize some of its insights towards our respective project of 
understanding gaming as a regime of truth; that is, what might reception studies, narratology, and 
ludology contribute towards our understanding of the totality of digital play. 
In terms of reception, four key insights are that of: hyperrepresentation, the Julia effect, 
the ELIZA effect, and audience desire. First, I use the term Hyperrepresentation to capture a 
highly productive, if not controversial, mode of scholarship concerned with understanding the 
effects the exaggerated representations of sexuality, gender, and violence frequently found in 
video games (e.g., Tomb Raider, Dead or Alive, Grand Theft Auto) have on those who play 
games. Though some of the scholarship within this subfield has generated criticism for allegedly 
exaggerating the negative effects of gaming (i.e., making a mountain out of a molehill) (D. 
Williams & Skoric, 2005) and of scapegoating the medium through abstraction (e.g., why is 
Grand Theft Auto any worse than Training Day) (Sadler, 2010), these studies concerned with 
hyperrepresentation have generated interesting results, at least in terms of data if not always 
interpretation. For instance, it is important to know that the appearance of female characters in 
video games is abysmally low and when it does appear is frequently troubling, as women are 
often represented through the confining role of hypersexuality (Dietz, 1998); and it is equally 
important to know that in spite of games with female dominated casts, such as Dead or Alive: 
Paradise (Tecmo Koei, 2010b), the overall proportion of female to male characters has remained 
relatively unchanged at 14% for the past decade (Downs & Smith, 2010). Moreover, as the 
marketers of Dead or Alive: Paradise readily capitalize on (See Figures 2.1–4), representation in 
itself is not to be desired if it only means being portrayed as victims or sex objects (Dietz, 1998). 
Other studies concerned with the effects of hyperrepresentation have shown similar results 
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Figures 2.1-2. (top-bottom). This scene from Dead or Alive Paradise (Tecmo Koei, 2010b) is quite illustrative of 
what the producers had in mind for the game. But if the cut-scene were not clear enough (See Figure 2.1), then 
this commercial for the game , titled “Spanking the Monkey,” (Figure 2.2) makes it difficult to misunderstand 
the message (See also Figures 2.3-4). 
regarding the underrepresentation and problematic portrayal of non-white characters and the 
saturation of violence within video games (D. Williams, Martins, Consalvo, & Ivory, 2009; 
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Figures 2.3-4. (top-bottom). These additional commercials for Dead or Alive: Paradise further cement the 
sexualized intent of the game. In the first (Figure 2.3), titled “Midnight Snack” (Tecmo Koei, 2010c), a man 
walks in a sleepy daze towards his refrigerator, pulls out a piece of raw meat, then proceeds to smack it with a 
mallet for a short time, before putting everything away and heading back to bed. The second (Figure 2.4), titled 
“Caught in the Act” (Tecmo Koei, 2010a), shows a woman waiting slowly for her garage door to open, only to 
see her husband standing in the garage choking a chicken. 
Scharrer, 2004). The challenge for those concerned with the effects of hyperrepresentation upon 
game players has been precisely in the question of how to measure those effects, as it is not 
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enough to document the quantitative imbalance of representation between dominant and 
marginalized groups; indeed, tension within the ranks of effects researchers has emerged to 
suggest that the quantitative effects of video game hyperrepresentation upon a given player’s 
real-world behavior is negligible (D. Williams & Skoric, 2005). 
In contrast, though not necessarily in opposition, to the methodological challenges 
experienced by those studying the effects of hyperrepresentation, a vibrant tradition of audience 
studies has sought to sidestep the issue of effects measurement through the use of interviews and 
participate-observation analysis. Here, the question is less of what effect does the engagement 
with the video game form have upon the player, but rather that of what user desires does the 
video game form satisfy? Approaching the gaming encounter in terms of desire as opposed to 
effects has led some to challenge the findings of those invested in the study of the negative 
effects of hyperrepresentation. Henry Jenkins (2006), for instance, has noted that though the 
form of video games, and digital media more generally, may have an effect upon a user’s 
experience, ultimately the interpretive gaps already existing within the game, as well as those 
opened up by virtue of the users' creative energies, make gaming a site of audience desire. 
Jenkins deployment of de Certeau’s (1980/1988) notion of tactics and strategies—e.g., play 
versus control—has functioned as a productive counterweight to the sometimes deterministic, 
seemingly inevitable results of hyperrepresentation research. And yet, as others have noted, the 
experience of pleasure and play are not antithetical to systems of control and the problematics of 
power this entails (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Stone, 1995/1998). Indeed, the 
documentation of the Julia effect (treating computer programs as if they have desires and 
intentions) and ELIZA effect (treating computer programs as more intelligent than they really 
are) demonstrate that gaming constitutes a serious site of engagement for those who play; that 
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players come to treat game characters (particularly computer controlled) as intelligent, desiring, 
complex subjects, suggests that gaming has become an increasingly important site of identity 
work (Boellstorff, 2008; Turkle, 1995/1997). To the extent that this is true, then a new challenge 
emerges of understanding what opportunities for identity work exist within the form of gaming 
itself; and now we have shifted our analysis from an understanding of the relationship between 
the player and the form of the video game to the internal world of play itself. 
The internal world of play can be thought of as form proper, insofar as the concern is that 
of understanding the rules of the game (ludology) and/or the formal characteristics of the video 
game content (narratology) (Montfort & Bogost, 2009). In other words, from this perspective, 
one is not necessarily concerned with how the form of the video game impedes upon the 
production and/or consumption of game content, but rather one aims to practice a sort of new 
media formalism: with “’the game itself’ replacing the New Critics’ ‘text in itself’ as the 
hermetically sealed object of attention, rules and procedures replacing troupes and symbols as 
the features to be analyzed in isolation of authorial, historical, or cultural factors” (S. E. Jones, 
2008, p. 5).xviii Though this formalist approach may place unfair burdens on the form of the 
video game, such as in critiquing Medal of Honor: Rising Sun (Electronic Arts, 2003b) for not 
being able to fully represent war (See Hess, 2007), or alternatively risk defining the medium 
tautologically, in that games are simulation and that the presence of narrative is merely a relic of 
past media behavior (See Frasca, 2003), studies of the gaming form itself can help to illuminate 
the unique qualities of the digital play experience (S. E. Jones, 2008). 
As with the studies regarding videogame reception, several key concepts have sprung up 
around the studies of the video game form itself; of these, narrative architecture and algorithmic 
logic are of particular import. The first, narrative architecture, is a term coined by Henry Jenkins 
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(2003) as a means to make sense of the theoretical blockage experienced within the debate 
regarding games as narrative versus games as simulation. The debate focused in on whether 
games, and video games specifically, were best understood according to logics of storytelling or 
play (See: Frasca, 2003; Galloway, 2006; S. E. Jones, 2008). Jenkins (2003) conception of 
narrative architecture sought to reconcile these differences by applying de Certeau’s (1980/1988) 
notion of walking rhetorics towards the understanding of game content. The notion of walking 
rhetorics is built upon the premise that the construction of city space constitutes a series of 
strategies meant to promote certain mobile practices above the others. These mobile practices 
give ideological content to the citizen’s life insofar as some spaces are defined as the proper or 
improper domain for the functioning of various individuals (de Certeau, 1980/1988). And yet, 
even within a well-defined, structured city space, gaps exist that citizens exploit on a daily basis 
(de Certeau, 1980/1988), such as when protesting at a site designated for celebration, thereby 
suggesting that movement itself implies an ideological choice.xix Taking this framework, Jenkins 
(2003) argues that, like city planners, “game designers don’t simply tell stories; they design 
worlds and sculpt spaces.” This definition of game content as narrative architecture, hence, 
attempts to translate narrative theory into terms acceptable to the logic of rule-based play: rules 
are structures meant to encourage the player to partake in a particular narrative trajectory.xx  
Though coming from a different theoretical perspective (ludology), the notion of 
algorithmic logic complements narrative architecture, insofar as algorithms are not synonymous 
with rules, as rules refer to the parameters of the playing field (e.g., hit the ball inside this hole to 
win; the playfield must be of this length and consist of this material) whereas algorithms refer to 
the specific operations required to excel within the gamexxi; in other words, to use golf as an 
example, rules reference the objective and scoring system (e.g., hit the ball into the hole; incur 
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penalty for hitting the ball out of bounds), whereas an algorithm would be the step-by-step 
development and implementation of a proper swing so as to better fulfill the objective of golf. In 
this regard, the form of the video game is that of an algorithmic machine meant to discipline the 
player along a particular skill set (Crogan, 2003). And to the extent the game as algorithmic 
machine succeeds, “we are asked to mistake the structure of somebody’s else mind for our own” 
(Manovich, 2001, p. 61). This is a strong claim, and some might ask what ideology, let alone 
narrative, could emerge from the rules and algorithms of a game as abstract as, for example, golf 
or its video game equivalent (e.g., the Tiger Woods PGA Tour series [Electronic Arts, 2010f]). A 
preliminary reply would be that embedded within the logic of a game such as golf are stories of: 
a particular ideology of skill as power (e.g., the power of a golf swing comes more from form 
rather than brute force); a celebration of technological wealth (e.g., golf is a game that requires a 
relatively high level of income to participate); and dominance over nature (e.g., golf courses are 
highly planned, artificial terrain). In other words, just as forms of non-digital play are sites of 
complex cultural practices (James, 1963/1993), so too does the form of digital gaming compel 
participants to reproduce such cultural logics. This is done in video games through the 
rearticulation of life as that of an algorithm; that is, digital play distills the essence of a given 
problem (e.g., the economy, conflict, etc.) and then offers an idealized series of specific steps 
(i.e., the algorithm) as the most appropriate means of resolving the situation (Crogan, 2003; 
Galloway, 2006). In other words, video games offer an image of the world, and then make an 
explicit claim (through gameplay) as to the best course of action for operating in this particular 
conception of reality, and the player’s success is contingent upon the adoption of this standpoint, 
at least for the duration of play—and to the extent that at least some aspects of this domain of 
play are believed to be realistic, then perhaps this particular standpoint lingers even longer. 
 
 
 48  
 
 Clearly, then, the field of game studies has offered much to work with in terms of the 
significance of digital play for contemporary society: reception studies have documented how 
users come to treat video games as objects of anxiety and desire, thereby suggesting the 
possibility for cultural convergence (as in gaming culture and “non”-gaming culture) 
(Boellstorff, 2008; Dietz, 1998; Turkle, 1995/1997); and narrative and ludic analysis, though 
often disagreeing in terms of methodology, have produced similar arguments regarding the 
politics embedded within the form of digital play (whether in terms of story or the algorithm) 
(Crogan, 2003; Galloway, 2006; Jenkins, 2003; Murray, 1997). Far from being an innocent 
substructure upon which an individual engages in play, these studies have suggested that the 
conventions of digital play “proper”—that is, in terms of narrative and ludic elements—is 
intimately tangled up within the person who has taken on the role of player. The power of this 
entanglement, or rather the pleasure of this entanglement (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009), is 
that it leads one “to mistake the structure of somebody else’s mind for our own” (Manovich, 
2001, p. 61). And yet, what does it mean to take pleasure in this mistake? What does it mean to 
enjoy one’s symptom? What is the purpose of this power manifest as desire? 
 Though the politics of a given technology are embedded in the form taken upon—
amongst other sites of occasioning (Heidegger, 1954/1977a)—rarely has conventional game 
studies left this narrowly defined site of digital play (i.e., that is form) to venture into the politics 
of the production of digital play itself. This has had the effect of inadvertently delinking the 
domain of conventional game studies, conceived in terms of the analysis of a specific technology 
(the video game), from the field of political economic and cultural analysis; or rather, a binary is 
constructed between technology and the larger social ecology in that though they may interact 
and influence the other, they remain autonomous sites of practice (See Montfort & Bogost, 
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2009). A rich tradition of cultural studies, and continental theory, amongst other theoretical 
traditions, however, has cast doubt upon the construction and politics of this binary (Foucault, 
1978-1979/2008; Heidegger, 1954/1977a; R. Williams, 1974/2005). As such, though it may be 
useful analytically to speak of technology and culture, we must remember, however, that when 
we speak of technology, in actuality we are referencing an ensemble of material infrastructures 
and political economic practices, in addition to immaterial cultural practices (e.g., content); in 
other words, the differentiation is not between that of culture and technology, but rather that of 
various material and immaterial culture practices (technai).xxii At times, conventional game 
studies scholarship can point towards this larger problematic—such as when Gonzalo Frasca 
(2003) writes that the game developer “always has the final word and remains in charge” (p. 
233) or when Janet Murray (1997) notes that “interactors can only act within the possibilities that 
have been established by the writing and programming” (p. 152)—but even then, the concern 
rarely  goes beyond the level of form: how is this interest encoded, and not necessarily what is 
this interest that is encoded?  
That said, though conventional game studies scholarship rarely looks for the politics that 
inform the production of a particular platform style (e.g., the intention that stands behind a given 
form), recent work has shown that the crystallization of a given console form has a significant 
effect on subsequent software development (Montfort & Bogost, 2009). Choices in everything 
from how many input devices a platform can recognize, the capacity and speed of the storage 
device used, to the processing power of the machine, and other platform design factors, have a 
significant effect on what games are made for a console and how those games are received 
(Montfort & Bogost, 2009). Hence, the need for game studies to take into consideration the 
purposes and producers standing behind the conventionally defined domain of digital play. 
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The Purpose of Play, And its Producers 
It has come to be intellectually taboo to claim that technology has a purpose. Contemporary 
scholarship has labeled the works of Heidegger (1954/1977a), Jacques Ellul (1954/1964), Neal 
Postman (1985/2005), and Paul Virilio (1984/2009) as deterministic, and as having mistaken the 
political design of a given technology as being coterminous with the technology itself (Feenberg, 
2002; Hardt & Negri, 2001; Sassen, 2011b). The contention is that we ought to understand new 
communication technologies as part of a larger social ecology, rather than as a purely technical 
condition, so as to “make conceptual and empirical room for the broad range of social logics 
driving users and the diverse cultures of use through which these technologies are employed” 
(Sassen, 2011a). This seems to me, however, to be exactly what those labeled as technological 
determinist have sought to accomplish: 
What is important is not the adaptability of Man [sic], but the adaptability of men [sic]. We shall 
find the answer [of the consequences of technological use], not in the immortal soul of the 
Species, best in the preservation of our own individual souls, which are, perhaps, not immortal. 
(Ellul, 1954/1964, pp. 397-398) 
 
The purpose, then, of a given technology, from the standpoint of “technological determinism,” is 
not that of the creation of a particular universal subject (e.g., technology is bad or good for all 
people equally), but rather that of transforming the ontological structure of a given space and 
time (Heidegger, 1954/1977a, 1938/1977); in other words, though, for example, one may debate 
the political uses and consequences of the telegraph (and by extension the telephone and 
Internet), most would accept that these technologies have reconfigured our conceptions of space 
and time according to the logics of their operation (Carey, 1975/2009). It is the latter part of this 
statement that constitutes the primary concern of those labeled as technological determinist: “that 
which gives bounds […] is called in Greek telos, which is all too often translated as ‘aim’ or 
‘purpose,’ and so misinterpreted” (Heidegger, 1954/1977a, p. 8). Hence bound up in this notion 
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of the purpose of technology is that of making a space for the entanglement of multiple 
purposes—e.g., the contingency requested by Saskia Sassen (2011a, 2011b) for making 
conceptual and empirical room for the broad range of social logics through which technologies 
are employed (Boellstorff, 2008). Technology, thus, is that site upon which a multitude of 
purposes, to various extents and effects, converge, and thus are transformed; the creation and 
expansion of the telegraph in the United States, for instance, was motivated not just by military 
science and the financial interests of private enterprise (Starr, 2004; Wu, 2010) but also by that 
of the legitimate anxieties of a nation searching for a means “to bind the country together just as 
the portents of the Civil War were threatening to tear it apart” (Carey, 1983/2009, p. 159). 
Hence, it seems worthwhile to ask what interests, desires, and anxieties, have coalesced, and thus 
informed (e.g., given purpose to) the production of contemporary digital play. 
 Indeed, many investigative journalists and critical game studies researchers have already 
begun to take up this question of the interests that inform the production of play. Of central 
concern for those coming from this perspective is that of the historical involvement—and 
ongoing involvement—of the military-industrial complex. Though some have downplayed the 
military-industrial complex’s ongoing involvement with the video game industry, suggesting that 
gaming developed as a sort of benevolent parasite to the more insidious military interests and 
continues to subvert those interests (Jenkins, 2006), others have offered compelling evidence that 
the military continues to play an active and important role in the formation of contemporary 
digital play (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Halter, 2006; R. Stahl, 2006, 2010b). Nick 
Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter (2009) have gone further to suggest that the video game 
industry emerged during a period of shifts in global capital, and now operates as an important 
node in the circuit of production, reproduction, and, by extension, possible subversion of 
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contemporary Empire. This claim of gaming as part and parcel of Empire, though grand, actually 
resonates with contemporary industry practices more so than those which would relegate the 
interests of finance and militarism as superfluous to gaming—interesting contextual elements, 
but not core processes of gaming in and of itself. 
 And yet, Empire has invested heavily into the production of contemporary gaming 
practices. That the military-academic complex served as the technological incubator, in terms of 
financial and technological resources, for the development of the first video game, Spacewar! (S. 
Russell, 1962), and home video game console, Ralph Baer’s “Brown Box” (later licensed as the 
Magnavox odyssey; See Herz, 1997), ought not to be understood as the beginning and the end of 
imperial desire within video games. Early digital play depended upon and co-emerged alongside 
hacker culture, and despite being counter-cultural in some aspects, however, other elements of 
this group meshed quite well with the “free-market fever [of an] America about to elect Ronald 
Reagan as president” (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009, p. 11). And, far from being a counter-
cultural movement, the video game industry has long functioned, metaphorically speaking, as “a 
nerd who just wants to be popular” (Jason Hart, as qtd. in Lalley, 2005, p. 44).  
 In addition to influencing the cultural desires of those working within the video game 
industry, however, the interests of Empire have had a significant hand in the development of 
gaming technology itself. It was out of financial interests, for instance, that the Atari 2600 was 
manufactured with the MOS 6507 processor, as opposed to the already inexpensive MOS 6502 
(Montfort & Bogost, 2009). This decision, along with that of limiting the use of other expensive 
components, and selling the machine at cost, made the Atari 2600 an extremely popular and cost 
effective platform upon which the home gaming industry could develop; and yet, at the same 
time, the constraints of hardware design—in terms of maximum memory capacity—
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technologically encouraged the development of short (or long and repetitive) gaming 
experiences. Hence, embedded within the Atari 2600 technology is an economic logic of the 
razor and blades business model: the system had to be made inexpensive so that consumers could 
afford it; in making the system inexpensive, game developers were limited in the storage 
capacity needed to make multi-session gaming possible (for instance, the fabled Adventure 
[1979], considered the birth of the adventure gaming genre, could be completed within 2 
minutes; Montfort & Bogost, 2009); and, this limited duration of play encouraged the purchase 
of the additional cartridges that Atari needed consumers to buy so as to break even, let alone 
profit, since the machine was sold at cost. This mode of production built upon the incessant need 
to sell multiple cartridges so as to break even for every Atari console sold, a necessity that was 
embedded within the technology itself, is believed to have caused the industry crash of 1983; the 
gaming industry devoured itself in that new software was needed not only to generate profit but 
also alleviate the costs generated as a result of an ever expanding platform base. This dialectic of 
software versus platform—in that software was needed to cover the costs of platform production, 
which simultaneously increased demand for more platform production—which was embedded 
within the technology, as the result of the pressures of finance capital, encouraged an increasing 
reliance upon licensed software, and gross knockoffs, which were meant to generate sales by 
virtue of their likeness as opposed to content (Montfort & Bogost, 2009); ultimately, the industry 
crashed in 1983 as a result of consumers no longer being able to recognize gaming as a site of 
public desire—the $3b video game industry had transformed into $100m niche market within the 
span of less than a year (Sheff, 1993/1999).  
The interests of global capital would continue to have an effect on the development of 
digital play when, in the effort to resurrect the financial prospects of the U.S. Video Game 
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industry, Nintendo implemented the 10NES lockout chip with the release of the NES as a means 
of artificially inducing scarcity—the chip made it nearly impossible for unauthorized software 
manufactures to develop games for Nintendo’s platform (Sheff, 1993/1999). The industry crash 
and decline of Atari and subsequent rise of Nintendo, then, points to a shift in the political 
economic and cultural configuration of digital play: one that could account for the financial 
interests of third-party developers, consumer demand for quality games regardless of 
manufacturer, and the economic interests of hardware makers. Nintendo’s hardware design, 
however, effectively enforced its political economic interests; for though Nintendo’s 
technological and economic system did proceed to restore consumer faith in the industry, the 
concentration of power introduced as a result—the 10NES chip meant that game manufactures 
had to rely upon Nintendo to both approve of the game’s content and manufacture the game 
cartridge (Sheff, 1993/1999)—had a significant impact on the direction of gaming practices. 
Nintendo, for instance, would leverage its control over software production in the United States 
so as to ensure that games developed for the U.S. market would resonate with the company’s 
brand image as a toy, thus meaning that certain themes, such as religion, would be off-limit 
topics for U.S. game designers (Herz, 1997; Kent, 2001; Sheff, 1993/1999). To the extent that 
first Atari and then Nintendo’s political economic interests and technology served as the 
dominant platform for the expression of digital play for their respective generations, then, how 
can the sequence of events described above not be considered an essential part of the regime of 
truth we call gaming?  
Moreover, as the previous chapter suggested (See “Introduction”), not only are the 
interests of global capital and those of the U.S. military (and others perhaps) bound up in the 
practices of contemporary gaming, but so too are those of non-governmental organizations as 
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well. The growing presence of the indie gaming movement, typically understood as anti-industry 
and thus necessarily anti-Empire (See Games for Change, 2011), that has captured the attention 
of most research regarding non-governmental gaming production, however, has unfortunately, 
created a false dichotomy between the interest of global capital and the military and that of other 
sources of gaming production. Operating in the context of Empire, however, the interests 
involved in the production and consumption of gaming, regardless of their site of origin, cannot 
be separated so cleanly. As Heidegger (1954/1977a) notes, we must be able to distinguish the 
purpose of technology from the producer of technology: 
There is a fourth participate in the responsibility for the finished sacrificial vessel’s lying before us 
ready for use, i.e., The silversmith—but not at all because he, in working, brings about the 
finished sacrificial chalice as if it were the effect of a making; the silversmith is not a causa 
efficiens [e.g., that which puts a thing in motion]. 
 
The silversmith considers carefully and gathers together the three aforementioned ways of being 
responsible and indebted [e.g., the material, form, and purpose]. To consider carefully is in Greek 
legein, logos. Legein is rooted in apophainesthai, to bring forward into appearance. [….] The three 
previously mentioned ways of being responsible owe thanks to the pondering the silversmith. (8) 
 
In other words, the producer behind a particular manifestation of technology operates as such not 
necessarily because of some fantastic power emanating from her subjectivity (e.g., the great 
mind or auteur theory of production), but rather because she has the capacity, by virtue of her 
social position, to tap into the motives invested in the other practices of technology: e.g., the 
interplay between circuits of production and consumption (material), form, and desire (purpose).  
For instance, the desire to remember the Holocaust and those who sacrificed their lives in 
the process of bringing about the end of the reign of Nazi Germany may be commendable; 
however, the interest, as portrayed in the works of Steven Spielberg—the director of not only 
Schindler’s List (1993) and Saving Private Ryan (1998), but also the video game, Medal of 
Honor (Electronic Arts, 1999b)—links up nicely with the problematic that is the remembrance of 
World War II as the Good War (See “Chapter Four”). This problematic, this particular practice 
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of memory, has obscured the initial complacency in which Western Europe and the United States 
reacted towards the Holocaust (Ostrow, 2005; Zelizer, 1998) and the troubling racial practices 
that were in operation within the west during the same period, such as that of Japanese 
Internment. Hence, though the Medal of Honor video game series (Electronic Arts, 1999b, 
2002a, 2002b, 2003b, 2007, 2010c), may have originated as a pet project of Spielberg’s, outside 
of the explicit desires of finance capital and the military (Edge, 2011b), the franchise has linked 
up nicely with the imperial interests of both: military history games are amongst the most 
profitable genre in the industry and frequently portray military events unproblematically, in 
terms of the everyday good guy versus the absolutely evil bad guy (Hess, 2007). 
 This is not to suggest that anti-imperial gaming interests cannot exist—surely they do 
(See Games for Change, 2011). Rather it is to suggest that the interplay between Empire and 
anti-imperialist interests are more complex than they may be typically granted (Hardt & Negri, 
2001); it is not imperial interests versus anti-imperial subjects (or vice-versa), but rather that of a 
complex interplay between the two that at times makes for strange bedfellows (Hardt & Negri, 
2001; Thomas, 2011). Moreover, to the extent that purpose is typically understood in terms of 
individual agency or collective volition (e.g., policy), at the expense of that which is embedded 
within technology, then one remains ignorant of the political interests in operation within the 
technology itself. As Alexander Galloway (2006) has argued, if one were to intervene upon the 
purpose of gaming only at the level of ideology—deployed as content—than the politics of a 
fetish of algorithmic control would still remain untouched, and to this we could add the politics 
of material procurement and distribution itself. It would seem, then, that though multiple sites of 
occasioning exist for challenging the political economic and cultural structure of digital play—
from the materials used to the contents desired and institutional practices deployed—one must 
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remember to keep the totality of digital play always within sight. Failing to do so means that one 
risks reproducing the structures of domination in that of another, unobserved, domain of digital 
play; advocating for diversity amongst the ranks of content producers, as important as this may 
be, for instance, does not necessarily address the material effect digital play has on the global 
ecology—in terms of energy used, resources procured, and e-waste produced. Hence, it seems 
appropriate to now step back and give a rough account for the totality of contemporary digital 
play. 
The Reality of Play 
The technological real operates as a special mode of production in that it not only serves as the 
foundation upon which other forms of technology develop (e.g., the telephone needed something 
like the telegraph), but that it also serves as a site of veridiction for judging the plausibility of all 
subsequent technological development, whether actual or otherwise (e.g., mobile, “smart” 
phones can play games, but are they gaming devices?). Heidegger’s (1938/1977) discussion in 
“The Age of the World Picture” elaborates more clearly upon this, in that he argues that the 
possibility and actualization of photography helped to crystallize a particular ontological reality 
of “calculating, planning, and molding all things” (p. 135). In other words, much like Walter 
Benjamin’s (1935/2006) fascination at experiencing the ability for the motion picture to reveal 
“entirely new structural formations of the subject” (p. 31), so too do technologists (and those 
who experience technology) see a new regime of truth emerging from out of the technologies 
they have created (Miles, 2011; Weisberg, 2010).  
Yet, whereas Benjamin remained committed to a poetics of movement, in a word caught 
up by what Heidegger (1950/1977) calls the “in-flashing […] disclosing coming-to-pass within 
Being itself” (p. 44) that represents the possibility of turning technology towards other ends (e.g., 
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increased social and political consciousness), the excitement of many technologists, to the extent 
that technology itself is offered up as a solution to the social and political, up against that of the 
cultural (e.g., technology versus culture, as opposed to the technological is cultural), is directed 
towards that of the possibility of transforming a society into standing-reserve (Heidegger, 
1954/1977b). To perhaps put it more clearly, when technology is offered as the solution or logic 
upon which the social behavior should and is expected to conform, then unique populations are 
transformed into the unique inputs necessary for the technological machine to function; in the 
words of Jacques Ellul (1954/1964): 
Technique […] surpasses and transcends the machine because it remains in close touch with the 
human order. 
[….] 
Technique integrates the machine into society. It constructs the kind of world the machine needs 
and introduces order […]. It clarifies, arranges, and rationalizes […]. 
[….] 
Technique integrates everything. [….] Man [sic] is not adapted to a world of steel; technique 
adapts him to it. [….] Technique thus provides a model; it specifies attitudes that are valid once 
and for all. 
[….] 
When technique enters into every area of life, including the human, it ceases to be external to man 
and becomes his very substance. (pp. 5-6) 
 
And yet, Heidegger (1954/1977a) always held out hope that embedded within the four practices 
of technology was the chance for an opportunity to intervene upon the direction of technological 
development—though to do so one must first understand the danger posed by technology. 
Hence, for the sake of our purposes, that is to glean the possibilities of turning video games away 
from Empire and towards that of a more equitable global politics, it may be useful to give a brief 
account of the current state of play, based upon a synthesis of several of the key concepts 
discussed above: namely, the material, form, purpose, and producers of gaming today. 
The current regime of digital play is dominated by three hardware manufacturers across 
multiple, use-specific platforms. Two of the hardware manufacturers, Nintendo and Sony, have 
dedicated their energies towards the practices surrounding dedicated-use home and mobile 
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consoles: the PlayStation 3 (PS3) and PlayStation Portable (PSP), and now PlayStation Vita, for 
Sony, and the Wii and 3DS for Nintendo. The other major hardware manufacturer, Microsoft, 
has roughly split its energy between the home console (Xbox 360) and personal computer 
markets; though Microsoft does not directly profit from the sale of PC games, the development 
of DirectX, a collection of game development friendly application programming interfaces, was 
meant to answer the question of  whether Windows could become “a gaming platform that could 
compete with Sega and Nintendo?” (Eisler, 2006)—and to the extent that DirectX succeeded in 
answering this question, then Windows, and by extension Microsoft, could function at the center 
of a given home’s information and entertainment needs. Indeed, it is believed that Microsoft only 
entered the home console market because “they were concerned that the Sony PlayStation was 
going to usurp […] the PC’s rightful place as the home hub, the gateway to the outside world” 
(Matt Rosoff, qtd in The Economist, 2005; See also Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). 
Though three major hardware manufacturers may control platform production, the 
similarities of the three are more striking than their differences. In terms of material 
procurement, all three manufacturers are involved in an exploitive circuit of production, 
consumption, and disposal. Though Sony received the bulk of the criticism surrounding the use 
of tantalum—an important element used in the manufacture of electronics equipment and whose 
demand is believed to have played a role in the war between the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Rwanda—all major electronics manufacturers are implicated to some extent; and if 
Sony received criticism by virtue of its status as the most popular gaming company in the early 
2000s, then the popularity of Nintendo (and to a lesser extent, Microsoft) has led the demand 
today. Likewise, all three home consoles (and PCs, if we choose to include them) utilize a 
considerable amount of energy under conventional use, especially if we include the various 
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apparatuses, such as high-definition television sets, that have become part and parcel with 
contemporary gaming practices (Hittinger, 2011). Indeed, Greenpeace has consistently ranked 
video game console manufacturers poorly in its annual “Hi-Tech Company Report Card,” with 
Microsoft and Nintendo ranked last (17th and 18th respectively), and Sony in a three-way tie for 
6th, with a score of 5.1 out of 10 (Greenpeace, 2010). As Nintendo begins the shift towards high-
definition gaming, it is conceivable that not only will its Greenpeace ranking remain unchanged, 
but that the industry as a whole will continue to be part of a larger, global trend towards ever 
greater energy consumption. 
Beyond the three major hardware manufacturers, the industry as a whole is dominated by 
men and patriarchal values. The video game industry has long functioned as a gentlemen’s club, 
with female employees typically confined to marketing and public relations responsibilities 
(Haines, 2004; Stone, 1995/1998); in 2004, women comprised only 17% of the industry work 
force, with “an enormous 73% of women working […] outside the main jobs of creating the 
games” (Haines, 2004). Considering that the overall number of women working in the industry 
had only risen from 16% in 2002 to 17% in 2004 (Haines, 2004), it is difficult to imagine that the 
numbers have shifted significantly. Though it is difficult to obtain numbers regarding the racial 
demographics of those employed in the industry, interviews with those in the industry suggests 
that African-Americans and perhaps other non-White populations are underrepresented in the 
industry (John, 2008a, 2008b). My experience at the 2011 Electronic Entertainment Expo 
resonates with these interviews, and suggests that the industry is still very much dominated by 
White and Japanese men, with increasing numbers of Asian Americans; the vast majority of 
women, regardless of ethnicity, however, appeared to be employed as promotions staff (e.g., 
“booth babes”). Moreover, the high turnover rate, low pay, and subsequent expendability of 
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game testers, suggest that the knowledge economy of video game content is built upon the backs 
of the knowledge economy of working class populations. That said, the higher pay associated 
with working on the game development side of the industry (e.g., programming), is increasingly 
becoming one of the few (though important) things that distinguishes the work experiences of the 
middle class knowledge worker from the lower class game tester (See: Bonds, et al., 2004; EA 
Spouse, 2004; McMillen, 2011). In spite of this convergence, however, higher pay is a legitimate 
difference, and to the extent that economic mobility is increasingly tied to participation within 
the knowledge economy proper (Cassell & Jenkins, 1999; Entertainment Software Association, 
2010)—and not its material substructure—then vast populations have already been relegated to 
the economic margins of contemporary Empire. 
This is more than just a political economic critique of the employment conditions and 
demographics of the industry, as valuable as that critique is, as it also speaks to the interests and 
desires addressed through the practices of gaming. Dominated as it is by men, it is not surprising 
that the industry caters to the interests and desires of masculine audiences (Haines, 2004). 
Intersecting these interests as well is that of racial and sexual anxiety. After the first trailer for 
the game Resident Evil 5 (2009) appeared in mid-2007, prominent game journalist N’Gai Croal 
commented, “Wow, clearly no one black worked on this game” (qtd. in John, 2008c). Similar 
comments have been made about other contemporary games; for instance, speaking of Grand 
Theft Auto: San Andreas (Rockstar Games, 2004), Morgan Gray, a video game developer 
commented:  
so far [‘San Andreas’] is the only ‘Grand Theft Auto’ that I didn’t beat because if I have to hear 
one more ‘nigger’ drop out of someone’s mouth knowing it was penned by a bunch of white 
cats—I’m like I’m done here. I can’t play this; I’m feeling so filthy. [….] I’m not saying it’s a bad 
game; I’m saying without the proper tools to understand what’s really going on there, it’s just too 
risky at what people’s takeaway will be. (qtd. in John, 2008b) 
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Bound within these concerns is that of the anxiety and desire embedded within the content of 
these games. It is not just that African Americans were not heavily involved in the creative 
processes of game design—though people of African descent were hired as voice and motion 
capture performers—but rather that two seemingly different games, in terms of genre, gameplay, 
and narrative, made by two seemingly different populations, Edinburgh, Scotland (Grand Theft 
Auto) and Osaka, Japan (Resident Evil 5), could both present racially problematic games, and 
then defend those actions under the guise of authenticity. This is not to suggest that either a game 
is inauthentic or authentic, but rather that the regime of truth upon which to validate the 
authenticity of each game is that of Empire. In other words, the meticulous geographic mapping 
of actual urban spaces and the use of historically appropriate music and other cultural 
iconography, in Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, works to evacuate history from processes of 
racialization—race is space and the ghetto is the truth of African American identity.xxiii 
Likewise, a similar evacuation of history occurs in Resident Evil 5. Resident Evil 5, like Grand 
Theft Auto: San Andreas, makes use of history only insofar as to situate the spatial contexts of 
the game. Here, a history of medical and political anxiety surrounding Africa is deployed so as to 
fix the continent as a site of perpetual disease and despair—space is culture, and the wild of 
Africa is the truth of its people (See “Chapter Five”). Even the content of games is a site of 
imperial anxiety and desire. 
This is the current state of play. Practices of gaming require ever more frequent 
technological linkages, as it is no longer enough to merely own a television and video game 
console to constitute a site of legitimate gaming practices; one must now own a large, high-
definition television set, have access to high-speed, broadband Internet, and (optionally) possess 
surround sound speakers, not to mention the increasing glut of peripheries (e.g., Wii Balance 
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Board, PlayStation Move controllers). Gaming content, though having expanded to include non-
traditional audiences, remains heavily geared towards fulfilling the desires of White, 
heterosexual, masculinity. This is not to suggest that the desires of others are not being fulfilled, 
but rather that these desires are often only fulfilled to the extent that they converge with the 
interests and anxieties of White, heterosexual, masculinity. And though working within the 
industry is not as laissez-faire as once thought to be, employment within the industry (especially 
on its knowledge economy side) remains lucrative and desirable; and yet, the possibility of 
fulfilling this desire remains limited, especially for those coming from racialized and gendered 
backgrounds. This is the current state of play, and it is here we find the foundations for the 
production of a hardcore subjectivity. 
From Hardcore Technologies to Hardcore Subjectivities 
If it is true that technology aims to construct “the kind of world the machine needs” (Ellul, 
1954/1964, p. 5)—and to be clear, by technology, I mean that set of practices and modes of 
occasioning that are invested in the production and consumption of the machine we call 
technology (in this case, the video game machine)—then what kind of world is being sought 
after by the technology we call the video game? First, it should be clear that I believe standing 
behind the apparatus we call video gaming is an array of interests, including various publics, 
corporate, military, state, and non-governmental desires. These interests manifest at various 
stages, to varying effects and consequences, in the circuit of production and consumption. The 
organizing principle of these desires, and anxieties, I believe, however, is that of Empire. This is 
a global phenomenon driven by a breakdown in the integrity of the nation-state as an organizing 
principle and the subsequent rise in transnational capital as a governmental logic (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Hardt & Negri, 2001). This is not to suggest that nation-states, or 
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that the state-form more generally (in terms of supranational political bodies, such as the United 
Nations), no longer have a role in global politics, but rather that the positioning of capital as that 
which serves as the common bond between various populations thus serves as a site for political 
action that operates in excess of the interests and desires of the state-form. In other words, the 
economic (as opposed to the political) field has come to be conceived as the natural and 
legitimate site for the petitioning of interests (Foucault, 1978-1979/2008). And yet, we know, 
however, that the economic is not a natural field, but rather one that must be called upon, given 
form, and guaranteed with the backing of explicit political interests (Foucault, 1978-1979/2008), 
such as that of the legal recognition of private property which is demanded by and gives form to 
contemporary economic liberalism. As such, though the “world market both homogenizes and 
differentiates territories, rewriting the geography of the globe,” nation-states function as “filters 
of the flow of global circulation and regulators of the articulation of global capital” (Hardt & 
Negri, 2001, p. 310). To clarify my initial claim, then, if it is true that gaming constructs the kind 
of world that Empire needs, then what kind of world is being constructed by the practices of 
digital play? 
 Though this question is one that will be undertaken and put to test over the course of this 
dissertation, it seems as though exploring the production of a new subjectivity that is capable of 
carrying out and desiring the needs of imperial play is a necessary beginning. This desire is 
embedded, I believe, within the video game player in accordance with the five modes of 
technological engagement discussed above (material, form, purpose, producer, and the 
technological real). The particular configuration of this application, however, can be synthesized 
in terms of two distinct but overlapping fields of desire: material consumption and the political 
imaginary. The first concept, material consumption, means that access to the realm of the 
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political imaginary is contingent upon a certain threshold of material consumption. This does not 
mean that material production and consumption necessarily determines the form of the political 
imaginary realized within gaming practices, but rather that certain material prerequisites are 
required to even the access that political imaginary. For instance, though gaming is talked about 
as if it operates in the immaterial realm (as immaterial labor or virtual play), the production and 
consumption of gaming practices involves a transnational circuit of material procurement, 
embodied laboring practices, and environmental consequences, in terms of energy usage and 
waste disposal. This transnational circuit is expanded by orders of magnitude as we include the 
additional technologies that have transitioned from being supplemental gaming practices to that 
of essential gaming practices. These are technologies such as high-definition television displays, 
high-speed, broadband Internet, digital distribution models, add-on content, subscription based 
pay-to-play services (or advertising supported services), et cetera. In essence, though the gaming 
industry may have tracked $25.1b in consumer spending, in terms of hardware, accessories, and 
game content purchased within the United States for the year 2010 (Entertainment Software 
Association, 2011a), this economic footprint expands significantly once we consider that gaming 
practices have influenced the production and consumption of other media technologies and 
contents; moreover, though the Entertainment Software Association, as a U.S.-based association, 
only tracks sales, demographic, and usage data within the United States, gaming practices bleed 
across national borders. Put simply, engagement in contemporary digital play within the United 
States may consist of, for example: playing on a console designed by Japan-based Nintendo, with 
components from Canada-based ATI, U.S.-based IBM, and others, that was assembled in China, 
with materials procured from across the globe; connected to a television designed by a Korean-
based manufacturer (e.g., Samsung or LG), with its own circuit of production and consumption; 
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while using a broadband Internet connection (provided by AT&T) to play with a stranger in 
France; and, we have not even mentioned the game being played!  
This global network of production and consumption, is one in which the video game 
player not only participates, but adamantly desires. Gamers have come to expect and demand 
that contemporary video game consoles will link seamlessly with the other global circuits of 
production and consumption. Indeed, as noted earlier in this chapter, the dramatic decline in 
Nintendo’s 2011 economic forecast (which dropped by 80%) speaks explicitly to this gaming 
desire; though the Nintendo Wii significantly expanded the notion of what constituted a gaming 
public, through the implementation of unconventional gameplay elements (e.g., motion control), 
the company failed to integrate a global circuit of production and consumption to the same extent 
as its competitors. In other words, as impressive as the circuit described above in the previous 
paragraph may be—with its four layers of production and consumption—it pales in comparison 
to the linkages offered by other gaming practices. Nintendo has not been able to move beyond 
the construction of gaming as an entertainment supersystem, with its corresponding subject, the 
fanboy. The subjectivity of a fanboy, however, is one that is only capable of sustaining the logics 
of an entertainment supersystem—that is to fanatically consume and reproduce a narrow 
commodity across a broad spectrum of entertainment practices.  
Today, however, the subjectivity of the fanboy has given way to that of a hardcore 
subject. That is because, though Nintendo continues to produce fanboys, those same individuals 
must operate within a hardcore world, in which gaming practices are no longer confined to 
gaming, as conventionally understood, itself.xxiv What this has meant is that fanboys continue to 
be produced, but since Nintendo fanboys are notorious for purchasing almost exclusively 
Nintendo products (e.g., consuming a narrow commodity), the production of the fanboy 
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inadvertently removes Nintendo from a very important circuit of production and consumption for 
contemporary gaming practices: third-party support (See: Matthews, 2008; Muskus, 2008). 
Moreover, since third-party, multi-console games typically look and play better on other modern 
gaming consoles (e.g., the Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3), due to more advanced graphics 
processors and internal storage space and memory, Fanboys are encouraged to satisfy their 
gaming desires by owning multiple consoles: the Wii for their fanboy needs and another system 
for their hardcore needs. For instance, why buy Call of Duty: Black Ops (Activision, 2010a) for 
the Wii, when the game was obviously optimized for the PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360, as the 
game emphasizes online play, downloadable content, and high-definition graphics capabilities—
all networks of production and consumption limited or lacking on the Wii. And indeed, Call of 
Duty: Black Ops sold significantly better on these two other systems: 12.89m (Xbox 360), 
10.48m (PS3), and 1.03m (Wii) respectively (VGChartz, 2011). Here, we witness evidence of a 
desire for a global network of production and consumption manifest. 
The desire to access a global network of production and consumption speaks to the 
political realities of which the gamer is a part. One does not play for the sake of consumption, 
but rather one plays because play offers a means for making sense of (or escaping) the political 
realities of today. This desire is reflected in the content of those games that have come to serve 
as the most popular sites of play today: Call of Duty, a military-themed game, became the 
bestselling third-party console and PC franchise of all time in 2010, despite having only existed 
since 2003 (Activision-Blizzard, 2010); The Sims, a lifestyle simulator, is the bestselling PC 
franchise of all time, despite having first appeared in 2000 (Electronic Arts, 2010e); and, 
Resident Evil, a dystopian near-future, survivor horror game, which is not only an extremely 
popular franchise in its own right (Capcom, 2011b), but has also spawned the most popular video 
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game-themed movie franchise, as well as a series of comic books and novels. Though other 
popular video game genres do exist, and are worthy of analysis, it is striking that the genres 
represented above, the first-person shooter, simulation or resource management, and survivor 
horror, have dominated the industry since the turn of the century. These are not pure categories, 
as some games, such as Dead Space (Electronic Arts, 2008b) and Bioshock (2K Games, 2007), 
blend elements of multiple genres (e.g., the first-person shooter and survivor horror); but the 
point remains that the themes of war, resource management (economics), and dystopia have 
come to be increasingly popular topics in the last two decades. 
These genres are legitimate sites of desire and anxiety. To various extents and effects, 
vast publics live in a constant state of military, economic, and environmental anxiety and desire. 
If the millennium did not bring us the “Y2K bug,” as feared, it did not, however, fail to deliver 
upon the anxiety and desire embedded within that selfsame metaphor of the bug: that of a global 
order about to emerge from chrysalis. From the Gulf War of 1991 to September 11th 2001, global 
hegemony was undergoing a state of rapid metamorphosis, such as that marked by the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization and the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the 
end result being that of Empire—with the United States at its head (Hardt & Negri, 2001). What 
the new millennium brought, hence, was not something altogether new, but rather the full effect 
of a particular crystallization of global politics. This has meant: a prolonged state of global 
conflict, that of the war on terror, with no foreseeable end in sight; transnational economic links 
so powerful that financial uncertainty in one corner of the globe can destabilize whole regions in 
other parts of the globe; and, seemingly annual outbreaks of, or fear of, global epidemics, not to 
mention the seemingly unstoppable threat of global warming. As Paul Virilio (2004/2005) has 
argued, the global reach of the new millennium has resulted in a world “that is closed, 
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foreclosed, in which we [are all under threat of being] outsourced, in other words, excluded” (p. 
109). This is the political imaginary of which gaming engages: the fear of not being included in 
war (as victor), the economy (as entrepreneur), and life as we know it (as survivor). This is the 
complex web of anxiety and desire of which the production and consumption of play is a part; 
both because these practices are embedded within the circuits of production and consumption of 
gaming (e.g., the mines of the DRC [See Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009]) and because play 
itself becomes a site of legitimation, privileging certain anxieties and desires above the others. 
This then is the subjectivity that is the hardcore gamer: (1) one who’s production and 
consumption reproduces the economic circuits of Empire; and, (2) one who’s political imaginary 
converges with, and thus reproduces, the political anxieties and desires of Empire. Though not 
all gamers are necessarily hardcore gamers, to the extent that hardcore subjectivities drive the 
production and consumption of video game technologies and contents (Dyer-Witheford & de 
Peuter, 2009; Haines, 2004), then we increasingly live in a hardcore world—that is, the world of 
imperial play. The politics of this imperial play is such that the fantasy of being an imperial 
subject is seen as desirable, even if the actuality of being such a subject is often not so desirable. 
If in 2001, Lev Manovich expressed concern that work and leisure “not only […] increasingly 
involved computer use, but […] also converge around the same interfaces” (p. 77), today we are 
witnessing something quite different: today work and leisure frequently involve the same subject 
matter, or fantasy thereof. Simulations of work, warfare, and epidemic function as the model by 
which we measure actuality; when a game is deemed realistic, it is only because we have 
mistaken the mental mapping of another’s anxiety or desire for that of our own (Manovich, 
2001). When we deem a game to be realistic, we must be careful that we have not mistaken the 
desires and anxieties of Empire for our own. 
 
 
 70  
 
But I Do Not Play That Way 
Play is not personal. Though we may have our own unique reasons for engaging with play, the 
experience of play is intertwined with the practices of which make it possible to say that one is 
playing. Today, when one says she or he plays video games, behind the statement are the often 
unacknowledged circuits of production and consumption upon which digital play is made 
possible. Today, when one says she or he finds a game compelling, behind the statement is the 
often unacknowledged suspicion that such a game may not be a game at all, but rather fragments 
of an actuality. Today, when one says she or he does not play that way, the belief is that her or 
his gaming practices have not necessarily aligned with the dominant regime of imperial play, in 
terms of the: material, form, purpose, and/or producer. These beliefs are not necessarily 
incorrect. One may play games only developed by independent game designers, so as to 
somewhat mitigate the circuits of production and consumption of video gaming, at least on the 
knowledge economy side—as a physical console or computer is still needed to play. One may 
play games only with others physically present, so that the form of play is grounded within 
community values. One may play games only dealing with “innocent” subject matter, such as 
Cooking Mama (Taito, 2006), so as to avoid the more troubling politics of play. And, one may 
play games only developed by companies with a strong commitment to workplace diversity, so 
as to promote the development of more diverse gaming content. These are all viable gaming 
options that run up against the dominant logic of imperial play. 
And yet, one does not need to play that way to still satisfy the desires of Empire. The 
console assembly workers in Guadalajara, Mexico, still work under harsh conditions, and will 
still see their factory close in favor of cheaper labor markets (See Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 
2009), regardless of how one plays the pro-Empire content of the Call of Duty series (Activision, 
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2003b, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a), or even the anti-Empire content of the Metal 
Gear Solid series (Konami, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2008). Why are we lead to believe that satisfying 
a given populations’ desire “to play shooter games one way or another” with “homegrown 
alternatives allowing [these] youths to play from their own [culture’s] perspective [and] not as 
surrogate Americans,” would fundamentally reconfigure the logics of the game play algorithm 
(Galloway, 2006, p. 82), as opposed to just the parameters of play; this is not to suggest that 
parameters are unimportant, but rather that if the fundamental logic of contemporary play is that 
of the algorithm, and mastery of the game requires that one submit to the logic of another 
(Crogan, 2003; Manovich, 2001), then how can merely flipping the parameters of play (e.g., the 
enemy is now them, rather than us) transform the ideological desires of the game, when even if 
the parameters are different, the flipping itself remains the same? In other words, if the 
fundamental logic of the first person shooter is to “fight, resist and destroy your enemy,” 
precisely how does it matter whether the enemy is Hezbollah, the National Alliance (a white 
separatist group), the U.S. Military, or Electronic Arts that is the one encouraging us to do so 
(See: R. Armstrong, 2005; Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Edge, 2011b; Harnden, 2004; 
Wiltenburg, 2003)? My point is not to suggest that Hezbollah, Activision, the U.S. Military, or 
the National Alliance are equally illegitimate or legitimate organizations, but rather that when 
each of these four (and there are definitely more) unique and very different populations each find 
a particular video game form to be a suitable site for recruitment of future military personnel, 
then we must ask: is it the genre that is flexible enough to satisfy the anxieties and desires of 
such different groups? Or is it that the groups are each flexible enough to conform their anxieties 
and desires to the logics of the genre? In this case, the logic of war: enemies are always already 
enemies; the heroes are unquestionably heroic; and, violence is the only realistic option. 
 
 
 72  
 
Though legitimate (and illegitimate) desires and anxieties are addressed via contemporary 
gaming practices, if we are truly to commit to not playing that way, and undermining the logic of 
Empire, then we must attempt to grasp the totality of gaming as a global practice. Addressing 
individual strands of gaming—as in focusing solely on the material, form, purpose, or producers 
of play—has proved to be a worthwhile practice throughout the history of game studies, insofar 
as it is useful to know how representation functions in video games or that various communities 
can redeploy the same genre so as to serve their particular needs. And yet, failing to grasp, or at 
least attempting to grasp, the totality of play, is to risk not recognizing what Nancy Fraser (2009) 
has termed, critical theory’s “’dangerous liaison’ with neoliberalism” (p. 114).xxv Or to restate 
this for our interests here, failing to recognize the totality that is play means that we risk 
celebrating gaming practices without understanding the various substructures embedded 
throughout. In the chapters that follow, dedicated to the popular gaming themes of warfare, 
resource management, and dystopia, I attempt to grasp as best as possible the totality of that 
which is gaming: (1) so as to recognize the dangerous liaisons that exist between digital play and 
Empire; and, (2) to learn how we might better exploit those moments of not playing that way. 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
xiii Patrick Crogan’s recently released “Gameplay Mode: War, Simulation, and Technoculture” (2011) serves as an 
important exception, however. That said, I am confident that Crogan would agree that the field of game studies in 
general has shown an aversion to considering digital play as an important engine of contemporary global capital. So 
though the logistics of writing have prevented me from thoroughly engaging this recent work, I am pleased to see 
that others, perhaps more capable than I, am looking towards such questions. 
xiv To be fair, Aaron Hess would probably not define himself as a technological determinist, but rather a rhetorician. 
However, to the extent that his analysis of Medal of Honor: Rising Sun leaves aside the question of technology, his 
position ultimately results in the same conclusion as that of the penultimate technological determinist, Neal 
Postman; Hess writes, “Since fully representing war is impossible [in video games], the limited participation of 
Rising Sun gamers leads to a critical blindness regarding modern warfare” (p. 352).   
xv By totality, I do not mean that the task of the critic is to reproduce the geopolitical and historical record of a given 
domain in its absolute—that is, reproduce a map the size of the territory—as I do not believe this is even possible, or 
useful. Rather, I mean that we must seek to understand how our domain operates as a complex whole in conjunction 
and tension with other contemporary and historical political projects. 
xvi Consumption itself is a form of waste production. In the video game industry, this is evidenced by the fact that 
with every new iteration of a video game console, prior software is rendered obsolete in that new consoles can rarely 
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read the code of previous hardware. And though backwards compatibility has emerged as a counterpoint to this 
claim, this mechanism does not stifle the production of waste, but actively reproduces it: for instance, the shift to 
digital distribution as a means of backwards compatibility (e.g., God of War Collections [Sony Computer 
Entertainment, 2009]) effectively destabilizes the collectors industry, thus removing an important site in the 
recycling of old game hardware and software—that is, with digital distribution, less people will be inclined to hold 
on to old gaming platforms because new gaming platforms contain the perceptual experience of the old one. 
Moreover, to the extent that digital play is increasingly tied to accounts, it is foreseeable that the circulation, and 
hence ownership, of older consoles will be actively discouraged in that software may be locked to given 
system/account so as to deter presumed piracy; thus, effectively reducing prior systems to what is known within the 
gaming community as a “brick”—that is, a useless, non-functioning, piece of technology. 
xvii Some may object, and protest that those studying the consumption side of gaming (e.g., psychoanalysis, media 
effects, and audience studies) are in actuality concerned with locating the effects of technology. True as this may be, 
however, those studying the effects of the consumption of video games frequently abstract the ends of technology 
from the ends of society itself. In other words, if searching for the consequence of technology can be properly 
thought of as searching for the telos of a technology, then one is in actuality looking for “that which in advance” 
gives boundaries to the production and consumption of the thing (Heidegger, 1954/1977a, p. 8); psychoanalysis, 
media effects, and audience studies are not often interested in understanding “that which in advance confines” the 
intention of a given technology, but rather take as their starting point the formal attributes of technology as a 
given—and then, subsequently, how is it that this form is consumed. Hence, rather than being concerned with 
understanding the causa efficiens of technology, that which “is responsible for what has matter and for what as 
[form] are together co-responsible for” (Heidegger, 1954/1977a), studies of consumption often ignore the interests 
that stand behind the construction of a given technology, and instead take technology to be an effect without cause. 
xviii Steven Jones offers this to the observation in relation to the practices of ludologists in contrast to that of other 
approaches to video game studies, such as narratologists and cultural studies inspired modes of analysis. To the 
extent, however, that many narrative and cultural approaches to the understanding of video games focus on the game 
content itself, at the expense of “authorial, historical, or cultural factors,” then these studies are as confined to the 
formal characteristics of the video game as ludologists—but in terms of literary formalism as opposed to gameplay 
formalism (See: Hess, 2007; Murray, 1997). 
xix Though to be clear, movement for some operates on the outer limits of choice—thereby suggesting that so too is 
stasis, sometimes, a sign of privilege. 
xx It is a wonder as to why Henry Jenkins demonstrates particular nuance regarding the play of pleasure and control 
in this earlier writing on the form of new media, explicitly gaming, whereas in his later, Convergence Culture 
(2006), pleasure is placed on the side of play and control is conceived as something that can be and is to be 
overcome—thus celebrating new media as antithetical to control, thereby obscuring the nuance of his earlier theory. 
xxi Algorithms obviously are more than just the steps needed to excel within a game, but for the concerns of the 
player, the algorithm of the game is that which must be learned so as to excel in the game (Crogan, 2003). 
xxii As an analytic, however, it still can be useful to set technology (understood in the conventional sense) apart so as 
to understand the politics invested within the machine itself, for politics often operates “under the cover of technical 
necessity” (Starr, 2004, p. 6). 
xxiii To a lesser extent this critique could be levied chords that of Grand Theft Auto: Vice City (Rockstar Games, 
2002) and other games in the Grand Theft Auto series; the difference, perhaps, is that the characters starring in the 
other games can all to some extent lay claim to Whiteness. The problem then, is that these other characters function 
as warnings against ethnic identification amongst White peoples. Whiteness, conceived as a utopian space, is 
necessarily a non-space, protected us such by the lack of ethnic identification. The trouble then, is that Tommy 
Vercetti (Vice City) and Niko Bellic (Grand Theft Auto IV [Rockstar Games, 2008]) identify as Italian and Eastern 
European, respectively, as opposed to white; whereas such an option is never available, more even possible, for CJ 
(GTA: San Andreas [Rockstar Games, 2004]).  
xxiv Here, I am speaking exclusively of end-user gaming practices (i.e., using a game machine to play games versus 
using a game machine to connect to the internet or watch a movie). 
xxv Nancy Fraser is speaking specifically of feminist theory in this article, however, while speaking at the University 
of Illinois in 2011, she elaborated that her target was critical theory more generally (See: Bulut, 2011; Kwon, 2011).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF PLAY: LOGISTICS OF ANXIETY AND DESIRE 
 
David Harvey (2007) has written that “future historians may well look upon the years 1978-1980 
as a revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history” (p. 1). Those who do 
will be unable to avoid the role new information and communication technologies have played 
within this political economic revolution. If old communication technologies, such as the 
telegraph and train, brought about the standardization of time via time-zones and promises of 
sustaining the integrity of nation-states and colonial empires (Carey, 1975/2009, 1983/2009), 
then new communication technologies, such as the internet and mobile telephony, have sought to 
undermine notions of time and space itself. Whereas old communication technologies sought to 
regulate time (e.g., I cannot work when I am asleep), new communication technologies seek to 
penetrate time (e.g., I continue to work through automation even when I am asleep). Again, 
David Harvey (1990) is instructive: “Financial services and markets (aided by computerized 
trading) likewise speeded up, so as to make, as the saying has it, ‘twenty-four hours a very long 
time’ in global stock markets” (p. 285).  
And yet, the key to understanding the effects and consequences of the political economic 
revolution brought about during the years 1978-1980 cannot be understood only in terms of the 
compression of time and space, that is transmission. For as John Dewey (1916/1955) noted, 
society exists not only “by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said to exist in 
transmission, in communication” (p. 5). To the extent that this is true, then our accounts of the 
effects and consequences of new communication technologies cannot be solely occupied with the 
accelerating compression of time and space (e.g., transmission), as important as this may be, but 
must also take care to note the transforming social relations brought about by a society 
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increasingly operating in accordance to the logic of these new communication technologies, that 
is an attention to the rituals associated with these new ICTs. The production and consumption of 
a particular communications regime speaks to the anxieties and desires of a given time and place 
(R. Williams, 1974/2005). To understand the role new ICTs have had in the configuration of 
contemporary national and transnational culture and economies, then, it seems pertinent to 
understand how this technological regime was articulated in relationship to existent social 
anxieties and desires. A key site for understanding the historical and ongoing articulation of this 
relationship, I argue, is to be found within the history of the video game industry. 
 The ubiquity of new information and communication technologies, however, can obscure 
the role the video game has played and continues to play in the development and ongoing 
ecosystem of new ICTs. Though the concept of contemporary ICTs had existed theoretically 
since Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine (in 1832), and would come to function as a reality as 
early as 1940 with the creation of the ABC and Ultra electronic computers (Kurzweil, 1999), the 
general public’s first encounter with new ICTs would come in the form of the video game. As 
Tim Wu (2010) has written, it was not until 1977, with the introduction of the Apple II, that 
“personal computing, an obscure pursuit of the hobbyist, [became] a nationwide phenomenon” 
(p. 275); only two years prior, in 1975, the sales of personal computers had just exceeded 5,000 
units (Kurzweil, 1999). In contrast, the first video game console available to consumers, the 
Magnavox Odyssey, sold between 85,000 to 100,000 units in 1972, the year it was released 
(Herz, 1997; Kent, 2001); this is in addition to the arcade market, of which Pong, the first arcade 
success, had an installation base of 100,000 units by 1974 (Montfort & Bogost, 2009), and was 
so popular at its first location, Andy Capp’s Tavern, that two-weeks after being installed, the 
machine jammed due to being overloaded with coins (Kent, 2001).xxvi For the vast majority of 
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the public in the 1970s, video games were their first encounter with new media technologies; and 
this continues be true to this day, with the Pew Research Center’s Internet and American Life 
project (2012) reporting that, in 2009, more teenagers had access to a gaming device than they 
did a cell phone, computer, or even MP3 player (See Figure 3.1; See also Lenhart, 2009). 
Though the early and ongoing popularity of the video game can be at least partially 
explained in terms of relative cost for households with more limited (though still substantial) 
disposable incomes, this statement alone is not enough if we are to understand the political 
Figure 3.1. Teen Gadget Ownership. 
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economic significance of the video games popularity. To begin, some numbers are in order. As 
noted above, the personal computer was still a very rare and expensive technology in the mid-
1970s. The first popular, widely adopted personal computer, the Apple II cost $1,298, upon its 
release in 1977 (Montfort & Bogost, 2009). After accounting for inflation, this is the equivalent 
of $4,859 in terms of purchasing power today (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). In contrast, the 
Atari 2600, released the same year, sold at $199 (Montfort & Bogost, 2009), or $745 in today’s 
terms (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). Economic barriers to arcade machines were, and 
continue to be, even lower, costing the consumer mere quarters to play—though this can quickly 
add up through multiple play attempts. This cost differential between full-featured computers 
and dedicated gaming consoles clearly illustrates the financial barriers that made purchasing a 
Figure 3.2. The ICT Public (1970-1976). Sources include Friedman (2005), Herz (1997), and Kent (2005). 
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Figure 3.3. The ICT Public (1977-1985). Sources include Friedman (2005), Kent (2005), and Sheff (1999). 
 
personal computer economically unfeasible for the vast majority of the public (See Figures 3.2-
3). It does not explain, however, why these economic barriers existed in the first instance. 
Differences in technological capabilities only offer a partial answer, for though the first home 
video game consoles were closed-circuit systems featuring only a handful of games and 
extremely simplistic technology, even for the period, beginning with the Atari 2600, however, 
video game consoles have frequently shared similar technological components and, especially 
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today, capabilities (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Montfort & Bogost, 2009). Regarding 
the Atari 2600, for instance, the core microprocessor, the MOS 6507, “from a programmer’s 
perspective, […] behaves more or less identically to a 6502 [the same chip used to power the 
Apple I and Apple II], but it cannot address as much memory, a limitation that ended up 
affecting the maximum capacity of videogame cartridges” (Montfort & Bogost, 2009, p. 13). 
Though a price difference existed between the chips, $20-25 for the 6502 versus $5 for the 6507 
(Goldberg, 2007; Montfort & Bogost, 2009; Moritz; O'Grady, 2009), this difference translates 
into roughly $50-75 today (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011), and hence it is not enough to 
account for the economic logics operating in the personal computing and video gaming markets. 
 Moreover, though relatively less expensive than early personal computers, dedicated 
video game consoles were still considerably expensive for the average household (See Figures 
3.2-3). Hence, the rapid and widespread historical adoption of dedicated video game consoles—
not to mention the ubiquity of gaming across both dedicated and general purpose new media 
technologies today—would appear to speak to the capacity for digital play, as it has been 
historically configured, to speak to the anxieties and desires of various populations. To put this 
more clearly, digital play has the ability to motivate players to engage in mundane and 
monotonous behaviors that—outside of the realm of gaming—the subject would ostensibly 
otherwise not choose to participate. Examples include: the Harvest Moon franchise (Natsume, 
1996, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2010), a popular and long running farming simulation series, 
wherein the player is compelled to begin each virtual day by watering crops, milking cows, and 
managing the other intricacies of running a farm (See Figure 3.4); the Diner Dash series 
(PlayFirst, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2010), a popular restaurant strategy franchise, wherein the 
player is compelled to perform the duties of a restaurant server as quickly and efficiently as 
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Figure 3.4. Harvest Moon (Natsume, 1996). Here the player is watering crops she has 
planted. 
Figure 3.5. Diner Dash (PlayFirst, 2003). One would be excused for mistaking the 
game to be an electronic training simulator for servers. 
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Figure 3.6. The Sims 3: Showtime (2012). This expansion pack for The Sims 3 allows for players to live out their 
dreams of becoming a singer, acrobat, magician, and/or DJ. 
possible within a given period of time (See Figure 3.5); as well as the incredibly popular The 
Sims franchise (Electronic Arts, 2000b, 2004b, 2010e), which offers the player the opportunity to 
simulate one’s imaginary life (See Figure 3.6); et cetera. My characterization of these games is 
not meant to position those who play these games as unrefined or cultural dupes, but rather that 
the fact that these games and others like them are so incredibly popular is a testament to their 
ability to capture the anxieties and desires of various gaming populations. Indeed, the games 
mentioned here, and those of the simulation and strategy genre more generally, often engage 
with the legitimate anxieties and desires of an array of populations: nostalgia for the days when 
life seemed less hectic (e.g., Harvest Moon; See Drake, 2012); recognizing the skill involved in 
efficiently managing the floor of a restaurant (e.g., Diner Dash; See Saltzman, 2005); and the 
dream of living the life you always wanted (e.g., The Sims; See Electronic Arts, 2011b). Caught 
up as these games are within the anxieties and desires of a given moment, however, lends them 
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to imagine, and thus code (that is hardwire), the game world according to various economic 
logics: in Harvest Moon, all actions are arranged according to units of energy and time; in Diner 
Dash, patrons are organized according to economic units, wherein some eat faster and tip better 
than others, so that the overriding logic is not providing a good dining experience per se, but 
rather managing the flow of customers so as to generate the most profit; and, in The Sims, the 
totality of life operates within an economic framework so that friendship, for instance, often is 
included as an employment variable with promotions contingent upon whether one has a certain 
threshold of friends—even when those friends have little to nothing to do with the employment 
network. 
 Hence, it seems to me that gaming operates as an important engine and archive of 
contemporary economic anxiety and desires. So that we might understand how it is that video 
games have come to operate as an important node in this historical, geographical, and 
technological terrain that constitute the circuits of production and consumption of contemporary 
economic anxiety and desire, this chapter is structured as follows: (1) I offer a rough history of 
the political economic configuration of the video game industry, focusing specifically on how 
certain economic logics have come to be embedded within its circuits of production and 
consumption; and, (2) I then explore the historical trajectory of the Civilization series, an iconic 
franchise of significant industry renown, thus offering the franchise as an electronic archive 
documenting the maturation of contemporary economic anxiety and desire. Throughout this 
chapter, my argument is that the experience we call digital play has come to function as an 
important site of global economic production, consumption, and thus, transformation. 
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Electronic Engines of Economic Transition 
The emergence of the video game industry marked a fundamental shift in the economic logic of 
the new communication industries, and encapsulated the political economic anxiety and desire of 
the 1970s more generally. The computer industry, in contrast, operated as an outgrowth of the 
military-industrial economic model that had dominated the U.S.’s political economic system 
since the early part of the 20th century (Sennett, 1998). This economic system operated according 
to the logic of a “paternalistic capitalism,” as best exemplified by the company IBM (Sennett, 
1998, p. 122). This political economic structure meant that, like an army, the company promised 
to take care of the worker as long as the worker remained fully committed to the business 
(Sennett, 1998). This managerial system went hand-in-hand with the Keynesian political 
economic philosophy that had come to dominate the U.S. economic system from the 1930s to 
1970s (See Harvey, 2007). The U.S. government’s active involvement in maintaining this 
political economic interest meant that those companies working in the military-industrial sector 
had come to expect a certain economic routine: 
The timelines and reliability requirements for military software are frequently created in a pork-
barrel milieu. The software has to be extremely reliable, although in practice no software is 
completely reliable. [….] And, as with any large project, any changes anywhere in the system 
must have a paper trail—revision requests, authorizations, confirmations. These are well-worn and 
quite serviceable histories of successful large-project management. (Stone, 1995/1998, pp. 129-
130) 
This economic structure guaranteed a certain sense of financial stability in return for reliable and 
consistent service. In other words, these corporations could charge premiums on particular 
commodities because these businesses had established a strong, enduring relationship with its 
consumer and/or government base. The emerging personal computer industry sought to replicate 
this model; Apple, for instance, early on sought to become “your personal computer company,” 
so that the question for the consumer is “not Apple but which Apple” (Clyde Folley and Maurice 
Goldman, qtd. in Moritz, p. 61). For those of the last few generations, however, though the 
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corporate appeal remains, the bureaucratic structure from which it emerged, are remnants of a 
history of mundane, mind-numbing labor performed by the “‘time-servers’ and others wrapped 
in the armor of bureaucracy” (See "Rico," Sennett, 1998, p. 18). The early counter-cultural 
hackers from which the video game industry emerged agreed. 
 The video game industry grew out of a fusion between certain strands of the counter-
cultural hacker and student movements of the 1960s and the economic appeal of corporate 
capital (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). These early members of the industry wanted to 
experience a certain level of financial security, but wished to obtain this economic success 
through a hip, “play-as-work” ethos (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009, p. 12). As Jason D. 
O’Grady (2009) gushingly writes: they worked to prove that “you could not only have fun at 
work, but that pursuing a capitalist dream could be hip” (p. x).xxvii Due at least in part to their 
early success, this and subsequent generations have considered flexibility, being open to change 
and taking risks, as desirable workplace features (Sennett, 1998). Though in practice this has 
often meant extended hours of unpaid labor, and constant economic uncertainty, the allure of 
flexible labor and the promise of getting paid for doing what one loves has continued to be 
incredibly attractive for contemporary generations of workers (Bonds, et al., 2004; Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; EA Spouse, 2004; McMillen, 2011; Sennett, 1998). And this is 
why the economic barriers to procuring video game commodities have historically been low: the 
transference of risk.  
At a very early stage in its economic development, the video game industry sought 
multiple avenues for transferring risk to anyone who would take it—from the consumer to the 
workers themselves. This is in part due to an economic collapse experienced by the industry at 
an early point in its development, for when the industry first began it too sought to mimic the 
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economic structures of older, established media institutions. Just as broadcast content was 
created so as to sell radio and television sets and audiences (Baughman, 2006; Smythe, 1977; 
Starr, 2004), so too was game content developed to sell systems (with the major difference being 
that the first consoles housed all their content within the system). Publics, however, operate 
according to different economic practices than corporations and governments. Unlike broadcast 
media, which could rely on advertising so as to provide the “free-lunch” of information about the 
interests of regional, national, and global concern that were in heavy demand at the turn of the 
century (Smythe, 1977; R. Williams, 1974/2005), the video game industry had to ask for the 
consumer to invest in what was essentially a one-and-done form of entertainment. There was no 
“free-lunch” that would be supplied after purchasing the unit, as with television, nor even a 
razor-and-blades business model that would later come to dominate the industry—with a 
significant, neoliberal difference (see below)—rather, the consumer was asked to pay a premium 
for an electronic toy that offered a very limited list of features: 
Here’s this thing I wanted to sell for $19.95 coming out at $100. Then in [Magnavox’s] 
advertising they showed it hooked up to Magnavox TV sets and gave everyone the impression that 
this thing only worked on Magnavox TV sets. (Ralph Bare, qtd. in Kent, 2001, p. 25)  
Though the Magnavox Odyssey initially sold well, the market was soon saturated with other 
“Pong clones” (the major game featured on these early video game consoles) and with 
consumers being asked to pay from $60 to $100 (i.e., $253 to $421 today) to choose between 
amongst 30 “Home Pong machines,” which could have been sold at one-third the price, the 
industry crashed in 1977 (Herz, 1997, pp. 34-35). The consumer would only carry so much risk. 
 This realization marked a fundamental reconfiguration of new media labor practices, 
practices that have come to be standard operating procedure in other contemporary new media, 
and non-media, industries as well. If the consumer could not be trusted to pay a premium for new 
media commodities, then economic risk would need to be transferred elsewhere. For the video 
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game industry, this happened in two-steps, steps that have come to be emulated elsewhere: (1) 
innovating the extraction of work from play and leisure; and, (2) licensing out and digitizing the 
razor-and-blades business model. Regarding the first, the video game industry sought to craft the 
appearance of being a hip, counter-cultural, play-as-work career opportunity (Dyer-Witheford & 
de Peuter, 2009; Stone, 1995/1998). The atmosphere of holding meetings in hot tubs, gathering 
for “Friday night beer busts,” naming projects after sexy female employees, as well as drug 
experimentation and the prospect of playing free games, was a carefully crafted managerial 
strategy designed by Nolan Bushnell while at Atari so as to ensure that workers and colleagues 
would buy into his business philosophy (Kent, 2001, pp. 51, 56-57). And though this atmosphere 
proved to be fun for some—if not exclusively for male employees—low-level employees were 
expected to work 16-hour shifts from time to time, while only receiving a mere $1.75 per hour 
($6.55 today), plus benefits to build arcade units that sold for roughly $1,200 ($4,500 today), 
though it only cost Atari about $300-400 to build them (Kent, 2001, pp. 51-53). Though 
disillusionment existed then, and continues to exist, within the industry, and elsewhere, regarding 
the false promises of flexible capital (Bonds, et al., 2004; EA Spouse, 2004; Kent, 2001; 
McMillen, 2011; Sennett, 1998; Stone, 1995/1998), the industry continues to invest heavily in 
sustaining the appearance of being a site of playful labor (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). 
 In 1977, the first step, of exploiting the playful labor of the employees of the video game 
industry, was established, and would come to be standard operating procedure by those who 
would follow in the industry.xxviii As this practice would come to mature, the playful element 
would come to only define those labors directly connected with software production (e.g., 
programmers, artists, et cetera), and even then not always (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009). 
And even though working at some corporations, such as Electronic Arts, can offer promises of 
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beautiful workplace facilities, such as high-quality gyms, soccer fields, and subsidized gourmet 
food, the expectation is that these amenities are “just candy”: 
You’ll walk around and you’ll see the amenities: is it the steam room, the fitness centre, the 
subsidized gourmet meals, the cappuccino machines [that contribute to EA’s economic success]? 
[….] It’s all of that, but that’s just candy. The guts of it that makes it a cool place to be, is that the 
people here want to win. Trying is nice, making mistakes is okay, but it’s all about winning. 
Here it is, 3:30, a gorgeous afternoon, and my soccer field is empty. But I can tell you that at 3:30 
this morning, there will be 75 people in this building working their butts off. (Glenn Wong, EA-
Canada president, qtd. in C. Taylor, 1999) 
For others working at less established corporations, the amenities are limited to free pizza and 
admission to the Electronics Entertainment Expo (E3), though the expectation of all-nighters, 
long hours, and crunch continue to be the same (Bonds, et al., 2004); and even then, it is difficult 
to appreciate any workplace perks, whether at Electronic Arts or some smaller company, when 
structural crunch is implemented so as to make 65-80 hour work weeks common (Bonds, et al., 
2004; EA Spouse, 2004). These perks as it is, however, are already becoming a thing of the past 
as video game corporations are increasingly outsourcing rote programming, game porting, and 
made-to-order artwork to “lower tax” venues (read: Eastern Europe, China, India, and Latin 
America) (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; C. Taylor, 1999).  
This fate had already befallen those employed as physical laborers in the industry, when 
in 1984 Atari began to shift console manufacturing overseas to Hong Kong and Taiwan: “This 
was the first in a series of offshore migrations that gutted Silicon Valley as an electronic 
manufacturing center” (Kline, et al., 2003, p. 206). This practice was continued and perfected by 
Nintendo and other subsequent console manufactures (Herz, 1997), especially after the passage 
of NAFTA and other neoliberal policies made it easier to work across economic borders (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kline, et al., 2003). Whereas in 1977, Atari had once offered 
assembly and loading dock workers “Friday night beer busts” (Kent, 2001, p. 51), by 1992, 
Nintendo’s six distribution center loaders would barely constitute a party; this after Nintendo 
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opted to implement a state-of-the-art distribution center, equipped with automated robots, in 
North Bend, Indiana: “before, we had 20 people doing 1,000 orders a day, […] Now we have six 
people doing 2,500 orders a day” (Wayne Hamilton, Nintendo's Director of Distribution, qtd. in 
Erickson, 1992). And though Hamilton would insist that Nintendo’s shift to “just in time” 
manufacturing—a trend shared by other major corporations, such as Boeing and Wal-Mart—did 
not result in significant savings from firing people (Erickson, 1992), the infrastructure would 
make it easier to relocate its U.S. console and game manufacturing operations from Redmond, 
Washington to “free trade” zones in Mexico and elsewhere (Kline, et al., 2003). The high-tech 
distribution network had come to be so successful that in 1997, The Economist described 
Nintendo as a model “fabless” corporation—that is a manufacturing firm “with no fabrication 
facilities of [its] own” ("Fabulous," 1997). The shift to transnational manufacturing practices has 
not just resulted in the loss of jobs in the U.S., Japan, Western Europe, and elsewhere, but also 
increased exploitation and economic inequity in the regions in which these facilities have been 
relocated (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kerr, 2006; Kline, et al., 2003). For instance, at a 
Maxi-Switch manufacturing plant for Nintendo’s Game Boy in Cananea, Mexico, “local health 
officials made three to four ambulance trips a day during the summer months to rescue those 
who had collapsed on the production lines”; all this for $3.50 per day—not per hour—after 
working a ten-hour shift (Kline, et al., 2003, p. 207). 
These experiences and reports of economic exploitation are amplified in that not only has 
the industry sought to extract the greatest amount of value from the cheapest amount of labor 
possible, through outsourcing and the relocation of production facilities to countries with lax 
labor laws, but also through the industry’s reconfiguration of the razor-and-blades business 
model in terms acceptable for contemporary digital neoliberal capital. As we know, the razor-
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and-blades business model is geared around the concept that a given company will sell the main 
hardware or platform (i.e., the razor) at cost or little profit, and then seek to turn a significant 
profit by selling the essential, complimentary parts or software at a premium. The razor-and-
blades business model became a staple of the video game industry as a response to the hardware 
crash of 1977. Early home video game consoles were closed-circuit systems featuring Pong and 
a handful of other hardwired games. In 1977, a flood of companies hoping to make a fortune off 
the Pong video game phenomenon overloaded the video game market with Home Pong consoles 
leading to market saturation, and then a subsequent industry crash (Herz, 1997; Kent, 2001). 
Atari and other companies realized that even if the closed-circuit market had been cornered, 
“owning the system wouldn’t have done anything to directly influence future purchases” 
(Montfort & Bogost, 2009, p. 10). This led Atari and a handful of other video game companies, 
such as Magnavox and Fairchild Semiconductor International, to introduce open, interchangeable 
cartridge systems (Montfort & Bogost, 2009). 
With the advent of the cartridge system, video game console manufacturers opted to 
follow the razor-and-blades business model so as to lock in future consumers (Kent, 2001; 
Montfort & Bogost, 2009). The business model, however, makes sense only “if customers are 
loyal or if the [company] can block other firms from entering the blade market” (Picker, 2010, p. 
2). The proprietary nature of video game consoles initially served as an adequate barrier to 
keeping other companies out of the “blade market” (i.e., producing cartridges that could play on 
a competitors’ console) (Montfort & Bogost, 2009). In 1979, however, four Atari programmers 
left the company to establish the first independent home console video game developer (Kent, 
2001; Montfort & Bogost, 2009). Every Activision cartridge sold was an attack on Atari’s razor-
and-blades business model, as the expectation is that the razor-selling company will find the 
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majority of its profit from the selling of blades. Though Atari would later implement a third-
party licensing system to deal with this situation (in 1982), the damage had already been done as 
an influx of independent developers had already been in existence for many years (Montfort & 
Bogost, 2009). In 1983, the industry crashed again, this time due to an overload of poorly 
designed games, as well as from the strain of having to endure a cumbersome business model 
(Herz, 1997; Kent, 2001; Sheff, 1993/1999). The industry had come to be too risky for all 
participants involved. Console manufacturers could not be confident that selling video game 
systems as razors was a worthwhile endeavor; after all: 
If the razors are actually being sold at a loss [or little profit] then a better strategy seems clear: let 
the other guy sell the razors […] while you sell only the profitable blades. You don’t have to lose 
money on the razors if some other poor sap is willing to do so. Remember the money is in the 
blades. (Picker, 2010, pp. 1-2) 
Consumers, whom took on risk by investing in a particular console and the purchase of 
subsequent cartridges with the hope that they would see a return in entertainment value, found 
themselves unable to distinguish the good games from the bad (Herz, 1997; Kent, 2001). And 
this decline in consumer sentiment towards home video game consoles, meant that whatever U.S. 
video game developers had survived the 1983 industry crash felt that the personal computer 
industry served as the more steady and viable video game market (Sheff, 1993/1999). For the 
home console segment of the video game industry to resurrect itself, risk would have to be 
reallocated across at least one of these sectors so as to make the other participants willing to 
return to the market. 
Though the razor-and-blades business model had successfully operated in the toy-
industry at least since 1959, with Mattel’s Barbie and accessories (Kinder, 1991/1993), as the 
experience of Atari and other console manufacturers would suggest in 1983, the model would 
need to be reconfigured to work for the video game industry. The model would not just be 
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reconfigured, however, but rather taken to new heights by Nintendo in 1986 (Kline, et al., 2003). 
Nintendo realized that to revitalize the comatose U.S. video game industry, the company would 
need to carefully regulate the amount of risk operating in the market. The razor-and-blades 
model in itself was not enough, for that business practice was only capable of lowering the 
threshold of market participation for new consumers—i.e., lower the risk of initial entry; but it 
could not, however, sustain this low-level of risk for returning consumers, and did nothing to 
protect console manufacturers from the threat of independent game developers. A free-market 
was a dead-market in the eyes of Nintendo, consumers, and even independent developers and 
retailers alike (See Sheff, 1993/1999).  
To resurrect this market, Nintendo sought to regulate risk through two interlocking 
mechanisms: an ironclad licensing system and its technological manifestation, the 10NES lock-
out chip—which worked to, or at least attempted to, prevent unlicensed parties from developing 
NES games. Regarding the licensing system, Nintendo recognized that the presence of third-
party developers contributed to the intrinsic value of the video game console, in that games made 
available for the system constitute durable goods that may deter consumers from switching to 
other platforms, as long as the quality of those games remain high (Kline, et al., 2003). As 
Randall Picker (2010) explains, video games and other new media software operate differently 
than prior razor-and-blade commodities in that: 
An Xbox customer can’t easily switch over to a new game system from Sony, even if Sony 
offered the game box for free. Switching means forfeiting the installed base of Xbox games. This 
isn’t a sunk-cost fallacy: the games are genuine usable assets that bring a functionality to the Xbox 
customer and that wouldn’t be available on the competing platform, at least not without spending 
money to buy new games for the new platform. (p. 15) 
Nintendo could not provide this intrinsic value alone, for even then, in the mid-1980s, game 
development had become a time-consuming, expensive, and risky affair (Kline, et al., 2003). 
Third-party developers made up this difference, thereby adding value to the ownership of a 
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particular console—that is adding switching costs to the system—but to the extent that a game 
console manufacturer profited off the sale of game units, as opposed to hardware, then this 
would be value added that Nintendo or any other manufacturer would possibly never see. Hence, 
Nintendo worked to devise an elaborate licensing system which would allow for it to recognize 
the benefits of independent developers’ involvement while simultaneously minimizing any risk 
from their participation: 
The plan had Nintendo evaluating every game and giving it a rating on forty-point scale. Licensees 
then would place an order for at least 10,000 cartridges. The finished cartridges, manufactured by 
NCL in Kyoto, would be sold back to the developers. Depending on the memory capacity 
required, Nintendo charged up to $9 to $14 per cartridge. The agreement stated that the price 
‘includes both the cost of manufacturing, printing, and packaging the [games] and royalty for the 
use of [Nintendo’s] licensed intellectual properties.’ Licensees ended up taking on all inventory, 
distribution, and sales responsibilities—and all risks. (Sheff, 1993/1999, p. 215) 
This licensing agreement clearly benefited Nintendo at the expense of independent developers in 
that further stipulations prohibited licensees from releasing more than five Nintendo games a 
year, and further required developers to agree to an exclusivity clause which forbade developers 
from porting any game for a period of two-years from the date of initial release (Sheff, 
1993/1999); in addition, for every game manufactured, Nintendo made $5 profit, regardless of 
whether the game sold or not (Sheff, 1993/1999).  
Whether or not the system resulted in the production of superior quality games for the 
consumer is a matter of debate. Nintendo argued that the policy benefited the player for: 
if [the developer] could only make [games] for the NES and only make a limited number of 
games, then it might dawn on [the developer] that they had better make a good game [….] They 
couldn’t afford to make many mistakes because they only had five shots a year. (Howard Lincoln, 
qtd. in Sheff, 1993/1999, p. 215) 
The licensing system also worked to limit the flow of games, so as to avoid the “Atari-style 
danger of overproduction” (Kline, et al., 2003, p. 114); Nintendo’s “Seal of Approval,” thus 
functioned as a promise to the consumer that the video game market’s integrity, in terms of 
quality and quantity, remained intact (See Figures 3.7-10). The licensing review process, 
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Figures 3.7-10.The Front and  Back cover for Super Mario Bros. 3 box art illustrating the size and position of 
Nintendo’s “Official Seal of Quality” for NES games. 
additionally, did benefit developers to some extent as Nintendo offered licensees access to 
“Nintendo’s marketing, development, and customer services” (Sheff, 1993/1999, p. 215). And 
yet, though this system worked and proved to be especially lucrative to Nintendo, developers, 
and retailers, at least for a time, it also provided hardware manufacturers with an unprecedented 
level of power and introduced a culture of hard and soft censorship (Montfort & Bogost, 2009; 
Sheff, 1993/1999).xxix Though it could be argued that today, this culture of hard and soft 
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censorship has dissipated, considering that there currently exist three viable console 
manufacturers and a robust personal computer gaming market, we must remember that the 1980s 
were formative years for not only the industry but the future tastes of contemporary developers 
and consumers alike. Game developers frequently craft games that they themselves want to play 
(Haines, 2004; Kerr, 2006; Peterson, 2011), and for many programmers, artists, and game 
designers, those tastes were shaped during the years when Nintendo, dominated the market. In 
other words, the market is not an apolitical, ahistorical thing, but rather has a political economic 
history.  
Clearly, then, the video game industry functions as an economic engine of anxiety and 
desire for those seeking to make a living in our contemporary economic system. From software 
engineers, artists, and other, frequently male-bodied, knowledge workers attracted to the 
promises of getting paid for doing what one loves to the often young women seeking to gain 
independence from traditional family structures by working at the maquiladoras in Mexico, and 
elsewhere, the video game industry functions as a persistent site of economic desire (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kline, et al., 2003; See also: Kirshner, et al., "Juarez"; Kirshner, 
Mackinnon, Shoebridges, & Simons, 2008). And yet, the promises of neoliberalism, flexible 
capital, or whatever name we choose to give to our contemporary global economic regime have 
often failed to pan out, at best, and at worse, have been implicated in the destruction of families 
either through increased rates of divorce (Bonds, et al., 2004) or the promotion of state-
sanctioned violence and warfare (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Halter, 2006; Kline, et al., 
2003; Peckham, 2008; R. Stahl, 2006; See also: Kirshner, et al., "Juarez"; Kirshner, et al., 2008). 
And still we play. Though the pleasure of our play may frequently be built upon the backs of 
others, documenting this political economic history can only offer a partial account as to why 
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flexible capital and its manifestation through the circuits of digital play continue to be seen, by 
some, not just as viable but also desirable as well. If it is true that popular culture constitutes an 
important site wherein political economic anxiety and desire is made, lost, and struggled over 
(Hall, 1983), and video games constitute an important site of contemporary culture (Bissell, 
2010; Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kerr, 2006; Kline, et al., 2003; McGonigal, 2011), 
then further, sustained, analysis is needed of the sites of culture itself, e.g., the games, if we are 
to understand how the anxieties and desires of flexible capital are made to resonate with our 
own. To this end, I offer a case study of the highly regarded and influential game franchise, 
Civilization. As one of the longest running and most highly regarded simulation games—
amongst industry professionals, gamers, and educators alike (Charsky & Ressler, 2011; IGN, 
2007; 2K Games, 2005a)—I believe that the Civilization franchise operates as a rich historical 
archive speaking to the ongoing economic and political anxieties and desires of various 
populations. 
Simulacra and Civilization 
In 1975, Baudrillard arrived in San Diego with “the idea that California was a testing ground of 
simulation” (qtd. in G. Dyer, 2010, p. x). Six-years later, in 1981, he would famously write, “The 
territory no longer precedes the map […]. It is […] the map that precedes the territory” 
(Baudrillard, 1981/1994, p. 1). Though it is doubtful that Baudrillard had video games in mind 
when making the statement, as he was speaking more generally of the United States’ 
overdeveloped and powerful media apparatuses, he did believe that the ability for the computer 
to “function as a mechanical supermachine” capable of modeling—that is configuring—the real 
at every level, was the only technology that could “still truly interest us” (Baudrillard, 
1981/1994, pp. 126-127). And whether Baudrillard happened to stumble into the first Video 
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Arcade, the Time Out Family Amusement Center in the Northway Mall in Colonie, New York 
(established in 1970; Herz, 1997, p. 50), or happened to play one of the 100,000 “’Pong’-type 
games produced in 1974 alone” (Sheff, 1993/1999, p. 140), as he traveled across the United 
States, he would have been hard-pressed not to notice the beginnings of what could properly be 
understood as the computer for the masses, the video game (See Chapter Three introduction). 
In the three decades since Simulacra & Simulation was first written, the video game 
form, and the computer simulation game particularly, has gone on to fulfill promise, or was it a 
warning, Baudrillard made when writing that it is in the shadows of Empire “that present-day 
simulators attempt to make the real, all of the real, coincide with their models of simulation” 
(Baudrillard, 1981/1994, pp. 1-2). The popular game series, SimCity (EA Games, 1999, 2003; 
Maxis, 1989, 1994), for example, has been “regularly used [in civics classes and urban planning 
seminars] to give budding policy wonks a preview of their chosen career,” with for instance, 
over a hundred city mayors using the game “to demonstrate their bureaucratic chops” at the 1994 
Mayors Conference in Portland Oregon (Herz, 1997, p. 221). This is in addition to games, such 
as Hidden Agenda, which functioned in the U.S. State Department as a training device for 
diplomats, as well as new FBI, CIA, and Drug Enforcement Agents (Herz, 1997); the premise of 
the game? 
Set in a fictional composite of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti, [….] you play the president of a 
Central American country after the overthrow of an unpopular dictator. Your mission: Select a 
cabinat from the ranks of far-right, centrist, and left-wing political parties, finesse the 
superpowers, and stave off invasion, counterrevolution, riots, death threats, inflation, and a bloody 
coup. (Herz, 1997, pp. 220-221) 
Though the intention of the Hidden Agenda was that of encouraging players to “suspend their 
North American viewpoint and learn to empathize with the plight of a developing nation” 
(Gasperini), the game’s adoption by the State Department does point for the need to examine 
gaming practices from within the context of both its production and consumption (Owens, 2010). 
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For contemporary U.S. game makers and players, this context is that of the shadows of 
neoliberalism and U.S. Empire. Hidden Agenda was adopted by both educators and government 
officials alike due to the game’s promise of serving as a faithful simulation of Central American 
politics; and yet, to the extent that the game (i.e., the map) worked to influence educational 
outcomes and policy decisions (i.e., configure reality), we can still hear Baudrillard’s laughing 
reminder that “the computer does not come into play as a process of simulation,” but rather as a 
mechanism of a third order simulacra (Baudrillard, 1981/1994, p. 127): that is, “the models […] 
are themselves an anticipation of the real” (Baudrillard, 1981/1994, p. 122). The map precedes 
the territory; the game has come to be real. 
 Confirmation that this is so—that is that gameplay has come to be treated as real, and 
subsequently carries with it real affects—is evidenced by the growing support for transforming 
educational models according to the logic of digital play. The push has gained most support 
amongst those working within the field of the digital humanities (For an overview, see Svensson, 
2010). For instance, two prominent voices, Kurt Squire and Henry Jenkins, have long sought to 
harness “the power of games in education” (Squire & Jenkins, 2003). The belief being that, since 
the video game industry has had a major influence on students’ lives, it is time for research to 
“consider how games might be used in pursuit of engaging, effective learning experiences” 
(Squire & Jenkins, 2003, p. 5). And though the pedagogical effectiveness of gameplay-inspired 
teaching models remains inconclusive (Charsky & Ressler, 2011; Kerr, 2006), educators have 
advocated for the integration and adoption of gameplay models as a desirable pedagogical 
practice (Kee, et al., 2009; K. Weir & Baranowski, 2011). As Kevin Kee et al. (2009) has 
argued, though with the caveat that gameplay ought to be seen as a supplement, and not 
substitute for good educational practices: “why stop at reading about ancient barbarian invasions 
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when you can also repulse them” (p. 326). Moreover, as Claudio Fogu (2009) has suggested, the 
difficulty in adequately accessing the educational potential of a video game lies in the medium’s 
impact on the construction of historical consciousness itself: 
What is a ‘historical’ video game, let alone a successful one? It is difficult to answer this question 
because all our definitions of history have been constructed in a linear-narrative cultural context 
[….] [whereas] digital history enters the twenty-first century exclusively under the sign of the 
possible; we are now interested only in what may happen and are no longer concerned with what 
has happened. (Fogu, 2009, pp. 103, 121) 
And though this may be true, we ought to be concerned about the consequences of this 
transformation, for as others have pointed out, the pleasure of play comes from melding with the 
logic of the computer (Crogan, 2003; Friedman, 1999; Manovich, 2001). What then is the logic 
of education that arises from this pleasure of melding with the simulacra that is contemporary 
gaming? If we look to one of the more popular game models, the Civilization series (See: 
Charsky & Ressler, 2011; Fogu, 2009; MacDougall, 2009; Owens, 2010; Squire, In Press.; K. 
Weir & Baranowski, 2011), the answer would appear to be that of Western Empire (Douglas, 
2002; Poblocki, 2002). 
 Though Trevor Owens (2010) has taken critical scholars, such as Douglas and Poblocki, 
to task for analyzing games apart from the context of their reception, arguing that “far from 
poisoning young minds, [Civilization III] is intellectually engaging on multiple levels, as a game 
mechanic and as a kind of laboratory for collective experiments” (Owens, 2010, p. 492), Sid 
Meier himself has agreed that the game is deserving of criticism for being uncritically western-
centric: 
I think that’s probably true. In those days, there was a little bit of a Cold War mentality about the 
game. The world was divided between the West and the Communist worlds, and we were trying to 
present the most familiar leaders, the most familiar technologies, and the most familiar ideas. [….] 
So I think Civilization had somewhat of a Western-centric view of the world. Just the whole idea 
that technology drives progress might not be so much of an Eastern concept as it is a Western one, 
so I think it’s true. (qtd. in B. Edwards, 2007, p. 8)  
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The question, then, is not whether Civilization advances a worldview that “is more likely to 
generate support for the Western superpowers than the traditional tools of cultural imperialism” 
(Poblocki, 2002, p. 175), for at least the first part of that question—promoting a Western 
worldview—has been answered in the affirmative by critical theorists and even the game 
designer himself (Douglas, 2002; B. Edwards, 2007). As important as that question has been, the 
question that ought to concern us today is rather two-fold: first, if the Civilization series 
constitutes an important site of cultural struggle, then what anxieties and desires are embedded 
within this historical document? Second, through what mechanisms—rhetorical, technological, 
and political economic—are these anxieties and desires made manifest: that is, how is this 
anxiety and desire activated to resonate with our own, as well as materialize through the very 
production and consumption of play itself? The first part of this question has been partially 
answered through the crude rubric of Western imperialism (See: Douglas, 2002; Poblocki, 2002), 
whereas little work has been done regarding the second. The rest of this section is an attempt to 
provide working answers. 
 But before it is possible to do so, that is to give an analysis of the political economic 
interests embedded in the Civilization series, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the 
game and its broader play mechanics. The series belongs to a subgenre of turn-based strategy 
games, known as 4X Games (Emrich, 1993; piL, 2009), and is widely considered as having 
popularized the model (Aurabolt, 2009; IGN, 2007). Alan Emrich (1993), whom is believed to 
have been the first to recognize this particular subgenre, describes the 4X model as follows:  
Explore, Expand, Exploit and Exterminate. In other words, players must rise from humble 
beginnings, finding their way around the map while building up the largest, most efficient empire 
possible. Naturally, the other players will be trying to do the same, therefore their extermination 
becomes paramount. (p. 92) 
As it regards the Civilization series, this means beginning the game with two units: a “settler,” 
which is the only unit capable of founding a city; and an initial “warrior” or “scout,” which are 
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Figure 3.11. This screenshot shows the starting configuration for Civilization IV. Note that though multiple units 
appear to be present (e.g., three warriors and four settlers), they only constitute just two units, as each respective 
group will always travel together (e.g., one settler appears as four, two settlers will appear as two distinct groups 
of four). In addition, note the two circular icons just above the warrior. These icons mark those two spots as 
containing environmental resources (e.g., corn and sheep). Resources are important as they carry with them 
either public benefits (e.g., health, happiness) or strategic benefits (e.g., iron for training a “swordsman” unit). 
Figure 3.12. This screen shot shows the initial map configuration for the game Civilization IV. This global 
perspective illustrates how little one knows of the outside world. As Poblocki (2002) notes, the mechanics of 
the game functions as a “trip out of the heart of darkness [and] towards the light of civilization” (p. 168). 
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initially meant to be used to explore the surrounding terrain (See Figures 3.11-12).xxx The first 
few turns involve the establishment of one’s initial city, which is immediately designated as the 
permanent capital of your emerging empire, and the preliminary exploration of the surrounding 
terrain with your other unit.xxxi It is important to note that “settlers” are exhaustible units, which 
means that the settler will be “consumed” and disappear upon establishing a city, and thus new   
“settlers” will need to be “trained” as needed to establish future cities. The establishment of 
multiple cities is essential to one’s success within the game, as these spaces constitute the only 
site of production for the player (See Figures 3.13-14). That is, cities are the only means by 
which the player can: (1) “train” units, from “workers,” to combat units, as well as more 
“settlers”; and, (2) construct buildings that add to a given city’s productivity and/or contribute 
other benefits, such as increased “happiness.” Managing one’s need to train new units with 
constructing new buildings operates as one of the central challenges of the game, as only one 
operation can be undertaken at a time within a given city. In other words, if I have one city, 
“Kyoto,” I must decide whether I wish to build a “granary” which will help increase the rate of 
Kyoto’s population growth, or another “warrior” so that I can more quickly scout the 
surrounding terrain; if, however, I have two cities, “Kyoto” and “Osaka,” then I can have Kyoto 
build a “granary” while the Osaka trains a new “warrior”—though once the granary is built, only 
Kyoto will benefit from its establishment, so after the warrior is trained, I will then need to build 
a granary in Osaka as well. Cleary, the complexity of the game is capable of quickly growing 
exponentially as additional cities are needed so as to balance various gameplay needs, such as 
training combat units while simultaneously developing cities for greater levels of production—of 
which, for example, there are roughly 60 units and 30 buildings in Civilization III (2001). The 
game helps make this manageable by operating according to a turn-based rule-set, which means 
 
 
 102  
 
Figure 3.13. The screenshot captures the establishment of the initial, capital city in Civilization IV. The “star” 
icon demarcates this as my civilization’s capital city, and the “1” inside signals the population size of the city, 
which is then converted by an algorithm to appear as a fictitious demographic size (e.g., 1 = 1000 citizens, 2 = 
6,000, 3 = 21,000, etc.) 
Figure 3.14. This image illustrates the production process of a given city in Civilization IV. When a city is able 
to train a new unit or produce a building, the player is given a list of available options. In this case, I am able to 
train a warrior, settler, worker, or build a barrack. The number next to each unit/building is the amount of turns it 
would take to produce one of the units/buildings based on current city production levels. 
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that only after I have completed all possible (or desirable) moves is the next player able to act, 
but the challenge still remains. More could be, and will be, said about the mechanics of the 
game, but the above synopsis should be sufficient for adequately grasping the analysis that 
follows below. 
 As mentioned earlier, it is already well-documented that the Civilization series was and 
continues to be a product of the Cold War generation (B. Edwards, 2007; Poblocki, 2002).xxxii 
Embedded within the logic of the game is Samuel Huntington’s 1993 post-Cold War “clash of 
civilizations” thesis, two year’s prior to Huntington’s Foreign Affair publication (Poblocki, 
2002). Huntington’s thesis, which Poblocki (2002) argues is more convincingly presented in Sid 
Meier’s Civilization series, is as follows: 
• The fact that the world is modernizing does not mean that it is Westernizing. 
• Asia […] is expanding militarily and economically. Islam is exploding demographically. The West may be 
declining in relative influence. 
• Culture-consciousness is getting stronger, not weaker, and states or peoples may band together because of 
cultural similarities rather than because of ideological ones, as in the past. 
• In a multi-polar world based loosely on civilizations rather than on ideologies, Americans must reaffirm 
their Western identity. (Kaplan, 2001, sec. 1) 
It is the Civilization series’ consistent articulation of Huntington’s first plank explicitly, and the 
second implicitly, that function as the motivation for Poblocki’s (2002) criticism of the game 
(the third and fourth planks would not be coded within the game until the fourth rendition of the 
game, which tellingly came out after 9/11). The historical narrative offered by Civilization 
adheres to the history of Western Empire, suggesting that historical progression ought to 
conclude in Americanization (Poblocki, 2002). And yet, as one plays the game and 
technologically advances alongside the political development of the other nations, international 
conflict becomes increasingly more persistent. This is because culture is hard-coded within the 
game as that of an ahistorical thing. So for instance, in Civilization I (MicroProse, 1991b), the 
Aztecs, for instance, will always seek to aggressively expand, and frequently declare war on 
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others to do so (See MicroProse, 1991a). Since the Aztecs are culturally predisposed to be 
“fierce warriors and dangerous opponents” (MicroProse, 1991a, p. 137), then it is antithetical to 
both the logic of the game (e.g., winning) or even play itself (e.g., surviving) to engage with the 
Aztecs on any other level than that which suits one’s strategic interests; in other words, no matter 
how modern the Aztecs (or any other nation for that matter) have become, they will always 
continue to be Aztecs, that is, foreign, and thus, always already potential threats. Moreover, since 
the future of technological progression is written in advance (See Figures 3.15-16), as other 
countries modernize, the global playing field will necessarily become more level—and not 
necessarily equitable—as all developed nations will potentially have access to the same 
technological measures.xxxiii This is the explicit and implicit lesson embedded within the 
narrative trajectory of the Civilization series: (1) political economic modernity is not related to 
cultural modernity (Huntington’s first plank); and, (2) political economic equity necessarily 
means the decline of a given superpower’s influence (Huntington’s second plank). 
 It was not until the introduction of religion, in Civilization IV (2K Games, 2005c) that the 
third and fourth planks of Huntington’s thesis became coded within the series, and thus explicit. 
This is important for it suggests that what had before been theoretically implicit in 1991—that 
cultural-consciousness is getting stronger and that Americans must thus reaffirm their Western 
identity—had gathered enough cultural salience in 2005 to warrant gameplay consideration. 
Prior to the implementation of this gameplay mechanism, the diplomatic options of the 
Civilization series held fast to the Cold War logic of nation-states as relatively self-contained, 
competing superpowers. Though technology could be traded between civilizations, in addition to 
tribute, in Civilization I, all diplomatic actions would conclude with an “agreement of peace or a 
declaration of war” (MicroProse, 1991a, p. 127). Civilization II (MicroProse, 1996b) and III 
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Figures 3.15-16. (top-bottom). Though the tech tree initially begins with possibility, and calls for strategic 
planning (Figure 3.15), the future is destined to culminate in a scientific “future tech” regardless of the 
civilization desired (Figure 3.16). Screen capture taken from Civilization V. 
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(Infogrames, 2001b) offered additional diplomatic options, such as the ability to form “alliances” 
(MicroProse, 1996a, 1996b) and establish “trade embargos” (Infogrames, 2001a, 2001b), but 
continued with the political economic logic of the Cold War as a framework for understanding 
diplomacy. In other words, democracy and communism were deployed by the U.S. as competing 
political economic superpowers, in the sense that the Soviet Union was first imagined as 
constituting a political economic threat to the United States before it then became conceived as a 
physical threat: “The United States found itself increasingly driven by the need to placate class 
antagonism, and thus anticommunism became the overriding imperative” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, 
p. 176). The threat was not driven by scarcity of resources—the 1973 Oil Crisis 
notwithstanding—for scarcity itself was the outcome of political economic policy, such as 
embargos; nor was the threat that of military annihilation—though this would later become a 
possibility as a consequence of political economic policy. Rather, the threat was that “if the 
political offensive is long delayed, it will be too late for bombs” (James Burnham, qtd. in 
O'Gorman, 2009, p. 395). In other words, the Cold War framework for understanding 
international politics was that if the United States did not act aggressively, the cultural integrity 
of its political economic system would perish (O'Gorman, 2009, p. 395). The Cold War was a 
war over political legitimacy, and the Civilization series carries with it the residue of that 
political struggle. 
 The first three iterations of the Civilization series worked to fine-tune this logic as a 
gameplay mechanism. Indeed, in all games within the series, containment, as James Burnham 
had argued in 1952, is not enough (O'Gorman, 2009). For the first three games, in particular, 
every mechanism of international politics operated exclusively through political economic 
means: embassies, trade agreements, military alliances, et cetera (See: Infogrames, 2001a; 
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MicroProse, 1991a, 1996a). Though these mechanisms could be used to contain other 
civilizations, through for instance establishing a trade embargo, containment as an end in itself 
was coded as an inefficient strategy. This is because the game is predicated on winning, and 
winning has been defined in zero-sum terms throughout the series (See: 2K Games, 2005b, 
2010a; Infogrames, 2001a; MicroProse, 1991a, 1996a). It is, however, important to note that the 
categories of what constituted winning transformed and crystalized over the span of the ten-years 
separating Civilization I from Civilization III; and this deserves further analysis before we move 
on, for it speaks to the transitioning cultural logics that separates Civilization I through III from 
Civilization IV and V. 
 As mentioned earlier, Civilization I through III digitally captured Huntington’s “Clash of 
the Civilization” thesis in gameplay form. The logical thrust of this thesis was encoded within 
the Civilization series in terms of a zero-sum logic in that only one nation could come out the 
victor over the course of a given game session. Equally important, regardless of which nation 
happened to win a particular session, as a historical simulator, the lesson taught is that only one 
nation will win. For the first game in the series, Civilization I (MicroProse, 1991b), winning can 
only occur through one of two ways: military domination or survival—with the latter being a 
consolation prize (See MicroProse, 1991a, p. 43).xxxiv Civilization II (MicroProse, 1996b) 
adhered tightly to the victory conditions outlined in Civilization I, but updated one aspect of the 
first game—the space race—to constitute an additional victory condition. Already, as Sid Meier  
himself has noted, we can see the cultural anxiety of the Cold War having embedded itself in the 
game through the designation of the space race and military domination as victory conditions 
(See B. Edwards, 2007). With the introduction of Civilization III (Infogrames, 2001b), however, 
we can see the beginnings of the implementation of Huntington’s third and fourth planks, and the 
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shift towards a post-Cold War global politics, or what Hardt and Negri (2001) have called 
Empire. This groundwork for this shift within the series was initiated through the creation of 
three additional victory conditions, on top of the two established earlier: dominating the world 
(i.e., possessing “the vast majority of the world’s land and population”); diplomatic triumph (i.e., 
be elected Secretary-General of the United Nations); and, cultural victory (i.e., reach a particular 
threshold of “cultural points” through the construction of wonders or other city improvements) 
(Infogrames, 2001a, pp. 150-153).  
Through the establishment of these victory conditions, we can see that the Civilization 
series has come to encode the anxiety embedded within Huntington’s third and fourth plank. But 
first, the victory condition of dominating the world, reinforces Huntington’s second plank—
“Asia is expanding militarily and economically”—by digitally coding the possession of 
significant landmass and population size as constituting victory conditions in their own right, 
thereby granting legitimacy to the notion that large countries, particularly China, constitute a 
political economic threat by virtue of their girth alone. Though it can be undoubtedly argued that 
within the logic of the Civilization series that any nation could theoretically function as China—
from the Aztecs to the British to, yes, the Chinese—the point is not that China or any other 
country is called out as potential threat to U.S. hegemony, but rather that the victory conditions 
themselves grant legitimacy to the notions of threats to victory itself. In other words, it could 
very well be that in a given session of gameplay that it is the Aztecs whom have come to possess 
the largest population and most land, and thus win a cultural domination, and clearly the Aztecs 
have long since passed as a viable nation; and yet, the lesson to be learned, the common-sense 
passed through the simulation of this given game session, is that a large population and equally 
large landmass operate on the same terrain in terms of global hegemony as that of military 
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dominance. In contemporary terms, to the extent that the Civilization series offers itself as an 
allegory of history, with multiple simulations running to advance the logic of historical progress 
itself, which is both what its detractors and supporters alike argue (See: Douglas, 2002; Fogu, 
2009; Kee, et al., 2009; Owens, 2010; Poblocki, 2002), then regardless of which nation wins a 
particular simulation, the logic of winning and conditions upon which this victory are made are 
granted legitimacy: the U.S. model of technological progression is certainly a viable means of 
winning (e.g., space race or military domination), but now, players must recognize that so too are 
“Eastern” alternatives (See B. Edwards, 2007, p. 8), such as possessing significant landmass and 
population size, equally viable pathways to winning global hegemony. 
 The addition of two other victory conditions functions as further instantiations of U.S. 
anxiety and desire regarding the global political economic order. Whereas global domination, in 
terms of population and landmass, resonates with a discourse that suggests the BRIC nations 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) constitute a threat to U.S. hegemony, by virtue of size alone—
without recognition of their dependence upon transnational corporations for economic 
functioning (Schiller, 2007)—the cultural and diplomatic victory conditions offer alternative 
models for simulating how U.S. global hegemony can be maintained. Civilization III’s  inclusion 
of a diplomatic victory option, as coded in terms being elected Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (Infogrames, 2001a, 2001b), recognizes a shift in global politics that Hardt and Negri 
(2001) argues has come to be the hallmark of contemporary Empire: that is, the increasingly 
mixed-constitution of global hegemony (pp. 309-314). The recognition of the U.N. as 
constituting a legitimate site of power, as simulated from Civilization III onward, resonates with 
the transforming global position of the United States. As Hardt and Negri note, though the U.S. 
is capable of acting alone to sustain its global hegemony, it “prefers to act in collaboration with 
 
 
 110  
 
others under the umbrella of the United Nations” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p. 309). But again, if, as 
Kacper Poblocki (2002) argues, the Civilization series operates as a more compelling digital 
enactment of Huntington’s “Clash of the Civilizations” thesis, then so too does the series offer a 
more compelling take of the anxiety and desire embedded within Hardt and Negri’s thesis of 
Empire.  
But first, public awareness of the transforming constituency of global politics is 
documented in the changing game mechanics of the Civilization series. In Civilization I (1991), 
the United Nations functions exclusively as a forum for resolving “international problems 
through diplomacy” (MicroProse, 1991a, p. 83). For the player, then, serving as the home of the 
United Nations (much in the same way that New York currently does) offered the benefits of 
underwriting all peace treaties, thereby making it so that when negotiating “with other 
civilizations, they will always offer to make peace with you” (MicroProse, 1991a, p. 83) . In 
1996, Civilization II was released, with the developers seeking to enhance “the effects of 
Wonders we thought were too weak (e.g., […] United Nations)” (MicroProse, 1996a, p. 180). To 
strengthen the benefits of establishing the UN, the game developers opted to recognize the 
United Nations’ increasing role as a global peace keeping organization (See: MicroProse, 1996a, 
1996b). This is important for two reasons. First, gameplay mechanics meant that civilizations 
which had adopted republic or democratic forms of governances could have military endeavors 
overruled by the their respective Senate; possession of the United Nations, however, granted the 
player a “50 percent chance to override the Senate’s interference in foreign policy negotiations” 
(MicroProse, 1996a, p. 41). In essence, the United Nations had come to be seen as a potentially 
anti-democratic organization capable of serving military interests through “peacekeeping” 
missions as much as it sought to negotiate peace. And indeed, this relates to the second important 
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point, in that this gameplay mechanism reflects the increased emphasis the United Nations has 
placed on peacekeeping missions. According to the United Nations, 66 peacekeeping operations 
have been undertaken since first beginning in 1948; of those 66, however, 53 of them have taken 
place after 1988 (United Nations, 2011). In the mid-1990s, during the development of 
Civilization II (1996), several high profile peacekeeping missions, such as those of Rwanda 
(1993-1996; United Nations, 2001, 2003) and the Former Yugoslavia (1992-2002; United 
Nations, 1996, 2002), concretized the notion of peacekeeping within the U.S. public imaginary—
and Civilization II functioned as one site wherein which it was codified. With Civilization III 
(Infogrames, 2001b), the political legitimacy of the United Nations was recognized by being 
codified as a victory condition itself; in essence, whomever controlled the United Nations by 
definition controlled global politics. This is a fantasy of course, but deserves further 
consideration for the narrative trajectory of the United Nations, as embedded within the game 
series, simultaneously works to both document and activate U.S. anxiety and desire over the 
political potential of the UN. 
Indeed, obtaining a diplomatic victory is challenging to the extent that how other 
civilizations view you is contingent upon a variety of factors, many of which are beyond control: 
such as the cultural predisposition of a given nation and how your civilization compares to others 
(Infogrames, 2001a, 2001b). Though these variables may be accurate factors for understanding 
how any relationship operates, whether interpersonal or international, the valence granted 
towards them and the victory condition upon which they are contingent are invested with an 
explicitly U.S. political economic outlook; the Civilization II (1996) manual foreshadows this 
anxiety embedded within the diplomatic victory option of Civilization III (2001) quite well: “If 
you are the largest, most powerful, and richest civilization in the world, all rivals are likely to be 
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very demanding or antagonistic. [….] Leaders with whom you are allied tend to become jealous 
as your civilization grows larger and more powerful” (MicroProse, 1996a, p. 123). From this 
perspective, if one were to adopt the rubric of international relations offered by Civilization I, II, 
and III, it is difficult to see how the United Nations could operate as a viable mechanism of U.S. 
global interests. Again, it is important to note that the question is not whether the player—or 
computer for that matter—has opted to play as the United States, but rather that in seeing the 
game as a historical simulator running through different scenarios for achieving global 
domination, then, to the extent that the parameters offered are that jealousy is an overriding 
variable governing international politics, it is clear from the game that the United Nations 
functions as an inadequate mechanism for obtaining and sustaining global dominance. And yet, 
how then is the United States to maintain its hegemonic status: if global domination is not an 
option—as the BRIC nations have more land and people; if military domination, though 
possible, is no longer desirable, as the public is weary of war—“war weariness” was codified in 
Civilization III, and most greatly affected democratic governments (Infogrames, 2001a, p. 42); 
and, if rapid global modernization means that the United States may not be able to hold onto its 
technological edge for too much longer? The answer would resonate strongly with Huntington’s 
fourth plank that  “Americans must reaffirm their Western identity” (Kaplan, 2001): Civilization 
IV (2K Games, 2005c) would incorporate religion and culture as global factors (See also 2K 
Games, 2005b). 
Prior to Civilization IV (2005), culture and religion had operated as national constructs 
significant for internal governance, but only indirectly related to global affairs. For instance, in 
Civilization I (1991), religion and culture were symbolically represented in terms of “cathedrals” 
and “colosseums,” but the effect of their presence was that of “making unhappy people content” 
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(MicroProse, 1991b, p. 69). With Civilization II, the concept of culture remained the same—that 
is as a means of alleviating internal dissent—but religion was expanded so as to operate as a 
form of governance as well as a mechanism for pacifying the masses (as it had done in 
Civilization I). This conception of religion as constituting both a public good (e.g., “making 
unhappy people content”) and, in some cases, a form of government, is important to dwell on 
momentarily for the latter, governance, feature was removed in Civilization III (2001). That 
“Fundamentalism” as a legible form of governance was introduced in Civilization’s 1996 
iteration, but removed in Civilization III (2001), suggests that for a brief moment, the U.S. 
cultural imaginary had come to recognize that, as Stuart Hall would later write: “politics, having 
been exhausted in its social-democratic-liberal-reformist form, leaves only a much more 
extreme, indeed archaic, form, which has come back into the present” (qtd. in MacCabe, 2008, p. 
38). Again, it is worth quoting the developers of Civilization II at length: 
The people in such [Fundamentalist] societies are often fanatically devoted to their beliefs, and 
may be willing to die, use force, or commit great atrocities to preserve them. 
[….] 
The diplomatic penalties for “terrorist acts” (such as bombing city improvements, poisoning wells, 
and so forth) committed by Diplomats and Spies is reduced, since the world comes to expect no 
better. (MicroProse, 1996a, p. 68) 
Like the introduction of the U.N.’s peacekeeping function in the same game (Civilization II), so 
too did the coding of Fundamentalism as a legible form of governance correspond with shifts in 
global politics.  
During the period between the release of Civilization I (1991) and II (1996), the United 
States was forced to come to terms with the experience of “Middle Eastern terrorism [arriving] 
on American soil” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). Though the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center may have brought the possibility of experiencing terrorism into the U.S. 
cultural psyche, however, the removal of a form of governance “based on religious fanaticism” 
(Infogrames, 2001a, p. 45), suggests that the West, and U.S. in particular, had remained “stupid 
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about […] religion” and the inability for “liberal humanism” to speak to the needs of a 
significant portion of the world (Stuart Hall, qtd. in L. Taylor, 2006). Or, perhaps it was merely a 
case of “bad timing,” and that as Civilization II suggests, the U.S. public was ready to take the 
challenge of religious fundamentalism seriously, but that the kairos of this event was lost amid 
the drama of President Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky (See The New York Times, 
1998), and thus, subsequently removed in Civilization III as the interest in religion as a political 
form faded away. Whatever the reason for its removal, however, it is doubtful that had religion 
remained in Civilization III that, due to the “Clash of the Civilizations” thesis simulated within 
the game, the inclusion of Fundamentalism would have offered an alternative solution to Middle 
Eastern politics than that suggested by The New York Times (1998): “The United States has 
every right to attack suspected terrorists if there is credible evidence showing that they were 
involved in attacks against American citizens or were planning such attacks.” Indeed, if as 
Baudrillard (1981/1994) writes, “present-day simulators attempt to make the real, all of the real, 
coincide with [Empire’s] models of simulation” (p. 2), then embedded within the gameplay logic 
of the Civilization series has always been the models necessary for showing that credible 
evidence indeed exists. In the aftermath of 9/11, these models would need to be updated; hence, 
Civilization IV (2005). 
 The problem with the earlier models simulated in the Civilization series was that 
international politics “often felt quite arbitrary one civilization might like you while another 
hated you” (Johnson, 2005, p. 181). So though in 1996, understanding global politics in terms of 
a Cold War framework of competing superpowers had continued to prove sufficient—“if you are 
the largest, most powerful, and richest civilization in the world, all rivals are likely to be very 
demanding or antagonistic” (MicroProse, 1996b, p. 123)—in the aftermath of 9/11, such models 
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proved to be inadequate: the “problem that diplomacy suffered from in previous Civ games was a 
lack of motive” (Johnson, 2005, p. 181). In a world where “culture-consciousness is getting 
stronger, not weaker, [….] Americans must reaffirm their Western identity” (Kaplan, 2001, sec. 
1); the question, how? The answer was to rethink the role of religion and culture in the formation 
of contemporary global politics. Religion and culture were no longer merely rituals that brought 
happiness to various national publics (MicroProse, 1991b; Infogrames, 2001b), nor even political 
systems that informed the governmental logic of a given nation-state (MicroProse, 1996b), but 
rather recognized as having “always played a critical part in human history” (2K Games, 2005b, 
p. 77). If 9/11 functioned as a moment of crisis for contemporary Empire, working to unveil the 
condition of global politics, and the catalyst of this event was “religion – which we forgot about” 
(Hall, qtd. in MacCabe, 2008, p. 38), then the inclusion of religion and culture as political 
variables would ensure that Civilization IV could adequately simulate the history of the present 
that we had failed to remember. Though the game designers opted to implement a missionary-
based system, as opposed to a trade routes model, the overall model offers a “useful back-story 
to give diplomatic dealings more logic” (Johnson, 2005, p. 181). Coupled with politics being 
embedded with culture, in that “many leaders [now] have a favorite civic and might pressure you 
to follow their lead,” it is inevitable that “diplomacy will break down with one of your rivals, and 
[thus] war” (Johnson, 2005, p. 180). In many regards, the revised diplomacy system offered in 
the game operates as a model for understanding why the United States must reaffirm its 
relationship with Europe, if it is to combat the threats presented from other cultures; for if, “One 
often has to make a long-term choice of trading partners, knowing that trying to make everyone 
happy may leave you with no friends at all,” and various nations are already predisposed to 
particular forms of governance and religion (Johnson, 2005, p. 182), then one must be sure to 
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Figure 3.17. Here is a screen shot of the available social policies for Civilization V.  Note that each policy branch 
contains 5 sub-policies that must be individually activated overtime. (See Figures 3.18-20). 
remember who really is one’s friend: for, as former President Bush famously said: “They hate 
our freedoms; our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble 
and disagree with each other” (Bush, 2001). Don’t believe him? Play Civilization IV. 
 In fact, the simulation may have worked out too well in illustrating President Bush's 
stance on foreign policy: “In Civ IV, the religions were primary factors of who liked whom and 
who disliked whom” (Jon Shafer, qtd. in PC Gamer, 2010, p. 2). The challenge has been that in 
the aftermath of the persistent state of exception that has been the war on terror, the ability for 
Empire to adequately grasp the complexity of the world has shown strain, and thus, religion in 
itself has proven itself to be an inadequate mechanism for modeling the tenuous state of 
contemporary global politics. The predictability of religion in Civilization IV no longer offered a 
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Figures 3.18-20. Here are three examples of the various sub-policy layouts within the social branches offered in 
Civilization V. As a particular social branch is fleshed out over time certain sub-policies require that certain 
prerequisite policies already be in place (as represented the lines connecting the various icons from top to 
bottom). 
compelling model for simulating the present, and thus diplomacy needed more depth (See PC 
Gamer, 2010); the role of religion had to be rethought. In fact, the whole concept of the state 
itself had to be rethought. Hence, Civilization V (2010) removed from the model any notion of 
organized religion as an explicit factor in international relations, along with any pure notion of a 
government as being “democratic,” “communist,” et cetera (2K Games, 2010b, 2010a).xxxv 
Government was now modeled as a collection of particular social policies that developed 
overtime (See Figures 3.17-21).  
In some regards, this change represented a more compelling historiographical account of 
social transformation, in that historical continuity exists in spite of historical ruptures (such as 
the French or U.S. revolution) (See Foucault, 1977/2003). And yet, the model simultaneously 
makes historical ruptures absolutely necessary in some instances. More clearly, Civilization V 
offers 10 different branches of social policy: tradition, liberty, honor, piety, patronage, 
commerce, rationalism, freedom, order, and autocracy (2K Games, 2010a, 2010b). The residue 
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of various forms of government can be found within these social policies; for instance 
“democracy” can be found within “freedom” and variations of fundamentalism can be found 
under “piety” (2K Games, 2010a, 2010b), but these social policies can to some extent be mixed 
to create unique forms of government; for example, “piety” (the religious social branch) can be 
mixed with “order” (the socialist branch) and “commerce” (the economic social branch). And 
yet, under no condition can “piety” be combined with “rationalism,” nor “order” with “freedom” 
(2K Games, 2010b; 2K Greg, 2010).xxxvi This is a fascinating and absolutely arbitrary design 
decision, as game patch 1.0.1.332 illustrates (which made “order” and “freedom” no longer 
compatible”), for it resonates with global developments that were underway during the period of 
Civilization V’s development; that is, the much reported wave of social protest that have swept 
through Middle Eastern countries as of late, of which new media technologies and platforms, 
such as Twitter, have been heralded as the tools for social revolution, and thus the enemies of 
non-Western forms of government: “Twitter will doubtless be cast a protagonal technology that 
enabled the powerless to survive a brutal crackdown and information blackout by the ruling 
authorities” (Ambinder, 2009). This logic is coded within Civilization V in that, though any form 
of governance can utilize any form of technology without penalty, should a pious country opt to 
advance along the technology tree more rapidly, that is, become more rational, then they must 
adopt rationalism as a social policy, which the game recognizes as initiating a revolution: one 
turn of anarchy during which all production, scientific research, and commerce come to a 
complete standstill (2K Games, 2010b). When Western secularism meets Middle Eastern 
spirituality, one must give. 
And yet, new communication technologies are not necessarily friends of Western 
conceptions of freedom (e.g., neoliberalism) either, as illustrated by the city of San Francisco’s 
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Bay Area Rapid Transit agency disabling cell phone networks in anticipation of anti-police 
brutality protests (Huppke, 2011) and British activists’ use of social media to organize protests 
(Malik, 2011)—of which British Prime Minister David Cameron quickly undercut as saying, 
“this is not about poverty. It’s about culture. A culture that glorifies violence, shows disrespect to 
authority, and says everything about rights but nothing about responsibility” (qtd. in Solon, 
2011). In many regards, Civilization V’s seemingly arbitrary decision to pit piety (i.e., religion) 
and rationalism (i.e., science) against each other adds cultural legitimacy to the claims made by 
Prime Minister Cameron: rationalism is the enemy of religion, not freedom (2K Games, 2010a, 
2010b). Granted, rationalism is not the enemy of socialism (i.e., order) nor fascism (i.e., 
autocracy) either; and yet, this is all the more reason that Western liberalism (i.e., freedom) 
ought to control technology: Civilization V shows what can happen if technology ends up in the 
end of nations organized by socialism (e.g., China) or piety/autocracy (e.g., Iran): order is useful 
for empires “interested in creating massive, sprawling” civilizations; and, autocracy is “well 
suited for those wishing nothing more than to crush their foes under the weight of their iron-
plated boots” (2K Games, 2010a, p. 95). Though, in terms of gameplay, these social policies may 
be embraced by many players as mere gameplay choices—as in, one game session I may wish to 
achieve a science victory (e.g., rationalism) whereas in another I may opt for a military victory 
(e.g., autocracy)—the lesson imparted is that free, rational governments (e.g., Western) are most 
interested in scientific progress, whereas pious, autocratic governments (e.g., Middle Eastern) 
desire nothing more than either absolutely converting the world and/or destroying those countries 
which resist. As such, if Civilization IV (2005) functioned as the zenith of Samuel Huntington’s 
“Clash of the Civilizations” thesis, then Civilization V (2010) offered the necessary corrective to 
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the simulation, which was needed for modeling the prolonged aftermath of the persistent state of 
exception that has been the war on terror. 
Civilization Preceding Civilization 
From the above, it is clear that the Civilization series functions as a site of Western anxiety and 
desire regarding global politics. Events from the contemporary moment, such as the coming of 
age of international terrorism and the peacekeeping missions of the United Nation, have a way of 
working themselves in as mechanisms for gameplay consideration. The game, however, is more 
than just a site of, what Steve Jones (2006) has called “virtual history,” that is, an installation 
capable of offering “alternative educational environments and alternative philosophical and 
theoretical systems” (p. 209). As Baudrillard (1981/1994) has argued, in an era of simulation, the 
models themselves are “immanent,” operating “in the cybernetic sense, that is, of the 
manipulation of the [real] at every level” (p. 122). In this sense, if technology works to construct 
“the kind of world the machine needs” (Ellul, 1954/1964, p. 5), and if it is Empire that stands 
behind, but does not necessarily control, the circulation of present-day simulators (Baudrillard, 
1981/1994), then we ought to understand the Civilization series, alongside those of other 
simulation technologies, as working to construct the kind of civilizations that Empire needs. My 
point is not that the act of simulation in and of itself necessarily leads to the upholding of 
Empire, as a rich tradition of cultural critique has made significant use of modeling as a means of 
preparing for and/or enacting social change (See Rodriguez, Rich, Hastings, & Page, 2006); 
rather, my point is that when those modeling efforts enter the realm of digital play, they must 
necessarily rearticulate portions of the logics embedded within the gaming practices of 
contemporary Empire: “good” simulations, however defined, still rely upon much of the same 
infrastructure and economic circuits of production and consumption as the “bad” simulations, for 
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instance; and, to the extent that adherence to particular generic conventions are necessary in 
order to remain legible as a viable form of digital play, then even progressive simulations are 
likely to rely upon the same gameplay mechanisms as those embedded within conservative 
simulations (Galloway, 2006; MacDougall, 2007), and thus ought to make us question the limits 
of critique within established modes of digital play (in its totality). Hence, though this 
examination focused primarily upon Civilization as a simulacrum of contemporary global 
politics, I would like to use the remainder of this chapter to make connections between this 
global politics analysis and my stated interest in the games’ functioning as a site of political 
economic anxiety and desire. 
 The global politics embedded within the Civilization series operate primarily through an 
economic rationality. Civilization presents a world of political conflict and the solution offered is 
that of the temptation of total informatic control:  
The massive “making equivalent” in Civilization—the making equivalent of different government 
types […], of different victory options, of formulaically equating n number of happy citizens with 
availability of luxuries, and so on—is, in this sense, an allegorical reprocessing of the universal 
standardization that go into the creation of informatics networks today. (Galloway, 2006, p. 101) 
This temptation for total informatic control is the central hallmark of contemporary neoliberalism 
in that neoliberal theory desires a means of “projecting [the formal principles of a market 
economy] on to a general art of government” (Foucault, 1978-1979/2008, p. 131). From the 
perspective of this economic philosophy, the role of the state is to secure and procure markets, 
whether they exist or not (Harvey, 2007). As Alexander Galloway (2006) argues, the Civilization 
series succeeds in massively reconfiguring complex political systems into numerically 
representative equivalences. And yet, though everything is capable of speaking the same 
language—that is, zeros-and-ones—the simulacra of civilization offered does not operate apart 
from ideology as Alexander Galloway (2006) ultimately concludes (See pp. 102-106), just as the 
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free market is not free from construction (See: Foucault, 1978-1979/2008; Harvey, 2007). As 
Elizabeth Esch and David Roediger (2009) have argued, the desire to make things equivalent for 
the sake of management (i.e., control) has long been a part of the political economic history of 
the United States. Indeed, at various points throughout the Civilization series, cultural strength 
charts not so dissimilar to that of the “Racial Adaptability Employment Chart of the Central 
Tube Company” in Pittsburgh (1925) have been deployed—if only being different in terms of 
overall complexity (See Figures 3.21-22). From this historical perspective, it would seem that 
though ideological analysis is no longer enough in terms of semiotics alone, at least when it 
comes to new media technologies (Galloway, 2006), ideology serves as more than merely a 
decoy in this postmodern world of ours. For indeed, as I have sought to argue, it is the ideology 
of Empire that serves to underwrite contemporary gaming—in the case of the Civilization series, 
primarily through the matrix of a neoliberal political economy. 
 Though the representation and encoding of global politics has transformed throughout the 
Civilization series, if anything has remained constant, it is in its consistent representation of the 
city as the necessary engine of contemporary capital (See: 2K Games, 2005b, 2005c, 2010a, 
2010b; Infogrames, 2001a, 2001b; MicroProse, 1991a, 1991b, 1996a, 1996b). In 1993, 
reviewing the game for the journal of Simulation & Gaming, Pierre Cobeil (1993) found it 
peculiar that the city occupied such a central position within the game design of Civilization I. 
Everything that the player does begins and ends with cities: cities must be improved so as to 
increase production; cities must be connected so as to facilitate trade; cities—and not necessarily 
the countryside—must be defended so as to keep them from being captured; and military units 
must be sent to secure potential sites for the establishment of new cities so that one’s Empire 
may grow. Cities were codified as the engines of Empire. This had the effect of requiring that all 
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Figure 3.21. Racial Adaptability Employment Chart for the Central Tube Company of Pittsburgh (1925). Used 
with permission from Elizabeth Esch and David Roediger (2009). 
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cities maintain a constant state of growth, as a stagnant city is an unproductive, useless city. 
Encoded within the game is the absolute requirement that a city must always produce: a unit, 
building, or surplus science or taxation, work must always be done. If a city is not producing, 
then it must mean anarchy or corruption (See: 2K Games, 2005b, 2005c, 2010a, 2010b; 
Infogrames, 2001a, 2001b; MicroProse, 1991a, 1991b, 1996a, 1996b). If nearly two decades ago, 
Cobeil (1993) found this preoccupation to be peculiar, but otherwise only noteworthy as a 
gameplay mechanic, today—and indeed even then—we cannot be so dismissive. As Cameron 
McCarthy  (2011) has argued the battle over the present and future is “taking place within the 
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remaking of the city as cities such as Chicago, Buenos Aires, New York, Nottingham, 
Manchester transform themselves from administrative and industrial centers to brand spanking 
new global metropolises” (p. 92). From the standpoint of Civilization, every city ought to be a 
global city, and thus is always under constant renovation. 
 Thirty-five years ago, James Carey (1975/2009) lamented that “because we have seen our 
cities as the domain of politics and economics, they have become the residence of technology 
and bureaucracy. Our streets are designed to accommodate the automobile, our sidewalks to 
facilitate trade, our land and houses to satisfy the economy and the real estate speculator” (p. 27). 
In Civilization¸ there are not even streets, sidewalks, nor even houses. There is only the desperate 
attempt to construct what Paul Virilio (2004/2005) has termed the city of panic:  
If the city is the most important political form of history, then the world-city that is contemporary 
with the age of planetary globalization does, indeed, have its back to the wall. And that wall is 
now the wall of time—‘the time barrier’; this real and astronomical time that has now outpaced the 
time of calendars and the ephemeris. (pp. 69-70) 
This anxiety is captured well in Civilization, for if a city does not have its back to the wall, that 
is, if it is not producing at the most efficient rate possible, producing both military units for 
defense and buildings for even greater levels of production, then the only option left is to build 
city walls themselves (See 2K Games, 2010b). As Baudrillard (1994) pointed out, “the real is, in 
fact, the last resource of metaphor, but that resource must not be called on—on pain of death, on 
pain of losing its metaphorical power, its power of illusion” (p. 104). In Civilization, one must 
build as if their back is against the wall, and then, if that metaphor fails, one must literally build 
walls as that last chance for survival, so as to avoid being captured by another nation. The 
problem is that eventually, one runs out of things to build, and then there comes a point where it 
is absurd to produce more units, and so one must at last give in and build walls. If there is a 
counterfactual history embedded within the logic of Civilization, it is this: sooner or later we will 
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find ourselves with our backs against the wall, and unlike the game, this reality will not end as 
soon as we conquer all other rivals. This is both our political economic anxiety and desire. 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
xxvi This event is important for two reasons. First, that the first popularly available new information and 
communication technologies were available in public spaces, bars and taverns no less, speaks volumes about the 
classed economies of video games and new ICTs more generally. Second, though two weeks may seem like quite 
some time for an arcade cabinet to overflow with coins, one has to remember that arcade games were an unknown 
form of entertainment. The following story from Al Alcorn, the programmer behind the arcade version of Pong is 
illustrative: “[Bill Gattis, the tavern manager for Andy Capp] said to me, ‘Al, this is the weirdest thing. When I 
opened the bar this morning, there were two or three people at the door waiting to get in. They walked in and played 
that machine. They didn’t buy anything. I’ve never seen anything like this before” (qtd. in Kent, 2001, p. 44). 
xxvii O’Grady (2009) is speaking specifically of the success of Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, of Apple fame, but his 
enthusiastic claim applies equally well to the video game industry, which had been working to craft the “capitalist 
dream could be hip” image several years prior to the establishment of Apple—while Steve Jobs was merely a low 
level employee at Atari (See Kent, 2001). 
xxviii At least this is the case amongst Western video game corporations, such as those based in the United States, 
Australia, and elsewhere, where high rates of employee turnover are common (Bonds, et al., 2004; Kerr, 2006; 
McMillen, 2011). This may not, however, be the case with Japanese video game corporations, which have 
demonstrated exceptionally high employee retention rates (Kerr, 2006). 
xxix For instance, for years Nintendo forbade the appearance of nudity or blood in any its video games. 
xxx I opted to use the game Civilization IV for figures 3.11-12 as this game offers the cleanest images of the city 
founding and production processes. However, graphic quality aside—or in the case of Civilization VI, too high of a 
quality—the overall mechanics remain relatively the same from game to game, though their differences are 
important and will be discussed. 
xxxi In Civilization IV (2005) it is possible to change your capital to another city by building a “Palace” in the desired 
city. This feature, however, was not included in Civilization V (2010) nor any of the other games in the series. 
xxxii I use “Civilization” and/or “Civilization series” to speak of the overall trajectory of Sid Meier’s game series. 
When referencing specific iterations of the game, I will mention the numbered version explicitly (e.g., Civilization I 
or Civilization II). 
xxxiii Whereas Civilization IV (2005) offers the clearest images for discussing units and city production, it is 
Civilization V that offers the cleanest documentation regarding the technology tree. Yet again, the differences will be 
discussed. 
xxxiv The objective of the Civilization franchise, in terms of gameplay, is to achieve global dominance. Though the 
mechanism by which global domination is achieved has changed throughout the history of the franchise, winning by 
survival, which is recognized in game as making it to the year 2050—designated as “The End of Time”—signifies 
not so much domination, but more of a global stalemate. As the manual for Civilization V (2010) puts it: “If no one 
has achieved victory, the game ends automatically at the end of 2050. The scores of all surviving civs will be tallied 
and a victor announced” (p. 117). This form of victory offers no sense of pride for the player, in that nothing is 
marked as significant in terms of play style—e.g., culture, technology, et cetera—it is merely a recognition of being 
slightly above average, as opposed to outstanding. 
xxxv The introduction of “civics” in Civilization IV as opposed to the conventional “types of government” utilized in 
the prior games, points to the beginnings of the fragmentation of a unified notion of the state. 
xxxvi On June 28, 2011, patch 1.0.1.332 was released for Civilization V which had, amongst other effects, the result of 
coding “freedom,” “autocracy,” and “order,” as all mutually exclusive social policies (See 2K Greg, 2010). 
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Figure 4.1. Call of Duty: Black Ops’ “There’s a Soldier in All of Us” (Sanders, 2011). This image shows the 
various civilians engaged in combat with one another. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE STRATEGIES OF PLAY: BALLISTICS OF ANXIETY AND DESIRE 
 
Though ultimately an absolute success in terms of cultural and economic impact, with over $1b 
in retail sales worldwide  (Activision-Blizzard, 2010), the launch of Activision-Blizzard’s Call of 
Duty: Black Ops was met with unintentional controversy just one week prior to the game’s 
release. The controversy stemmed not from the game’s choice of thematic content, the Vietnam 
War, nor the hyper-masculine game culture that had sprung up around the Call of Duty franchise 
and First-Person Shooters (FPS) more generally (See gtz, 2011), but rather Activision-Blizzard’s 
“There’s a Soldier in All of Us” advertising campaign. The advertisement, which appeared on 
November 5th, 2010, featured a collection of various civilians, ranging from teenagers in casual 
clothing to adults in professional attire, in a deserted field engaged in military combat—complete 
with assault rifles, missile launchers, helicopters, and other contemporary weaponry (see Figure 
4.1). Though Kobe Bryant, and to a lesser extent Jimmy Kimmel, bore the brunt of the criticism 
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for their participation in the commercial as role models, the main criticism of the advertisement 
stemmed from the nonchalant portrayal of military conflict as just another, if not more exciting, 
form of entertainment—something to be done after (or even during!) one’s free time. Indeed, the 
aesthetic appeal of the commercial was exactly that stark juxtaposition of various professionally 
dressed individuals, from a businesswoman to a Best Buy employee, fast food worker, and more, 
walking calmly across an active battlefield to the sound of the Rolling Stone’s “Gimme Shelter” 
(See Figure 4.2). Mark Medina (2010) of the L.A. Times captured the negative sentiment toward 
the commercial well, with his reaction of: “I think the commercial featuring a happy-go lucky 
vibe with ordinary citizens pretending to be in combat downplays the seriousness that real 
combat entails.” The controversy was one of borders: play here, fight there. 
 And again, though Bryant (more so) and Kimmel (less so) bore the brunt of the 
controversy, as namable faces capable of being blamed for their participation—that is for their 
Figure 4.2. Call of Duty: Black Ops’ “There’s a Soldier in All of Us.” Here, a professionally dressed woman 
walks calmly as a missile explodes behind here—in the next frame, she stoically aims her gun towards the 
offending target in retaliation. 
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blurring of the borders—the image that ought to hold our attention most is that of the nameless 
concierge employee attempting to do his job in the midst of a warzone, for only he appears to be 
flustered by the chaos (See Figure 4.3).xxxvii
xxxviii
 One can imagine him shouting, like Hassan al-
Bahadli (an Iraqi-citizen), “Seven years! Seven years, and these explosions are still going on?” 
(qtd. in, Shadid, 2010). How difficult it must be to conduct business, let alone live, amidst the 
torn billboards, shattered lights, and broken windows that are markers of the ongoing violence of 
Baghdad; the affect is enough to leave one “in a [cultural] coma” (Yusuf Mahmoud, qtd. in, 
Shadid, 2010). And yet, whereas Hassan al-Bahadli, Yusuf Mahmoud, and others, grow ever 
more disillusioned by the broken promises of a seemingly unending War on Terror—a war 
which has made the exceptional ordinary —the concierge employee’s irritation is aimed at 
the normality that would intrude upon the exception: the phone call. If security forces in Iraq are 
critiqued for using cell phones as a means to avoid doing their jobs, to escape the exceptional 
(See Shadid, 2010), then, like Alice’s looking-glass in Lewis Carol’s (1871/2010) Through the 
Figure 4.3. Call of Duty: Black Ops’ “There’s a Soldier in All of Us.” The concierge visibly flustered while 
answering his phone in the midst of a warzone. 
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Looking-Glass, the concierge’s cell phone carries the burden of exposing the permeability of 
global anxiety and desire between the here and there of domestic spaces: play here, war there, 
only it would seem as though everything is backwards. 
 To be clear, then, the controversy stemmed not from the presence of civilians within a 
war torn environment, for that phenomenon had already been sanitized in the early 1990s, when 
the politics surrounding Operation Desert Storm actively worked to reconfigure the parameters 
of war (R. Stahl, 2010b). Specifically, the presence of civilian bodies in war torn environments 
had been dealt with through the circulation of the phrase “collateral damage,” which functioned 
to depersonalize and legitimate “the death of civilians [by] transforming destruction into a 
legitimate byproduct of a noble endeavor” (R. Stahl, 2010b, p. 27). Neither was the controversy, 
however, necessarily the happy-go lucky vibe of the citizens, for war has long been understood 
to operate as a site of madness, conflating humor with hell, and thus one more reason to support 
(and protect) those troops willing to enter this irrational space on our behalf. For again, as Roger 
Stahl (2010b) argues, though the juxtaposition of humor and hell in films such as Apocalypse 
Now (1979) and Full Metal Jacket (1987) may have ruptured the link between military service 
and moral development, this new configuration of war as hell (and the effect this had on those 
who served) came to serve as further reason to support our troops. As such, the commercial did 
not downplay the seriousness that real combat entails, for the sanctity of real combat has long 
since ceased to exist. The controversy, then, was that of a breach in the perimeter of the here and 
there of what Roger Stahl (2010b) calls militainment: the act of translating state violence “into an 
object of pleasurable consumption” (p. 6). This, then, is where the controversy lies: in the here 
and there of “there’s a soldier in all of us,” missing was a state capable of demarcating the when 
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and the where of the borders of hell, and thus the threat of viewing violence upon ourselves as 
objects of pleasurable consumption. 
The anxiety and desire of the war on terror stems, then, from the reterritorialization of 
civil space in terms of military space and reconfiguration of military force in terms of a global, 
hyper-police force (Virilio, 2004/2005). This ongoing project differs from prior reconfigurations 
of national space, in that though borders have long been a concern of the nation-state, in terms of 
determining who may legitimately enter, as well as who has legitimate claim to the various 
spaces reserved within the nation (Ono & Sloop, 2002), the concern post-9/11 has been that of 
universalizing the politics of the border itself (Agamben, 2004/2008; Rajan, 2008). The 
importance of this move to globalize the border is not necessarily whether the mechanisms used 
to surveil the subject are successful, but rather that these mechanisms of control, previously 
demarcating which actions are appropriate for the interior or exterior, have become entangled so 
that the interior is considered a potential warzone and the exterior in need of a police-like, 
peacekeeping force. Examples of this include: the militaristic response to Hurricane Katrina 
within the United States and the continued presence of a “peace-keeping” force in Iraq, roughly 
ten years after victory was declared in 2003 (BBC News, 2003) and nearly eight years after the 
establishment of a transitional Iraqi government (BBC News, 2012). To be clear, September 11th 
was not the beginning of this transformation, but rather demarcated that moment when the 
reconfiguration (and legitimation of this reconfiguration) entered popular consciousness, for 
already well before 9/11 were arguments being advanced for the reterritorialization of civil space 
as just another military space, and the need for a corresponding military force capable of 
responding to this transformation: 
The most obvious challenge faced by the United States and its Marine Corps is the worldwide 
breakdown of order. […] governments are losing their monopoly on organized violence. The 
result, as Marines have seen in Somalia, Lebanon, and Los Angeles, will be chaotic situations in 
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which ethnic groups, street gangs, clans, and other non-state actors wage the war of “all against 
all.” (General Charles Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1996, p. 2) 
 
The Call of Duty: Black Ops’ “There’s a Soldier in All of Us” advertisement captured well the 
latter part of General Krulak’s concern for a “war of all against all,” but featured the wrong 
combatants: “ordinary citizens” (Medina, 2010) as opposed to “ethnic groups, street gangs, 
clans,” and other terrorists. The inversion of anxiety and desire in operation in the advertisement, 
then, exposes the consequence of transforming civil space into a standing-reserve for military 
space; indeed, the outcry resonates with the anxiety and desire embedded within the military 
projection of power abroad. Again, General Krulak (1996) is instructive: 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea deals explicitly with the full spectrum of challenges that we 
will have to face […] and the very exciting prospect of adapting the tradition of maneuver warfare 
[…] to all aspects of warfare. (italics added). 
 
Like General Krulak, the public has often shared this enthusiasm for the “shock and awe” 
approach to warfare when the targets are set on those abroad (Compton, 2004); when the 
potential targets may be us—however defined—as when proposals are made for extending the 
operations of drone technologies to within the United States, conversely, anxiety regarding the 
potential abuse of military power centers on the conception of borders: here is a problem, over 
there is none (Feuerberg, 2012; Lowy, 2012). And yet, as Paul Virilio (2004/2005) commented, 
our post-9/11 obsession with borders betrays the fact that we have yet to come to terms with the 
consequence of our configuration of national space as thoroughly extraverted: “Emancipated 
from all geophysical location, offered up to the chaos of a terminal neocolonial empire that is 
turning life on its head, for from now on: ELSEWHERE BEGINS HERE” ([capitals in original] 
p. 111). In other words, when civil space is conceived as standing-reserve for military space—
i.e., already at hand, deployable—then so too must every citizen be ready to answer the call for 
combat: hence, “There’s a Soldier in All of Us.” The anxiety, then, is that this may be the truth 
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Figure 4.4. Ever Sparkle Industrial Toy’s “Forward 
Command Post.” Page 486 of JCPenny’s 2002 
Christmas catalog described the toy as follows: “Take 
command of your soldiers from this fully outfitted 
battle zone. 75-piece set includes one 11 ½″ H 
figurine in military combat gear, toy weapons, 
American flag, chairs and more. Assembled 
dimensions; 32x16x32 ″H. Plastic. 10 lbs. Ages 5 and 
up. 
Figure 4.5. The PTWP Military Life Playset. 
JCPenney’s online catalog has the following 
description for the toy: “If your little hero is interested 
in saving the world, let his imagination run wild with 
this Power Team World Peacekeepers Military Life 
set. Includes 33 accessories; fully posable action 
figures; ages 3 and up.” The catalog further suggested 
other PTWP playsets available for purchase through 
the website. 
of our desire: the inversion of civil space as military space which is necessary for the production 
of the soldier in all of us may ultimately result in a war of all against all. 
 The anxiety extends only as far as one’s conception of the border, however. The fact of 
the matter is that the controversy is not that of what it means to be a soldier or that there are 
soldiers, but that in defining citizens as soon-to-be-soldiers, the consequences of this 
configuration are to be felt on this side of the border. As Eric Garris, webmaster of the libertarian 
anti-war.com, speaking of another toy that had inadvertently exposed the ongoing diffusion of 
the border, Ever Sparkle’s “Forward Command Post” (See Figure 4.4) commented: 
War toys have been around forever, but the problem here is the change in focus. Before such toys 
were more in line with the ideas of self-defence. 
[….] 
This is not just another war toy—it’s a total paradigm shift in the war toy industry. It’s setting up 
the young people for this new kind of war, where soldiers come into your house and take it over 
when they need to. ([italics added] qtd. in, Foss, 2002) 
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Though coverage of the controversy wrapped the debate in a framework of concern regarding the 
effects of violent toys on children (Foss, 2002), the paradigm shift addressed is explicitly one of 
borders or anxiety over the lack thereof—a fear that what had typically been reserved for over 
there may now come to fruition right here.xxxix As Snopes.com (2006) humorously observed, “an 
‘antidote’ toy was also available for purchase by concerned parents […]: the World Peace 
Keepers Battle Station”; this toy, now called the “Power Team World Peacekeepers Military Life 
Playset” (See Figure 4.5), has yet to attract similar controversy, and is still readily available from 
JCPenny as of this writing. The controversy that surrounded both Ever Sparkle’s “Forward 
Command Post” and Activision-Blizzard’s Call of Duty: Black Ops “There’s a Soldier in All of 
Us” advertisement, and the lack of controversy surrounding the “Power Team World 
Peacekeepers Military Life Playset,” suggests that the criticism Activision-Blizzard received was 
not about the gamification of warfare—for this convergence has been of increasing importance 
to development and functioning of the U.S. military (See “War and Cinema Video Games” 
below)—but rather that Activision-Blizzard and Ever Sparkle each touched upon the anxieties 
embedded within the transforming structures and theaters of modern warfare. 
 More than militainment, then, the threat of the “There’s a Soldier in All of Us” Campaign 
and toy’s like Ever Sparkle’s “Forward Command Post” is that, these representations of civilian 
space as potential military space suggest that there really just might need to be a soldier in all of 
us; or rather, that in the aftermath of 9/11, all space is potential military space, and hence, we 
may already be in the process of being reconfigured along the lines of a citizen-soldier-subject. 
Missing from the controversy, however, is an equal concern for the battlefield in itself, whether 
here or there, for little concern has emerged over the inclusion of contemporary weaponry in 
video games when enemies are the appropriate targets: them and not us. Moreover, though the 
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convergence between military and gaming technologies, in terms of training simulations and 
software interfaces, has garnered criticism from critical scholars and a handful of journalists 
(Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Halter, 2006; R. Stahl, 2006, 2010b), the concern that 
matters, from the perspective of the game developers, is that of how to most appropriately 
portray military space (See: Edge, 2011b; Goodrich, 2010). As Greg Goodrich, executive 
producer of Electronic Arts’ Medal of Honor (2010c) wrote:  
This is a voice that has earned the right to be listened to. It is a voice that we care deeply about. 
[This is] because the heartbeat of Medal of Honor has always resided in the reverence for 
American and Allied soldiers. (Goodrich, 2010) 
 
Indeed, it is this same concern and reverence for the battlefield that almost kept contemporary 
military games from coming into existence in the first place, not because of fear that they might 
promote the militarization of the U.S. nation, but rather out of fear that they might not adequately 
do so; it was only after receiving the blessing of military personnel—and not other concerned 
parties—that the contemporary (First-Person Shooter) military game genre was born (Edge, 
2011b; Poplak, 2010). And again, to further iterate, the controversy and concern has continued to 
be one of borders, not necessarily content: in 2010, Electronic Arts received criticism for 
allowing for gamers to play as the Taliban during multiplayer sessions; this criticism dissipated 
after Greg Goodrich opted to change their name to “Opposing Force.” The problem was not that 
the Taliban were in the game, but that we might play as them and kill us—the inversion of 
borders. 
 Considering the accelerated convergence of military and gaming technologies, and modes 
of representation, it is reasonable that many would be concerned with how borders are conceived 
in military games. Interfaces have converged to the extent that one would have difficulty 
discerning which is play and which is reality (See Figures 4.6-7). Past, present, and near-future 
military scenarios collapse upon each other due to the gravity produced from the speed of their 
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Figure 4.7. An image of the MQ-9 Reaper screen interface from Activision-Blizzard’s (2011) Call of Duty; 
Modern Warfare 3’s “Black Tuesday” level. 
Figure 4.6. An image of the MQ-9 Reaper screen interface from the U.S. Air Force’s (2011) “Changing Warfare 
Video.” 
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cultural circulation, so that it is now difficult to discern the plotline of the Cold War from the 
War on Terror (See: Activision, 2007a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011b; Milius, 1984; THQ, 2011b). The 
dizzying effect has resulted in the justification of the present (i.e., the state of exception) in terms 
of a near-future threat (i.e., the War on Terror) made known through a history deferred (i.e., the 
past is prologue). If the visual simulator made it so that “seeing and foreseeing […] tend to 
merge so closely that the actual can no longer be distinguished from the potential” (Virilio, 
1984/2009, p. 4), then the historical simulator makes it so that memory and anxiety merge so 
closely that the present can no longer be distinguished from the prophecy. The battle to prepare 
for (future terrorism) becomes the battle itself (the War on Terror). The intoxication of this 
prophecy fulfilled, a world in which borders are losing their meaning—that is, a world in which 
civilians are military targets—has indeed worked to bring out the soldier residing in all of us: 
“for the first time since the establishment of all-volunteer forces in 1973, the US military has met 
all of its recruiting goals [in 2009]” (Holmes, 2009). Though it would be too simplistic to 
attribute a one-to-one correlation between military gameplay and military recruitment (Mcginn 
& Boesveld, 2009), the military-funded recruitment game, America’s Army, is believed to have 
had “more impact on recruits than all other forms of Army advertising combined. [At] just .25% 
of the military’s total advertising budget” (Edery & Mollick, 2009, p. 141); and beyond military-
recruitment tools, commercially-funded military-themed games are so popular amongst military 
personnel that at one point Halo 3 was “widely known as the most popular activity for off-duty 
soldiers” (McGonigal, 2011, p. 2). Clearly, then, the convergence between the military and video 
game industries means that play itself is coming to be an integral part of the war machine; as the 
U.S. Air Force proudly touts on its website: “IT’S NOT SCIENCE FICTION. IT’S WHAT WE 
DO EVERY DAY” (See Figures 4.8-9; U.S. Air Force, 2011). Modern warfare, then, is not just 
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the name of a video game franchise (i.e., Call of Duty: Modern Warfare)—an object of mere 
entertainment—but a site wherein digital play and contemporary warfare are entangled to such 
an extent that: (1) video games operate as a site of experimentation (popularizing the combat 
scenarios and producing the subjectivities necessary for contemporary and future warfare); and, 
Figures 4.8-9. (top-bottom). Introductory flash-sequence for the U.S. Air Force’s website. The small text in 
Figure 4.9, beneath “It’s not science fiction,” reads: “Explore the careers and technology that turn the impossible 
into reality.” 
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(2) modern warfare, in turn, depends upon the subjectivities and interface technologies 
associated with digital play. 
 This chapter, then, is an attempt to detail the rough trajectory and consequences of this 
convergence between the “science fiction” of virtual play and the reality of what “we do every 
day.” This analysis is increasingly urgent, for though the cultural imaginary has long intersected 
with the political real, the gap between the two has become increasingly tenuous. This has 
occurred on two fronts: (1) as Walter Benjamin (1935/2006) and Martin Heidegger (1938/1977) 
each noticed in the 1930s, photographic technologies have dramatically transformed our 
conception of time and space so that our experience of a given moment can be expanded 
exponentially. An example of this is the amount of visual information extracted from Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the year 2010 alone would take one person four decades to watch (The 
Economist, 2010). Hence, this glut of information has (2) required the ability to process 
information at an ever increasing rate if one is to act upon the logistical edge gained from this 
amplification of time. If this has at-once meant the increasing reliance upon algorithms for the 
operation of the military (The Economist, 2010), it has also resulted in the need for militarized 
subjects capable of quickly extracting complex information from abstract representations so as to 
properly operate within this increasingly abstracted environment. Video game technologies and 
gaming literacy encapsulate these two fronts in that digital play operates through an abstraction 
of the world (e.g., head-up displays create a one-to-one equivocation between the health of the 
avatar and numerical representation) and simultaneously educate the player to operate within this 
abstraction (Crogan, 2003). The imbrication of video game technologies and military operations, 
as suggested by the U.S. Air Force (See Figures 4.8-9), urges us to understand the consequences 
of this gamification of modern warfare, in terms not just of technology, but cultural anxiety and 
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desire as well; for how does this gamified military technology operate as an extension of, and 
thus enable us to act out upon, the anxieties and desires embedded within digital play 
This analysis of the relationship between digital play and the military-industrial complex 
is of increasing importance, for in 1984, Paul Virilio convincingly wrote of the effects cinema 
had on the logistics of military perception, but the technological limitations of cinema—unlike 
digital play—could not overcome the tension between seeing and foreseeing: cinema was 
capable of editing the field of vision (e.g., popular films) necessary for the legitimation of 
military action or focusing the field of vision (e.g., the gun sight) so as to extend the reach of the 
war machine, but never both simultaneously—a gap existed between both functions (See Virilio, 
1984/2009, pp. 40-58, 85-111). The interactivity of the video game, and digital technologies, has 
obliterated the gap. The screen is now an interface (Manovich, 2001), compelling the potential to 
act upon the actual. What is needed, then, is a critical ballistics capable of accounting for the 
effect of virtual play upon the development and deployment of that interface. Ballistics refers to 
the forces—from wind speed to bullet velocity and more—that affect the trajectory of a given 
projectile. Utilizing these principles allows for forensic scientists to work backwards from a 
given event so as to discern how it may have occurred: does the bullet entry point suggest suicide 
or murder? In this manner, I am suggesting that so too ought critical game studies to be 
concerned with matters of ballistics. As Robin Wagner-Pacifici (2009) argues, “In a world in 
which a (now former) U.S. president articulates preemptive war as official strategic policy, 
sociological investigation of ‘futures in action’ […] is profoundly important” (p. 705). Video 
games are one such site where we bear witness to the ballistics of “futures in action.” And yet, 
the undertaking of this investigation “is not to assume that [these future projections] come true, 
but to explore the ways they deeply infuse social interaction, albeit in possibly contradictory and 
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surprising ways” (Mische, 2009, p. 702); so though video games may not dictate the path of a 
given action—just as bullet velocity alone is not enough to guarantee the trajectory of a given 
projectile—one would be foolish to ignore the force of this variable upon the matrix that is 
contemporary global conflict. That is, how might working backwards from a given military 
projection show how the arc of the missile launched from the battleship follows that of the 
simulated trajectory of the video game? 
 The form of critical ballistics that I am calling for, then, requires that those interested in 
the operations of modern warfare understand how contemporary consumer technologies are 
imbricated with historical, ongoing, and near-future military campaigns. This form of analysis 
requires that we understand both the form of technology and the cultural logics embedded within 
its operation; that is, if we are to grasp the logistics of perception, we need to look at more than 
just what a given technology, such as film (e.g., Virilio, 1984/2009), enables, but also to the 
media contents as well. This is because though film technologies, for instance, may be capable of 
capturing any given target via close-ups and mid- to long-shots, thereby transforming the 
possibilities of modern warfare (Virilio, 1984/2009), the popular contents of cinema legitimates 
some targets as deserving of certain forms of mise en scène vis-à-vis others. Likewise, if game 
studies is to incorporate this form of critical ballistics into its analysis of modern warfare, then it 
seems as though we must open up the militainment model as well. For though the concept in its 
contemporary configuration is important for understanding how the citizen-subject is being 
redefined “as a member of the ranks” (R. Stahl, 2006, p. 126) and does acknowledge that gaming 
technologies helps to facilitate this transition from citizen to citizen-soldier, the terms current 
conception conceives of the citizen as a consumer—as opposed to a co-producer—of 
contemporary logics of warfare: 
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We ought to cautiously follow this narrative to its conclusion, however. The metaphors of 
“interface” and “tele-action” imply a re-arming of the user, a high-tech reintroduction of the 
citizen-soldier. Dominant trends in post-industrial war suggest the opposite to be the case, 
however. The citizen has been progressively disarmed and dissociated from playing an active role 
in the actual military institution. Rather than reversing these trends, the interactive war intensifies 
them, encouraging the citizen to engage in a closed, constructed system that channels the civic 
urge through fantasies of military participation. [….] The “interface” between citizen and military 
is therefore not one where the citizen has any real role in “playing the war,” but rather should be 
thought of as a sophisticated means through which the military-entertainment complex “plays the 
citizen.” (R. Stahl, 2010b, p. 47; See also: R. Stahl, 2006, pp. 125-126, 2010a, pp. 80-82) 
 
I argue for the opening up of the militainment model, for I believe that collusion between the 
military and digital play does not need to result in the manifestation of a real-life Ender’s Game 
to enable citizens to have any real role in “playing the war”; rather, can we not conceive of these 
virtual-citizen-soldiers as the eager first-response testers of the interface, algorithms, and 
technologies of present and future warfare? If game studies is to incorporate the form of critical 
ballistics that I am calling for, then, it seems necessary to conceive of digital play as more than 
just a closed system, and rather consider gaming as being a site wherein new technologies, 
interfaces, and algorithms are tested for their deployment upon particular populations. 
This chapter, then, operates as a preliminary analysis of how the anxieties and desires 
embedded within the technologies associated with digital play have affected the trajectory of 
modern warfare; for if video games are an important site wherein we witness the mobilization of 
anxiety and desire, as I have claimed throughout this dissertation, then so too must gaming have 
had an effect upon the configuration of modern warfare. To undertake this critical ballistics 
analysis, this chapter is organized as follows: (1) I provide a brief overview of the relationship 
between technology and the functioning of modern Empire; (2) I place the advent of video game 
technology within the reconfigurations of modern warfare; (3) I trace the emergence of video 
games as culturally legitimate sites of historical knowledge; (4) I look to the Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare franchise as a provocative site at which to explore the production and 
consumption of contemporary crisis; and, (5) I look at the political implications of the Modern 
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Warfare series’ functioning as a work of fascistic art. The central argument that I aim to make is 
in following the history of the video game, we are able to document the historical production of 
the citizen-soldier of the near future; that is, the reconfiguration of the public as standing-reserve 
for the near future-conflict. 
Opening the Eye of Empire 
It is well-documented the role communication technologies have had in the formation and 
maintenance of the public sphere (Habermas, 1991; Starr, 2004). The importance of early print 
culture for the establishment of the public sphere has led many to christen free access to the 
media as in itself procuring and securing the manifestation of a popular, fourth estate (Ambinder, 
2009; McChesney, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2007; Nichols & McChesney, 2009; Starr, 2004; Wu, 
2006). If technology is politics by other means (Starr, 2004), however, then one must ask what 
bodies are excluded or forced to be reconfigured in order to participate in this de-politicized/re-
politicized public sphere (Fraser, 1997; Squires, 2002). Posing this question is not to call upon a 
caricatured and much-maligned theoretical standpoint of technological determinism, but rather to 
suggest that the political effect of a given technology is bound up within all that constitutes the 
formation of that medium, institution and infrastructure alike (Heidegger, 1954/1977a). In the 
case of communication technologies, then, for instance, print media could come into existence as 
a medium for the propagation of a particular definition of the public and the management of 
colonies at distance (Carey, 1983/2009). One does not have the privilege of saying this here is 
the technology and that over there is an aberration to those who suffer at the hands of 
technological dissemination. 
 That communication technologies are vehicles of power, capable of both transmitting and 
reconfiguring culture (Carey, 1975/2009), though not always articulated, has long been 
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understood, particularly by those with a vested interest in political outcomes. The U.S. South, for 
instance, adamantly opposed the federal government’s interest in nationalizing and expanding 
the telegraph in 1844 out of a concern that this and other national infrastructure projects “would 
strengthen the industrial north” (Starr, 2004, p. 164). So, though many in the U.S. North held out 
hope that the telegraph might function to bind together a nation on the brink of falling apart, 
those in the South knew well the politics of this technology: the compression of time and space 
more suited to the industrial north than the agricultural south (Carey, 1983/2009). The difference 
in techno-enthusiasm, then, depends on which side of the border one stands: here or there. If the 
U.S. South seemed paranoid—and to be clear, I am in no way defending the racial politics of the 
Confederates—then the British enthusiasm for the transatlantic telegraph ought to vindicate their 
anxiety, if not their politics (See: Carey, 1983/2009; Starr, 2004); as James Carey (1983/2009) 
notes: 
Although colonies could be held together with printing, correspondence, and sail, the hold, as the 
American experience shows, was always tenuous over great distance. Moreover, in colonial 
arrangements, the margin had as much power as the center. Until the transatlantic cable, it was 
difficult to determine whether British colonial policy was being set in London or by colonial 
governors in the field—out of contact and out of control. (pp. 163-164) 
 
Facilitating a particular definition of democracy here and expanding colonialism there are both 
embedded in the history of the telegraph, and contemporary communication technologies more 
generally; for it was only through the development of this and subsequent communications 
infrastructure that a system could emerge from which the “center of an empire could dictate 
rather than merely respond to the margin” (Carey, 1983/2009, p. 164). Embedded within 
contemporary communication technologies, then, is the definition, and hence possibility, of 
imperialism. 
 That empire existed prior to the development of the telegraph and other contemporary 
communication technologies ought not to undermine the significance these new media 
 
 
 145  
 
technologies had for national and international politics. Though it is true that the telegraph and 
other new mediums arrived in a world already undergoing significant political economic 
transformation, the development, implementation, and reception of a particular technology are 
consequences of particular political economic interests and struggles (Gitelman, 2008; Starr, 
2004; R. Williams, 1974/2005). If the old colonial empires were in the midst of industrialization, 
updating both economic and military systems, then so too were they in need of a parallel 
communications revolution so as to maintain their respective empires. And though this does not 
mean that the advent of new communication technologies necessarily align with the needs of the 
historical powers of a given period, we still ought to recognize the contexts and alliances that 
attempt to shape which political possibilities emerge from the production and consumption of a 
given technology (Bratich, 2009). For the telegraph, the historical context was that of Colonial 
Empires in search of a means compressing time and space so as to keep the colonies from 
leaving the political economic gravity of colonialism (Carey, 1983/2009) and the alliance was 
that of state-sanctioned monopolies (Wu, 2010). Hence, the telegraph emerged as part and parcel 
with contemporary Empire; for though the telegraph could exist without Empire, contemporary 
Empire could not exist without the telegraph and subsequent communication technologies—
embedded within contemporary communication technologies is the definition, and hence 
possibility, of imperialism. 
 Though the telegraph initially affected the practices of commerce and governance most 
(Carey, 1975/2009, 1983/2009; Czitrom, 1982; Starr, 2004), the compression of time and space 
brought about by the communications revolution quickly proved to be necessary and 
transformative in matters of military concern as well (Kittler, 2002/2011; Virilio, 1984/2009).  
Empire was faced with the logistical challenges of managing the evermore complex armies 
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necessary for bringing about its desires. If modernity had brought about the technique of 
discipline (Foucault, 1975/1995), the colonial empires were having difficulty extending this logic 
beyond their borders: 
When Napoleon […] created a battlefield, he was able to concentrate prevision and decision in one 
act of looking, and without neglecting detail he could re-establish organization and control with 
unequalled speed. But when Napoleonic warfare spread to the vast expanses of Russia in 1812, 
drawing in half a million men on the French side alone, this type of visual organization underwent 
logistical collapse. (Virilio, 1984/2009, p. 75) 
 
The theater of imperial desire itself had to be disciplined if Empire was to survive its own 
modernization: 
In the wars of old, strategy mainly consisted in choosing and marking out a theatre of operations, a 
battlefield with the best visual conditions and greatest scope for movement. In the Great War, 
however, the main task was to grasp the opposite tendency: to narrow down targets and to create a 
picture of battle for troops blinded by the massive reach of artillery units, themselves firing blind, 
and by the ceaseless upheaval of their environments. (Virilio, 1984/2009, p. 87) 
 
Advances in visual and communications media worked in conjunction to discipline the 
battlefield (Kittler, 2002/2011; Virilio, 1984/2009). Visual media technologies, such as cinema 
and photography, worked to recompose the fragmented battlefield so as to discern patterns of 
conflict that were often unclear to the combatants themselves (Kittler, 2002/2011; Virilio, 
1984/2009). Communication technologies, in turn, worked to communicate this information of 
the battlefield from frontline to central command and back again; this had the effect of not only 
allowing for the center of Empire to dictate rather than merely respond to the margin (as Carey 
[1983/2009] argued), but also to reconfigure warfare along the lines of the general tendency as 
opposed to the individual event (Virilio, 1984/2009). If the combatants of warfare could no 
longer grasp the massiveness of the conflict, conversely, the effects of mediation upon warfare 
are such that Empire has lost sight of the combatants themselves, for all that matters now is the 
general tendency (Virilio, 1984/2009). As the contemporary idiom, “you may have won the 
battle, but you lost the war,” reminds us today, what matters most within the logic of Empire is 
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the ability to see beyond a given battlefield so as to take in the complete theater of operations 
itself—modern warfare no longer imagines itself as an organic, episodic conflict, but rather 
foresees itself in the general tendency of the simulation. 
 To be clear, the conception of a peoples or nation has always only existed within the 
social imaginary of communication practices (Carey, 1975/2009; Hall, 1983; McLuhan, 
1964/1994). The difference, however, is that the advent of new communication technologies 
enabled Imperial desire to impose its “point of view” upon those beyond its national borders 
(Virilio, 1984/2009)—thereby breaching the conception of a border itself. Prior to these new 
communication technologies, Imperial desire groped blindly beyond its borders, hoping that the 
foreign other would buy into the imaginary community of Imperial order, rather than corrupt the 
center (See Conrad, 2004); beyond the threshold of the border, Empire could never be sure how 
its message was received (Bhabha, 1994) or if it even arrived, that is, if it was intercepted 
(Kittler, 2002/2011; Virilio, 1984/2009). True, this anxiety persists today with firewall systems 
and other advanced encryption methods, however, the opening of the imperial eye—made 
possible via the advent of new communication technologies—has transformed the crux of those 
concerns: meaning is no longer sought only through visible displays of power (e.g., military 
bodies), but now also through “invisible weapons that make things visible—radar, sonar, and the 
high-definition camera of spy satellites” (Virilio, 1984/2009, p. 89). These invisible weapons that 
make things visible, that is the eyes of Empire, do not operate at the level of the individual, but 
rather from the perspective of Imperial desire, thereby imposing a particular point of view upon 
global order. Collateral damage and other rhetorical figures are the tell-tale signs of this Imperial 
perspective. These are not empty rhetorical figures, but rather accurate descriptors of the material 
consequence of the Imperial vantage point; for as Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman 
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(1995/2009) comments, “from a distance, you don’t look anything like a friend” (p. 97). 
Communication technologies enable this operation of Empire at distance, and from a distance, 
the subject is little more than an object of Imperial desire. 
 This, then, is the paradox of contemporary communication technologies: the linking up of 
the multitude with that of the anxieties and desires of Empire. The opening up of the Imperial 
eye has at once enabled the subject to meet Empire eye-to-eye, but when that eye is that of the 
mechanical eye of the smart-bomb or predator drone, the point of view exchanged is rather one-
sided. This ability to not just surveil but also discipline at distance is not the only possible 
outcome that has resulted from the opening up of the Imperial eye, but it is no aberration either; 
it is rather a part of the built in logic of contemporary communication technologies. The origins 
and ongoing development of contemporary communication technologies, whether initiated from 
the public, private, or military sector, were often undertaken for the advancement of Imperial 
desire: long-distance telephony (Wu, 2010); the transatlantic wire (Starr, 2004); film and 
photography technologies (Virilio, 1984/2009); and the computer and contemporary digital 
technologies (Friedman, 2005; Hassan, 2008/2011). Though these technologies have long since 
left the closed-circuit of the military and economic elite, the influence these institutions have had 
on the uptake and ongoing development of these technologies continues. This is especially true 
as it regards the concern of this dissertation, the video game. 
War and Cinema Video Games 
In 1984, Paul Virilio understood the pilotless drone and other “guided” weapons to be the 
culmination of the fusion between war and cinema technologies: “the fusion is complete, the 
confusion perfect: nothing now distinguishes the functions of the weapon and the eye” (p. 104). 
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The resulting fusion brought about further confusion, however, in that the eye itself is 
increasingly alienated from its own weaponry: 
Proponents of a separate career field [for Drone Operators] have held strong convictions, pointing 
to the unique technical skills required to operate UASs as sufficient justification. [….]. [Col 
Michael McKinney] believes that […] Airmen can learn to extract three-dimensional situational 
awareness from a two-dimensional screen. ([Italics added] Cantwell, 2009, pp. 68-69) 
 
The extension of the eye into mediated space necessitated visual rehabilitation: learning how to 
extract three-dimensional situational awareness from a two-dimensional screen. The solution 
emerged nearly simultaneously; for with warfare becoming increasingly mediated, Ralph Baer 
would note: 
Shooting at targets in an arcade game is not too different technically from shooting at targets in a 
weapons training exercise. The same interactive video technology works well in both scenarios. 
(qtd. in, Halter, 2006, p. 85) 
 
Ralph Baer would know. Though more famously known as one of the founding figures of the 
video game industry, Ralph Baer was also a prominent developer of weapons-simulation and 
weapons-training systems (Halter, 2006); indeed, his invention of the first video game console in 
1967, nicknamed the “Brown Box” and later sold in 1972 as the Magnavox Odyssey, was 
initially classified as a top-secret military training device up until 1968 (Kline, et al., 2003, p. 
92). From its beginning, then, the video game would operate as the new domain of warfare; for 
when one cannot reasonably distinguish between the screen and reality, the screen takes 
precedence: 
Though even a single civilian casualty ought not to be taken lightly, the focus on alleged collateral 
damage distorts the essence of the drone program. Technology allows for highly trained operators 
to observe targets on the ground for as much as 72 hours in advance. Software engineers typically 
model the blast radius for a missile or bomb strike. Lawyers weigh in on which laws apply and 
entire categories of potential targets—including mosques, hospitals, and schools—are almost 
always out of bounds. All these procedures protect innocent civilian life. ([Italics added] Dhume, 
2011) 
 
In essence, the eyes of those on the ground are not to be believed, for even beyond allegations of 
corruption (whether them or us), we have modeled the strike in advance, and have had that 
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model approved by lawyers, and on that screen, no one of innocence died. If this sounds like a 
video game, it is because it is: why should we be surprised “that the age of media technologies is 
at the same time also the age of technical warfare” (Kittler, 2002/2011, pp. 41-42; See also 
McLuhan, 1964/1994, p. 339). 
The video game is a site of military anxiety and desire. The technology emerged within a 
Cold War political economic environment that was looking to evacuate the constraints of the 
political real. The fracturing of the globe along axes of a Communist and Western World, and 
subsequent military stalemates throughout the war, produced significant amounts of cultural 
fatigue within the United States. Capitalism found itself under siege from its inability to procure 
new economic markets in physical space, which was necessary for continued economic 
expansion. In essence, the Cold War produced the conditions for the collapse of capitalism, in 
that to the extent that Empire requires new labor and commodity markets for continued growth, 
the Communist World proved to be an impenetrable wall against Western desire. Coupled with 
the long-brewing political malaise of African American populations (See: Hughes, 1951/2002; 
M. L. King, 1963/2002) and other civil rights movements, Empire found itself on the verge of 
imploding from within and without, as it could no longer procure the political, economic, or 
moral resources necessary to sate the demands of the multitude. As Hardt and Negri (2001) 
argue, the saturation of the globe along the lines of two competing Empires would have been the 
death of both the Communist and Western World had the tension not been overcome. The 
Western World survived not necessarily because it was the more viable political economic 
system, but rather because it was able to procure new domains for political economic expansion: 
the virtual. In the 1970s, Financial Markets began the transition from real-time to virtual-time, 
thereby producing new sites of economic exchange: the futures market (Harvey, 1990). This 
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economic extension into virtual space resulted in the acceleration of the virtualization of 
contemporary military forces as well. 
Modern military forces had already been undergoing virtualization through the use of 
cinematic technologies which enabled the extension of the eye across time and space (Virilio, 
1984/2009). The evacuation of the Western economic market, from manufacturing to a service- 
and “cognitive” capital-based society, undercut the physical infrastructure of the military. 
Though the United States could procure materials and resources from its network of 
transnational markets, when those markets would not comply, due to political unrest, its military 
capabilities would be compromised: the 1974 Oil Crisis affected more than just public and 
commercial transportation (Virilio, 1984/2009). With the enforcement of imperial interests 
increasingly being augmented and supplemented via virtual means as it was, the 1974 Oil Crisis 
offered an economic incentive to accelerating even further the virtualization of the military, 
through the mass adoption of flight simulators and other virtual training technologies (Virilio, 
1984/2009). Though these flight and combat simulators were expensive—$35m and $18m for a 
cutting-edge flight and tank simulator in the 1970s respectively (Halter, 2006)—the technologies 
proved to offer effective equivalencies between the experience of virtual- and real-time and 
space (Virilio, 1984/2009).  
It was within this environment that Ralph Baer developed the video game console under 
the auspice of it being a low cost alternative to conventional military training systems (Halter, 
2006; Kline, et al., 2003); and though Baer would later claim this to be a ruse, “let’s call it what 
it really is: TV Games,” history would prove otherwise: 
[In the 1970s] Ralph Baer […] developed a groundbreaking series of interactive video systems at 
Sanders Associates that used interactive videotape and, later, videodisc, to train soldier rifle 
marksmanship [and] antitank artillery. (Halter, 2006, p. 151) 
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More than just low-cost alternatives, however, the military-industrial complex benefited from the 
cultural imagination of the video game industry: 
For example, human animations, which you see a lot in games—people jumping, fighting, 
running. Well, if you dress these human animations up in military uniforms and have them 
running in single file in formation and you feed that back into a DOD military simulation training 
scenario, now you’ve brought entertainment into a military training product. (Carlton Caldwell, of 
Lockheed Martin, qtd. in Herz, 1997, p. 204) 
 
This collaboration between Sega and Lockheed Martin in the mid-1990s is just one example of 
how the video game form has been working its way back into the military-industrial complex 
from which it had initially emerged: Atari’s Battlezone (1980a) is believed to have been the 
inspiration for DARPA’s SIMNET, an early multi-user vehicle-combat simulator developed for 
the military (Galloway, 2006; Kline, et al., 2003); id Software’s Doom II (GT Interactive, 1995) 
was modified by the Marines into a team-based infantry combat simulator (Lenoir & Lowood, 
2000; R. Stahl, 2010b); and, in 1999, the Institute for Creative Technologies was established at 
USC with a $45m grant from the Army to develop advanced game-based simulators for the 
military (Institute for Creative Technologies, 2012; Lenoir & Lowood, 2000; R. Stahl, 2010b).  
 This historical interest in digital play by the military-industrial complex speaks to the 
metaphysical shift in our experience of global politics. The advent of photography radically 
reoriented our relationship to the world through the proliferation of a kind of mapping logic; that 
is, the extension of the eye via the photographic apparatus rendered experiences of spaces 
hitherto unmappable—e.g., the battlefield—subject to structuration (Benjamin, 1935/2006; 
Heidegger, 1938/1977; Virilio, 1984/2009). The photograph imposed a particular perspective 
upon the experience of reality, and to the extent that this image enabled certain politics over 
others—via the recognition of certain patterns over others—then a claim was made to the 
validity of this abstraction of the real over others (Virilio, 1984/2009). And yet, even as 
photographic technologies were transforming the overall experience of warfare, the age of the 
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world picture, as Heidegger (1938/1977) called it, was beginning to reach the limits of its 
political efficacy. That is because if photographic technologies operated as the logical extension 
of a society intent upon extending the operation of the eye so that “seeing and foreseeing […] 
tend to merge” (Virilio, 1984/2009, p. 4), then photographic technologies also reveal the limit of 
their operation: the object of photography is always that of the past.xl The advent of digital play, 
however, overcomes this barrier of time, in that through the abstraction of fundamental rules 
from the domain of life, the object of play is that of the future—simulation. The proliferation of 
the combat simulator—which is an outgrowth of digital play—for contemporary warfare, then, 
speaks to the realization of the desire to see and foresee through an equivocation of virtual-time 
with real-time; that is, the simulator has ceased to be a facsimile, and instead has come to 
pervade all aspects of relevant life, so that real-time is evaluated in accordance to the logic of 
virtual-time. And it is this promise of the virtual—that it might operate effectively in lieu of the 
real—which was embedded within digital play at the moment of its inception, when Ralph Baer 
justified his work on the first video game console by noting the equivalence to conventional 
weapons training exercises (See Halter, 2006, p. 85).  
So, though one could understand the divergent, though overlapping, institutional paths of 
simulator technology and home video game technologies as evidence of two industries serving 
two very different interests and markets, this is not quite true. Yes, on one hand, the delinking of 
the video game industry from the military industry in 1972, when Ralph Baer’s “Brown Box” 
was released as the Magnavox Odyssey, did allow for the design of genres beyond those of 
explicit military interest, such as platform games such as Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo, 1985) 
and maze games such as Pac-Man (Namco, 1980). On the other, though operating in separate 
markets (but not always, as the Halo and Call of Duty franchises attest), the interests of Empire 
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continue to be served regardless of whether the audience is military or civilian, even when 
considering difference in content and genre variation; for it is important to remember that being 
able to extract three-dimensional situational awareness from a two-dimensional screen is a 
valuable skill for today’s modern military force (Cantwell, 2009). As Ronald Reagan commented 
in 1983, while giving a speech at Disney World’s EPCOT Center: 
I recently learned something quite interesting about video games. Many young people have 
developed incredible hand, eye, and brain coordination in playing these games. The Air Force 
believes these kids will be outstanding pilots should they fly our jets. The computerized radar 
screen in the cockpit is not unlike the computerized video screen. Watch a 12-year-old take 
evasive action and score multiple hits while playing “Space Invaders,” and you will appreciate the 
skills of tomorrow’s pilot. (Reagan, 1983) 
 
Though one might smile at the presumed inanity of comparing the mastery of Space Invaders 
(Taito, 1978)  to possessing the skillset necessary for taking evasive maneuvers with a fighter jet, 
President Reagan’s fundamental premise is that a relative equivalency between the screens’ of 
modern military technology and video game technology exists, and that familiarity with one is 
necessarily familiarity with the other: even in our leisure, we train ourselves for the war of the 
future—this was the source of Reagan’s pride. And it is here, then, where the video game 
industry carries on the unwanted legacy of William Higinbotham, the military scientist credited 
with creating the first video game with the intent of it serving as a friendly counterpart to the 
otherwise uninviting military-industrial technology (Halter, 2006; Kline, et al., 2003). The 
invitation of training for the war of the future-present has become ubiquitous, and many have 
embraced it; for many, war has come to serve as a whole way of life: at one point, “earning 
virtual combat medals” in Halo 3 (Microsoft, 2007) was the most popular activity for off-duty 
soldiers (McGonigal, 2011, p. 2).  
Indeed, in 2010, the franchise for which the rest of this chapter will be concerned, the 
Call of Duty series became the best-selling third-party video game of all time (Activision-
Blizzard, 2010); and, just one year later, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 was released to the 
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biggest entertainment launch, regardless of medium, with more than $400m (6.5m units) sold in 
the United States and Britain alone in the first 24-hours of its release—which has meant that for 
the past three-years, the Call of Duty franchise had released the bestselling video game of the 
year, with Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (Activision, 2009a) and Call of Duty: Black Ops 
(Activision, 2010a) generating day-one-sales of $310m and $360m respectively (Activision-
Blizzard, 2011a; Richmond, 2011). As Activision’s VP of Digital Sales, Jamie Berger, argued, 
“[COD] is not even a game any more, it’s a lifestyle. No different from being a golfer or a 
marathon runner, there are people out there who are Call of Duty players” (qtd. in Edge, 2011a, 
p. 14). This is not mere public relations hyperbole, as four million players registered for the free 
Call of Duty: Elite social networking and stat tracking service within six days of the service 
coming online; and one million of those users paid a $49.99 annual subscription fee (making the 
Elite service one of the ten best video game launches of the year, for the video game retailer 
GameStop, on its own terms [Grant, 2011]) for the privilege of receiving “expert-analysis of 
weapons [and] maps,” and more (Activision, 2011a; Mitchell, 2011; Schreier, 2011)—an 
equivocation of the mission briefings the military provides for its respective operations, except 
here, the virtual soldier pays for this pleasure. 
Why We Fight: From Medal of Honor to the Call of Duty 
In late-1997, during the post-production period for Saving Private Ryan (1998), Steven Spielberg 
met with DreamWorks Interactive regarding his desire to create a video game, which would 
become Medal of Honor (Electronic Arts, 1999b), so as to share his passion for World War II 
with younger audiences in the medium of their generation (Edge, 2011b). The military games 
that had existed up to this point treated historical events as mere set-pieces, with little 
explanation as to why such a conflict had manifest, or even what were the significances of 
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partaking in the conflict. For instance, the opening sequence of an early World War II themed 
game, Castle Wolfenstein (Muse Software, 1981), offers this scenario: 
The Nazis brought you here to get information out of you before they kill you. [….]. The battle 
plans for Operation Rheingold are hidden somewhere in the castle. I’m sure you know what it 
would mean to the Allied high command if we could [escape and] get our hands on those… 
 
The “I’m sure you know what it would mean” operates as the extent of the historical logic of this 
history lesson, in that, the player knows that: sure, Nazis are bad, Operation Rheingold is a Nazi 
operation, thus we must stop Operation Rheingold, whatever that is. id  Software’s take at the 
Wolfenstein universe fared no better in terms of historiographical richness, in that Wolfenstein 
3D (1992) replaces Operation Rheingold with Operation Eisenfaust, a Nazi secret weapon 
consisting of…, undead mutants—because regular mutants would not be enough. 
 So, there again, was Steven Spielberg expressing his desire to inject historical realism 
into a medium that has often been critiqued as being devoid of any, with the hope of sharing his 
passion of World War II with younger audiences.xli The meeting would give birth to a project 
designed to translate the emotional veracity of Saving Private Ryan’s historiographical style into 
the video game form (Edge, 2011b). The aesthetics of Saving Private Ryan’s historiographical 
style, which can be thought of as a hyper-real, romantic emplotment, that is the absolute beauty 
of the struggle (See: R. Stahl, 2010b; White, 1973), lent itself well to the procedural rhetoric of a 
first-person shooter, and so it was that, with Spielberg’s blessing, this genre would be granted 
legitimate access to claims of historical realism. Like Saving Private Ryan, this mode of 
historical realism would come to be defined in terms of affect, feeling “what it was like,” as 
opposed to understanding the politics of history, in this case, the politics of why we fight (R. 
Stahl, 2010b, p. 43). In this sense, if the Civilization franchise and others like it can be 
understood as a procedural rhetoric of conflict, that is, an interactive demonstration of the “clash 
of civilizations” thesis (see Chapter Three), then the first-person shooter, after Spielberg, takes 
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this foundation for granted, and instead offers a complimentary procedural rhetoric of affect, that 
is, an interactive demonstration of, what Roger Stahl (2010b) calls, the “support-the-troops 
rhetoric” (p. 43); and to the extent that both genres perform their rhetorical functions, then, as I 
argue, the representation of imperial anxiety and desire is saturated throughout the experience of 
gameplay. 
 From the start, everything about Spielberg’s project, aptly titled Medal of Honor 
(Electronic Arts, 1999b), was geared towards the “support-the-troops rhetoric.” An early trailer 
for the game, included fittingly with the video game version of Small Soldiers (Electronic Arts, 
1998), offers images of the game accompanied by a rousing score, with the following captions 
boldly superimposed over the footage: 
• AN ADVENTURE THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR MOST DANGEROUS 
CONFLICT AND HISTORY’S GREATEST TRIUMPH 
• WWII EUROPE RECREATED 
• A 3D WORLD TO EXPLORE 
• EXPLOSIVE COMBAT 
• PREPARE FOR YOUR FINEST HOUR 
 
By virtually inserting the player directly into the “heart of our most dangerous conflict and 
history’s greatest triumph,” Spielberg sought to give the player “genuine insight into the history 
behind WWII” (Edge, 2011b, p. 145). This genuine insight was predicated on the prospect of the 
game reproducing a rough approximation of the essence of the military experience, which 
according to the marketing material can be reduced to world exploration and explosive combat; 
and though this rhetoric of authenticity, in terms of world exploration and explosive combat, is 
not unique to the video game industry, combined with the illusion of the avatar, the extension of 
the individual into virtual space, the difference is that the video game player is promised not the 
subject position of witness, as in a documentary, but rather that of the participant: prepare for 
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your finest hour. Hence, one is compelled to support the troops because of the illusion of having 
undergone a rough approximation of the military experience. 
 Though warfare had long since come to operate through the virtual—that is, 
contemporary warfare is predicated on new media technologies that substantially reconfigure the 
experience of warfare—Spielberg’s Medal of Honor raised the stakes of this arrangement. Prior 
to Medal of Honor, it was relatively acceptable (beyond criticism of the effects of violent games) 
for video games to depict recent military conflict. For instance, speaking of Electronic Arts’ 
Desert Strike: Return to the Gulf (1992), William Burrill (1992) satirically wrote : 
Some may question the wisdom of capitalizing on the ugliness that was the Gulf war. But this was, 
after all, the conflict labeled “the Nintendo War,” for its stream of footage of whizzing smart 
bombs and skidding Scuds, and choppers buzzing the scorched Earth. It was just like a video 
game. And now it is a video game. (Italics added for emphasis) 
 
On a less satirical note, though William Schiffmann begrudging acknowledged that Desert Strike 
was “yes, […] another ‘war is hell’ game cart,” he enthusiastically concluded, “But what a cart! 
[…] This is a game with no drawbacks, except that it’s so tough. The graphics are solid, control 
is excellent and the challenge is awesome.” Even Burrill (1992) ultimately endorsed the game, 
writing, “Bottom line: if you like shooters and are not turned off by a blatant attempt to cash in 
on real life misery, you’ll like Desert Strike. I did.” Electronic Arts’ Desert Strike appeared in 
February 1992, one year after the actual Persian Gulf War concluded, and thus resonated with 
the early period of the militainment industry (See R. Stahl, 2010b). 
Cultural artifacts, like Desert Strike, associated with this period, sought merely to extend 
the experience of consumption—or cash in on this system—that had been established with the 
Persian Gulf War. And though the argument could be made, at no point did these cultural 
artifacts promise to offer an equivalent experience to that which was represented—that was best 
left as implied. For the acknowledgement of the equivocation of play to warfare would mean that 
 
 
 159  
 
the metaphorical power of play would be lost: “the real is, in fact, the last resource of metaphor, 
but that resource must not be called on […] on pain of losing its metaphorical power, its power 
of illusion (Baudrillard, 1994a). At this point in time, in the early 1990s, video games were still 
deemed as child’s play (D. Williams, 2003), and hence were not yet ready to reveal the existence 
of their adult content: generic skills, such as improved hand, eye, and brain coordination were 
acceptable, as evidenced by President Reagan’s EPCOT Center’s speech; but the world was not 
yet ready for the possibility that Orson Scott Card’s (1977/1991) Ender’s Game, or even Barry 
Levinson’s (1992) Toys, might be on the verge of actualization—and hence, the metaphor that 
was play could not yet be revealed as real.  
 Medal of Honor made explicit what had previously been implicit, however, and, as such, 
had to carry out the political legwork of dealing with this cultural shock stemming from this 
reconfiguration of the real. The game’s title, Medal of Honor, and tagline for the subsequent 
games in the franchise, “You Don’t Play, You Volunteer” (See: Electronic Arts, 2002b, 2003b), 
promised the player the opportunity to “fight WWII for the First Time” (See Figures 4.10-11). 
This rhetoric was interpreted by some players as meaning: “This is the game […] for the person 
who wishes they could have fought but was born 60 years too late” (Feddock, 2006). This desire 
for the erasure of time and space, the belief that the virtual could replicate the experiences of the 
real, was not embraced by all, however. Just weeks before Medal of Honor was to be released, 
Paul Bucha, president of the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, argued to Spielberg: “When 
it comes to the Medal of Honor, it’s a serious and sacred thing, you don’t turn it into a 
videogame. It’s an awful thing to do” (Edge, 2011b, p. 145). The exception taken by Bucha 
resonated with the ongoing cultural transformation currently taking place in the U.S. military’s 
transition from a “manned” to “unmanned” force. Like the contemporary Air Force pilots’ 
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objections to granting drone operators the title of “pilot” (Cantwell, 2009, p. 75), Bucha’s 
primary critique was that by promising an equivocation of experience between play and combat, 
Spielberg was “dishonouring the Medal of Honor. [And thus] Please change the name of the 
game” (Edge, 2011b, p. 146). In essence, it was not the content of the game that was 
objectionable, but rather the acknowledgement of the permeability between play and combat, and       
thus, the equivocation between the two—much like that of the objection by military pilots of 
calling drone operators “pilots.” 
Figure 4.10. Back cover of Medal of Honor (Electronic Arts, 1999b). 
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Figure 4.11. Back cover of Medal of Honor: Frontline (Electronic Arts, 2002b). 
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Much like the hierarchy established between military pilots and drone operators, with 
drone operators conceived as consisting of low-tier, support personnel, Spielberg and company 
resolved the tension with Paul Bucha and other military veterans by conceiving of the video 
game as virtual museum. Throughout the Medal of Honor experience, players would be exposed 
to historical footage that functioned simultaneously to serve not just to defer virtual combat to 
physical combat, but also to remind the player that such a distinction even existed in the first 
place. At the same time that drone operators were learning to extract three-dimensional combat 
information from the two-dimensional screen, military personnel were reminding those 
extracting this information that “this stuff is real. I’m taking real lives. I’m shooting real 
weapons. And I have to be really responsible for my actions” (General Jumper, qtd. in Cantwell, 
2009, p. 70); the fear was that in extracting three-dimensional information from two-dimensional 
space, the essence of the life on the other end of the screen would be lost in that translation 
(Grossman, 1995/2009). Hence, Medal of Honor made every attempt to remind the player that 
though the game was authentic, it was still a game—much like drone operators are constantly 
reminded that though this is like a game, it is still authentic. 
 The complicated embrace of and dependency upon the video game industry by the 
military-industrial complex illustrates the saturation of anxiety and desire in the managing of the 
borders between the virtual and the real. On one hand, the video game has been a site of extreme 
productivity for the advancement of military desires: combat simulators, military recruitment 
boosts, public relations and citizen-soldier training, et cetera. On the other hand, however, the 
increasing equivocation between play and combat has been a source of anxiety as well: the 
destabilization of existing military hierarchies due to the increasing virtualization of the military 
(e.g., Air Force pilots versus drone operators) and an increasing concern of the effect 
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virtualization is having on the experience of conflict itself. Though these two anxieties would 
seem to be dissimilar, they are in fact closely related: for though digital technologies are capable 
of placing combatants in ever closer proximity, the effect of the interface is that of an often 
unbridgeable distance, like that of the voyeur watching the undressing of death without fear of 
being exposed as such.  
For a time, the video game and military industry worked in conjunction so as to assure 
themselves and the public that war was real and not a video game. Today, however, this is no 
longer the case, as evidenced by the U.S. Air Force’s “It’s not science fiction, it’s what we do 
every day” campaign (See Figures 4.8-9). Video games themselves, have abandoned the deferral 
to the real as well, and have themselves taken part in the economy of military speculation: in 
2007, Medal of Honor: Airborne abandoned the tagline of “you don’t play, you volunteer,” in 
favor of that of “the first step is everything” (Electronic Arts, 2007); and, with the portrayal of 
modern warfare as the most compelling narrative thread for contemporary military games, the 
franchise rebooted itself in 2010 and abandoned its representation of the past in favor of that of 
the present-day Tier One soldier:  
The war wages on. We have dealt the enemy many crushing blows. We have exposed their 
positions and driven them back. But they have endured. They have adapted. And they are not as 
weak as we once thought. War requires the sledgehammer, but will be decided with the scalpel. A 
different breed of warrior is required. We are experts in the application of violence. We possess 
the mindset and will to do what is necessary. We are tier one. ([emphasis added] Electronic Arts, 
2010d; See Figure 4.12) 
 
Indeed the transition to modern warfare in contemporary video games represents the increasingly 
tenuous hold the real has on contemporary experiences of combat—for though these games 
claim the moniker of modern warfare, the conflict is that of the near-future conflict. Hence, in 
the shift from Electronic Arts’ Medal of Honor (1999b) to Medal of Honor (2010c) we can 
witness the transition of the digital lens in midflight: from once having followed the trajectory of 
the bullet (in 1999), the virtual conflict now widely precedes the actual conflict—as the U.S. 
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military continues to be embroiled in an international War on Terror, the U.S. public had just 
spent the past five-years playing out the conclusion of World War III via Activision’s Call of 
Duty: Modern Warfare Franchise (2007a, 2009a, 2011b). Indeed, when witnessing the climax of 
a near-future, plausible military conflict is documented as the biggest entertainment launch ever 
(Activision-Blizzard, 2011a; Richmond, 2011), then it is time that we follow the aim of the video 
game gaze, and trace the trajectory of the projectile shot in advance. 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare and the Ballistics of Anxiety and Desire 
Released on November 5th, 2007, Activision’s Call of Duty: Modern Warfare (2007a) was not 
the first video game to take up the subject matter of modern warfare—as WarGames (Coleco, 
1984), based upon the 1983 MGM movie of the same name, may have been the first—but the 
absolute success in the franchise’s shift from “retelling some of the greatest battles in World War 
Figure 4.12. Medal of Honor: Extended Announce Trailer (Electronic Arts, 2010d). This footage is shown as the 
narrator reads: we are experts in the application of violence. This sequence is significant for two reasons: (1) it 
represents the predator drone as the tool for the expert application of violence (as opposed to conventional 
weaponry); (2) the image resonates closely with that of the reports surrounding the predator strike on Qaed 
Senyan al-Harthi in 2002 (See Yenne, 2004). In a sense, then, though the U.S. public was not privy to images 
from the strike on al-Harthi, one can replay the experience in Medal of Honor (Electronic Arts, 2010c). 
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II” was not just a “gamble [that] paid off” (Goldstein, 2007), but rather accurately recognized the 
inability for World War II to continue to provide a compelling historical resource for the public’s 
understanding of post-9/11 global conflict. Electronic Arts’ Battlefield 2 (Electronic Arts, 2005) 
and others would also make this transition to modern warfare a few years prior to Call of Duty 4: 
Modern Warfare (2007), but for a time the past and near-future were held in tension as to which 
history offered the more plausible means for making sense of the present: in 2003, Medal of 
Honor: Rising Sun sold more than 4m units after just two-months on the market (Dunham, 
2004); whereas in 2005 Battlefield 2 had just sold 1.2m copies after its first two-months on the 
market (IGN.com, 2005).xlii As time went on, however, video game companies found the market 
for historical war games reaching saturation, at the same time that modern warfare themed games 
were showing significant market potential: in 2006, Call of Duty 3 (2006) sold 1.1m units 
(Surette, 2006); in 2007, Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (2007a) sold 2.1m units (Thorsen, 
2007); in 2008, Call of Duty: World at War (2008a) sold 2m units (Fritz, 2008); and, in 2009, 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (2009a) sold 4.7m units in just its first 24-hours of release 
(Cork, 2009). What this sales data documents is that Activision’s modern warfare themed Call of 
Duty games showed significant, nearly double, growth upon last year’s sales, whereas Call of 
Duty: World at War, the lone World War II-themed Call of Duty since 2008, was unable to 
expand upon the existing fan base. Indeed, when it comes to video games more generally, 
Modern Warfare 1 and Modern Warfare 2, and Call of Duty: Black Ops (which is a postmodern 
retelling of the Cold War), are the bestselling games of this past generation, at numbers 10, 4, 
and 2 respectively, despite having only been released during the last three years of the decade 
(Morris, 2011). Considering that Modern Warfare 3 sold 6.5m units in its first 24-hours of 
release (Richmond, 2011), and 24.95m units as of this writing (VGChartz, 2012), it would seem, 
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then, that the modern warfare thread has captured the cultural imaginary of the contemporary 
game-playing public; and to the extent that the franchise has become an entertainment 
phenomenon in itself, with celebrities such as Kobe Bryant, Jimmie Kimmel, Gary Oldman, 
Kiefer Sutherland, and Kevin McKidd participating in the marketing and production of the 
series, then the Call of Duty franchise carries with it a particular cultural gravity extending 
beyond conventional gamers as well. Hence, having captured the anxieties and desires of the 
contemporary public’s cultural imaginary, the franchise operates as a worthwhile site in which to 
document the ballistics of a futures in action. 
 For those unfamiliar with the intricacies of the Call of Duty franchise, however, the 
experience of the series can best be described as a video game version of a Michael Bay film; as 
Eric Folliot, senior brand manager for the franchise, describes it:  
Call of Duty delivers epic scale […] It effectively puts you in the heart of a movie that Michael 
Bay directed, and it’s just… explosions everywhere. It’s that experience that really resonates with 
people. They love it. That once-in-a-lifetime, you get in there, and you’re like “wow, I can’t 
believe I’m doing all this stuff.” So yeah, I think that’s what Call of Duty delivers. Epic scale, and 
fantastic storytelling. ([italics added] Smith, 2011) 
 
The reference to a Michael Bay film as the aesthetic equivalent of the Call of Duty franchise 
would appear to be ironic considering the Spielberg lineage of the series: the Call of Duty 
franchise begun when former members of the development team for Electronic Arts’ Medal of 
Honor: Allied Assault (Electronic Arts, 2002a) left to establish Infinity Ward, which was 
subsequently acquired by Activision (Activision, 2003a, 2004). Electronic Arts had contracted 
out the development of Medal of Honor: Allied Assault to 2015 Inc. due to EA’s in-house Medal 
of Honor team’s lack of comfort with PC development, as Allied Assault was to appear 
exclusively on computers (Fahs, 2009b). 2015 Inc. took the spirit of Steven Spielberg’s initial 
vision, that of giving the player “genuine insight into the history behind WWII” (Edge, 2011b, p. 
144), and injected it with the organic pulse of a world about to tear itself apart. Whereas 
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Spielberg’s military vision was that of a complicated interplay of voyeuristic respect and 
revulsion, meant to generate identification with and awe for the soldier capable of withstanding 
the horrors of conflict (R. Stahl, 2010b), 2015 inc. resolved the tension by removing any 
semblance of revulsion: 
A great deal of effort was paid to making Call of Duty 2 a more believable experience. Once 
again, believability proves distinct from actual realism, as Call of Duty intentionally diverges from 
reality in many ways. It isn’t a simulation, but rather a kind of storytelling, conveying the drama 
and tensions of the battlefield. 
[…] 
Infinity Ward [hence] made the bold decision to eliminate health packs from [Call of Duty 2]. 
Instead, they took a page from Halo 2 and introduced an auto-healing system that allowed players 
to recover health over time, rather than searching for medical supplies. Scavenging the battlefield 
for magic healing items didn’t lend itself much to realism, so the abstraction seemed like a wash, 
and it allowed Infinity Ward to put the focus on the combat itself—shooting, finding cover, and 
tracking enemies—rather than encouraging players to look around. ([italics added] Fahs, 2009b) 
 
So though the aesthetic inspiration of Spielberg and Michael Bay have something in common, in 
terms of representing war as a “fantastic thrill ride” (R. Stahl, 2010b, p. 43), it does matter 
whether the support-the-troops rhetoric is couched within the tension of rescuing one’s own 
soldiers from hell rather than eagerly awaiting the opportunity to join them; for though the first 
may serve to deflect criticism away from the war, in terms of promoting the circular logic of “the 
crueler the war, the more necessary it is” to continue the war so as to save those already serving 
in the war (R. Stahl, 2010b, p. 80), the latter verges on conceiving of warfare as the next big 
thing: 
When asked how Sledgehammer [co-developer of Modern Warfare 3] deal with such a sensitive 
matter as World War III, [Bret Robins, creative director for MW3] said: ‘You blow up a lot of 
cities, is what you do. We’re creating a huge, like a summer blockbuster story and experience. You 
try to go for the biggest and craziest moments and set-pieces and locations you can come up with. 
You try to do it in a very believable and authentic way, so it feels like this could actually happen.’ 
([italics added] Haley, 2011) 
 
Indeed, within the Modern Warfare universe, World War III had to happen in the third 
installment in the series, because it was the only thing that could top the experience of the first 
two games in the series: Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare featured the terrorist, Al-Asad, 
launching a nuclear missile into the midst of a Middle Eastern U.S. military operation “Shock 
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Figure 4.13. Image from “Aftermath” level of Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare. The perspective is from Sgt. 
Paul Jackson as he dies in the aftermath of the nuclear explosion. 
and Awe,” complete with the next level, “Aftermath,” dedicated to the player-avatar slowly 
dying from radiation poisoning (see Figure 4.13); and, Call of Duty: Modern 2 had the player 
witness the  invasion and overthrow of Washington, D.C. (see Figure 4.14), complete with a 
nuclear missile detonating in the stratosphere above the region so as to disable the invading 
Russian army with an electromagnetic pulse. When war is conceived as an extreme, aesthetic 
experience, then the only thing left after having blown up much of the United States, is to blow 
up a lot of other (international) cities, such as London, Paris, and elsewhere (see Figure 4.15). 
 The application of violence, as represented in the Modern Warfare series, is not merely a 
series of indiscriminate explosions, however, but rather operates according to a complicated 
interplay of anxiety and desire: it is no longer an anxiety and desire surrounding what they did to 
us, but rather what they will do to us—and what we want them to do to us, if only so we can 
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Figure 4.14. Image from “Whiskey Hotel” level of Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. The White House has been 
captured by the Russian Army. 
Figure 4.15. Image from “Battle of Paris” level of Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3. The Eiffel Tower is 
destroyed during a bombing blitz of Paris as the allied forces attempt to retake the capital back from the 
Russians. 
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respond in kind. The Modern Warfare franchise is a manifestation of the subject’s desire to 
witness first hand its own destruction, as proof of the need for revenge; in this case, revenge 
operates in advance, much like the preemptive strike of the War on Terror. But to the extent that 
the Modern Warfare franchise adequately captures the anxieties and desires of the present, then 
it is telling that the War on Terror is no longer able to capture the attention of the public as it 
lacks the firepower necessary to mobilize the masses—for that, we need the political economic 
might of nation-states. Indeed, though Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare uses the contemporary 
War on Terror as its narrative starting point, with the terrorist Al-Asad standing in for Osama bin 
Laden, that military paradigm is quickly pushed aside as being inadequate in satisfying the 
political anxiety and desire of the hardcore gamer; midway through the Modern Warfare 1, we 
learn that the hunt for Al-Asad, and by extension the Middle Eastern targets of the War on 
Terror, is merely a proxy battle meant to distract the West from the reemergence of Russian 
nationalism. The game tells us that Russian bitterness over the conclusion of the Cold War serves 
as the political economic support for Middle Eastern terrorists. Terrorists, then, are conceived as 
merely political figures necessary for reinvigorating the cultural might of nationalism; and it is 
this nationalism, this pride, this inability to recognize our new world order, that serves as the 
greatest threat to contemporary global order—as well as our greatest opportunity to reassert our 
rightful place as heirs of this new global order. The Modern Warfare franchise, then, positions 
the political economic power of the nation-state as that which drives the international War on 
Terror, both in terms of supplying the opposition and fortifying our resolve; for only the nation-
state has the infrastructure necessary to carry out mass destruction, in terms of both weaponry 
and citizenry. 
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 This imagining of the War on Terror as that of a series of covert proxy battles between 
Russia and the West functions to infuse conceptions of modern warfare as a continuation of Cold 
War politics, and thus positions U.S. Empire as a necessity. This link to Cold War politics is 
made explicitly within the game, in that the events of the Modern Warfare series are the direct 
result of this historical legacy: “Our so-called leaders prostituted us to the West… destroyed our 
culture… our economies… our honor” (Imran Zakhaev, Russian nationalist and primary 
antagonist of Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare, Activision, 2007a). This Cold War logic is 
extended further in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (Activision, 2009a) in that the manipulation 
of the Russian state by Vladimir Makarov, the leader of a Russian nationalist terrorist cell, leads 
to the invasion of the U.S. mainland by Russia; and in a nod to John Milius’s Red Dawn (1984), 
the invasion begins in a level appropriately entitled “Wolverines!” (Activision, 2009a).  
This infusion of Cold War politics into the cultural imaginary of modern warfare is 
further cemented in Call of Duty: Black Ops—which though a major entry into the Call of Duty 
franchise, is not thought of as part of the Modern Warfare narrative thread. In other words, 
whereas Modern Warfare 1, 2, and 3, released in 2007, 2009, and 2011 respectively (Activision, 
2007a, 2009a, 2011b) operate as sequels to one another, and thus share storylines and characters, 
the Black Ops narrative thread is conceived as a unique and separate storyline, with no narrative 
continuity between it and the Modern Warfare iterations. And yet, Call of Duty: Black Ops 
undertakes the political legwork of threading together the cultural memories of World War II, the 
Cold War, and contemporary warfare as well. In essence, the central presence of Viktor Reznov, 
the Russian World War II hero in Call of Duty: World at War (Activision, 2008a), as 
fundamentally opposed to the Cold War Russian state, cements the U.S.’s imagining of itself as 
the legitimate Cold War super power and Communist Russia as its illegitimate counterpart—for 
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the legitimacy of the Cold War Russian state is opposed by its war heroes. Moreover, the actual 
conflicts of the Cold War are further reimagined as being less of proxy battles and more as 
necessary covert operations undertaken (with success) for the sake of U.S. national security; in 
other words, Vietnam and other Cold War conflicts were never about the mere containment of 
communism, but rather that of the CIA seeking to prevent Russia from carrying out a biological 
attack against the United States (Activision, 2010a). Moreover, though the player is ultimately 
successful in preventing this biological attack from happening, the game concludes much like 
Phillip Noyce’s Salt (2010) with the suggestion that the Russian military was able to successfully 
embed a significant population of brainwashed sleeper agents within the United States—and that 
this, not the game’s main narrative of Russia seeking to attack the U.S. with biological 
weaponry, was Russia’s ultimate military project. And just like the premise of the movie Salt, to 
the extent that these sleeper cells continue to live, unaware of their purpose, within the United 
States, then the Cold War continues. 
 This, then, is the modern meaning of the citizen-soldier, as articulated in the Modern 
Warfare franchise: not just objects of military anxiety and desire, in terms of potential targets 
and agents of public opinion, whose participation is limited to that of being a hostage or voyeur 
(R. Stahl, 2006, 2010a), but that of the ready at hand organic weaponry of modern warfare. For 
Call of Duty articulates the military demand and public desire to push beyond what Roger Stahl 
(2010b) calls the “closed, constructed system [of militainment] that channels the civic urge 
through fantasies of military participation” (p. 47), into an integration with the war machine 
itself. The Call of Duty franchise represents the extension of the barracks beyond the 
confinement of the military-industrial complex and into living rooms throughout the West; it is a 
site of biopolitical production wherein the logic of military training becomes synonymous with 
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popular entertainment—that is, military preparedness takes on a governmental logic, wherein the 
public is conceived as standing-reserve for the near-future conflict. And with the absolute 
success of the franchise, who needs a draft, when many are not just ready, but also eager, to 
answer the Call of Duty? 
Conclusion: Fascist Art and the Mobilization of the Masses 
The existence of war is beyond question in the Call of Duty franchise—and indeed the demand 
for ever greater saturation of the conflict has operated as a significant militainment, economic 
engine for the past five-years. The anxiety and desire surrounding the instability of the present—
the demand for revenge against what they did to us, the desire to liberate ourselves from 
depending upon their resources, et cetera—has reached such a degree that the original theorist of 
fascist art, Walter Benjamin (1935/2006), would surely be surprised by the extent to which the 
anxieties of the subject has led to the absolute desire to witness first hand its own destruction, if 
only to have further justification for revenge. The war of the near-future is driven by the desire 
for mass destruction so that we can respond in kind with the anxiety of the precision strike; or 
conversely, this is the anxiety of knowing that one is always within reach of death (due to 
imprecision on their part) and the desire of believing that one is always legitimately able to 
respond in kind (due to the surgical strike on our part). In this war of the future in action, one that 
is playing out as we speak, on the screen, whether of the military or the public, borders are being 
erased because the threat of violence can no longer be contained due to the politics of the present 
increasingly depending upon the political force of the body under siege. The anxiety and desire 
embedded within the body under siege, that is, the subject driven by the vision of mass 
destruction, has come to operate as a powerful economic engine capable of advancing the 
political interests of Empire—corporations specializing in military and defense contracting are 
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heavily compensated by the U.S. Government, with Lockheed Martin ($16b), Northrop 
Grumman Corp. ($11b), Boeing ($10b), to name a few, rounding out the top eight government 
contract holders in 2010 (Washington Technology, 2010).  
If, however, as Benjamin (1935/2006) noted that in 1935 “war and war only can set a 
goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system” 
(p. 34), today, the difference is that in war and war only do various publics come into existence 
in and of themselves: “[COD] is not even a game any more, it’s a lifestyle. No different from 
being a golfer or a marathon runner, there are people out there who are Call of Duty players” 
(Activision's VP of Digital Sales, Jamie Berger, qtd. in Edge, 2011a, p. 14). To be a Call of Duty 
player means to operate at the forefront of the citizen-solider subject described by Roger Stahl 
(2010b); but these gamers are not subjects trapped in a “closed, constructed system” lacking 
“any real role in ‘playing the war,’” as Stahl argues (2010b, p. 47), but rather early anticipations 
of the subjects of a military futures in action: (1) testing the interfaces, algorithms, and 
technologies of present and future warfare; (2) embracing the gendered and racialized practices 
embedded within such subjectivities; and (3) lubricating the transnational political economic 
infrastructure necessary for the current and ongoing operation of Empire (See Chapter Five). As 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2’s Lt. Gen. Sheppard tells the player at one point: “Get up, 
Private Allen! Rangers lead the way! Move!” ("Team Player," Activision, 2009a); seeing as how 
this occurs near the very beginning of the game, this statement can be understood, for our 
purposes, as “Get up, Noob! Call of Duty players lead the way! Move!” In this regard, the 
advertising campaign for Modern Warfare 3, appropriately entitled, “The Vet & The Noob,” is 
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an accurate representation of the subject’s transformation through an engagement with the 
franchise (See Figures 4.16-18). In the commercial, the Vet, played by Sam Worthington, 
educates the Noob, Jonah Hill, on the intricacies of modern warfare; and by the end of the 
commercial, the Noob has found his inner soldier, and Sam Worthington and Jonah Hill thus 
Figures 4.16-17. (top-bottom). “The Vet & Noob” commercial for Call of Duty: MW3 (Berg, 2011). 
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walk triumphantly towards the viewer with the words “THERE’S A SOLDIER IN ALL OF US” 
emblazoned on the screen (See Figure 4.18). 
As I write this conclusion, there are 455,703 players engaged in virtual combat online in 
Modern Warfare 3 and 265,093 in Black Ops on the PlayStation Network alone. Considering that 
the franchise has sold more units for Microsoft’s Xbox 360 platform (13.07m [Xbox 360] vs. 
10.40m [PS3], according to VGChartz, 2012), it is conceivable that over 1.5m individuals are 
currently engaged in virtual combat online via these two games alone. Indeed, on its very first 
day of availability, Modern Warfare 3 set an Xbox Live record with 3.3m users online 
concurrently (Activision-Blizzard, 2011b); with Call of Duty: Black Ops having documented 
nearly as many simultaneous users on its launch day: 2.6m unique gamers (Activision-Blizzard, 
2011b).This does not account for the many others online engaged in virtual combat through 
America’s Army (United States Army, 2009), Battlefield 3 (Electronic Arts, 2011a), Medal of 
Honor (Electronic Arts, 2010c), or the many other popular military-themed video games.  
Figure 4.18. The conclusion of “The Vet & Noob” commercial for Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3. 
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Considering the vast convergence between the interface of various military systems and the 
reproduction of these systems in video games, and the value of being able to extract three-
dimensional situational awareness from the two-dimensional screen, it would appear that the 
production of the soldier for tomorrow begins here. This, then, is the logic of Modern Warfare: 
the production of the citizen-soldier in all of us. 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
xxxvii That Kobe Bryant bore the brunt of the criticism, as opposed to the networks that chose to air the commercial, 
TBWA/Chiat/Day, the advertising agency behind the spot, Activision-Blizzard, the company for which the 
advertisement was promoting, or even Jimmy Kimmel (who held as much, if not more, screen-time than Bryant), 
suggests that this attention was due to more than the “imposture of immediacy” effect of visual media—that is, the 
mistake of confusing the “optical illusion not just with the illusion of life but with the illusion of survival [as well]” 
(Virilio, 1984/1989, p. 39). Rather, as Michael Silver (2007) has argued, in the case of Michael Vick, the reception 
of these images, and subsequent criticism that they receive, circulate within a racialized history and space. In other 
words, Kobe Bryant, and not Jimmy Kimmel, bore the brunt of the criticism for this advertising campaign because 
Bryant’s racialized body is more capable of carrying the cultural anxiety of urban violence (e.g., the illusion of 
survival) than Kimmel’s sanitized body.  
xxxviii Giorgio Agamben (2004/2008) has argued that the politics of 9/11 have made it so that the state of exception is 
no longer exceptional. As Rajeswari Rajan (2008) notes, however, this conception of exception is not necessarily 
exceptional to the post-9/11 moment, as non-White populations have long been subjected to exceptional treatment. 
What is unique to this moment, then, is that the post-9/11 moment marks the reinvigoration of imperialist practices 
under the auspice of nation-building, citizen-subject formation. This new post-colonial, citizen-subject being 
formed, then, is an impossible being whose legitimacy is always under question, and hence always necessitated 
surveillance; this is what Rajan (2008) means when she writes that the present moment represents the convergence 
of Europe’s two atrocious histories: Auschwitz and colonialism. That is, the subject that is always already suspect, 
whether here or there. 
xxxix In addition to the already cited examples of Hurricane Katrina, other examples illustrating the universalization 
of border politics within the United States include the post-9/11 security measures implemented in airports (See 
Bearden, 2011), Arizona’s SB 1070 which makes the failure to carry evidence of legal residence a crime (See 
Archibold, 2010), the militarization of local police forces (Becker & Shulz, 2011; See also Howell, 2011), and the 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (Gould-Wartofsky, 2012). 
xl Cinematic examples of course exist of photographic speculation of the future; however, it is at this point when the 
utility of photographic technologies begins to decline, in that all that photography can offer is speculation regarding 
a general trend embedded in the past (See Virilio, 1984/2009). In contrast, digital play can simulate alternative 
scenarios of the past, present, and future through the manipulation of these general trends and/or constructions of 
alternative rule sets. 
xli That Steven Spielberg’s interest in the video game industry has come to serve as a sign of the legitimation of 
digital play is fascinating, for Spielberg has been critiqued promoting a romantic, heroic conception of the past that 
obscures as much as it reveals. In essence, that the legitimacy of the video game’s ability to engage with historical 
issues should be contingent upon the blessing of the film industry as opposed to the literary tradition, journalism, or 
even historians, illustrates which conception of reality the video game industry is seeking. 
xlii It is important to note that units sold may not necessarily be the best measure of market saturation comparison 
between these two games, as Battlefield 2 was only available on PC, whereas Medal of Honor: Rising Sun was 
available on all three major consoles at the time of its release—thereby suggesting two different, though overlapping 
markets. That said, the point of this comparison is that during this period, both historical and modern warfare games 
remained relatively popular amongst various sectors of the public. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE ECOLOGIES OF PLAY: BIOPOLITICS OF ANXIETY AND DESIRE 
 
Though capital is often imagined to be secular in its pursuits, many prominent scholars have 
argued that the “ethos of the modern bourgeois middle classes” is imbricated with the cultural 
form of Christianity (Foucault, 1977-78/2003; Weber, 1906/1946, p. 321). Indeed, the protestant 
ethic of “‘proving’ oneself before God” (Weber, 1906/1946, p. 321) is such a part of the psyche 
of contemporary capital that roughly three-quarters of those in the United States believe that 
Benjamin Franklin’s (1736/2012) aphorism “God helps those who help themselves” is Christian 
doctrine (Krattenmaker, 2007). If Weber (1906/1946) and Foucault (1977-78/2003) undertook 
the important legwork of linking the formation of contemporary capital to that of the protestant 
ethic and the Christian pastoral, however, other contemporary cultural theorists have sought to 
push this analysis further so as to understand the implications of Christianity’s eschatological 
element on the practices and futures of contemporary cultural politics (Baumgartner, 1999; 
Burke, 1969; Carey, 2002; Lewis, 2011). That is, if contemporary capital is indebted to the 
protestant ethic (Weber, 1906/1946), in that one’s bourgeois identity operates as a sign of her 
public worth (Foucault, 1979/2003), then what are those diabolical signs that are to be sterilized 
for risk of forfeiting one’s promise of social salvation (Burke, 1970/1989, 1973/1989; O'Leary, 
1993)? 
 Though this question of the end and promise of salvation is neither new nor unique to the 
history of Christianity, this sense of an imminent ending seems to have pervaded the cultural 
milieu of this particular historical moment as has no other period (Baumgartner, 1999; Carey, 
2002; Lewis, 2011). The frequent association of this eschatological structure of feeling with the 
populations of obscure cults, from the Order of the Solar Temple (1995-1997), Heaven’s Gate 
 
 
 179  
 
(1997), the followers of Harold Camping (2011), and more recent Mayan Calendar Prophecy, 
amongst others, however, obscures the larger sense of global anxiety that has pervaded our 
particular historical moment. As Frederic Baumgartner (1999) and Stephen O’Leary (1997, 
1993) have argued, the history of Western secular society has long been intertwined with that of 
Christian eschatology. This is particularly true for the United States, which has long imagined 
itself as the manifestation of heaven on earth, and thus always already under siege from the 
agents of hell and those other sinful individuals who “hate our way of life” (Baumgartner, 1999; 
O'Leary, 1993). Since the success of the Trinity Nuclear Test on July 16, 1945, moreover, the 
eschatological frameworks of religious and secular society have overlapped to such an extent 
that it is no longer possible to truly distinguish between the two:    
The atom bomb greatly raised millennial anxiety, both religious and secular, by providing a device 
through which the end could happen in a manner very close to that described in Revelation. In 
particular it stimulated nonreligious apocalypticism, since it was not possible for the human race 
to destroy itself, perhaps even the entire world, by its own agency, without requiring an act of the 
deity (Baumgartner, 1999, p. 213) 
 
The advent of the bomb made it possible to imagine the absolute destruction of the world at the 
hands of the Antichrist, whether he is motivated by the devil or otherwise. 
If the threat of nuclear annihilation served as an important moment in the fusion of 
religious and secular eschatology, however, the advent of new communication technologies have 
served to amplify and intensify our sense that global catastrophe is imminent (Carey, 2002; 
Lewis, 2011). This does not mean that conditions of our existence or fears of our contemporary 
moment have necessarily worsened—for whom amongst us has the right to evaluate one’s 
anxiety for life (e.g., the Holocaust) over another (e.g., Rwandan Genocide)—but rather that the 
circulation and frequency of these moments seem to have accelerated (Lewis, 2011). In just the 
past decade, for instance, we have witnessed a frenzy of reports suggesting that the end may be 
near: the Y2K bug (2000); SARS (2002-2003); Bird Flu/H5N1 (2003-2006); Swine Flu/H191 
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(2009); “Super Bugs” (2010-Present); et cetera. This is not to mention concern regarding the 
global economy, the War on Terror, and other global anxieties that have arisen since the turn of 
the century. Hence, though anxiety over the present and future may not be new nor unique to our 
contemporary cultural moment, we ought to be concerned with the question of what exactly is 
expressed within these anxieties (and desires); that is, “what is it precisely that is ending, and 
what is beginning” (Carey, 2002, p. 197)? 
 The general consensus would appear to be that the regime of the nation-state is coming to 
pass and the era of advanced, transnational capital is coming to fruition (Carey, 2002; Hardt & 
Negri, 2001; Harvey, 2007; Lewis, 2011; Schiller, 2007). This does not mean that the purpose 
and political power of the nation-state has come to an end, but rather that the function and 
efficacy of the nation-state is undergoing reconfiguration as contemporary politics is rapidly 
being subsumed within globalization processes (Hardt & Negri, 2001). The production of new 
communication technologies has worked to create “an ever-denser web of exchanges [amongst] 
civilizations, [so that] local self-sufficiency [is now] impractical and undesirable” (Carey, 2002, 
p. 234). This increased interdependence of various global economies has placed increased strain 
and anxiety on monitoring the integrity of global chains of production and consumption, so much 
so that it is no longer difficult to think of global food shortages and draughts, amongst other 
catastrophes, on the scale of biblical proportions (Lewis, 2011). The anxieties that are a part of 
our contemporary historical moment, then, speak to the sense that our global ecologies—
political, economic, as well as environmental—are in the midst of dramatic and traumatic 
reconfiguration.  
 Considering that the experience of contemporary capital is entrenched within Christian 
eschatology, it is not surprising that a plethora of cultural artifacts have emerged for the thinking 
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through of this sense of an imminent global crisis. Examples include: films, such as Outbreak 
(Petersen, 1995), Armageddon (Bay, 1998), Deep Impact (Leer, 1998), The Day After Tomorrow 
(Emmerich, 2004), and 2012 (Emmerich, 2009); television programs, such as Perfect Disaster 
(G. Edwards, 2006), Mega Disasters (Sharp, 2006-2008), It Could Happen Tomorrow (Gidez, 
2006-2007), and Nostradamus Effect (Ellis & Monahan, 2009); Video games, such as Metal 
Gear Solid (Konami, 2004, 1998, 2001, 2008), Call of Duty: Modern Warfare (Activision, 
2007a, 2009a, 2011b), and Fallout (Bethesda Softworks, 2008, 2010; Interplay Entertainment, 
1997, 1998); et cetera. Indeed, regarding the latter medium, it would seem as though the video 
game may be the eschatological medium par excellence; as the IGN PlayStation Team (2008) 
humorously noted: 
The world has some serious issues. After our incredibly accurate scientific tests, we’ve concluded 
that 99.987 percent of games made for all platforms involve—in some way or another—the end of 
the world.   This plot device […] clearly stands out as the most overused in the business. 
 
Many of the most cherished and iconic franchises in the industry, in addition to those listed 
above, from Mass Effect (Electronic Arts, 2008c, 2010b, 2012a), Final Fantasy (Square, 1994, 
1997, 2001; Square Enix, 2009), and Halo (Microsoft Game Studios, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2009, 
2010), amongst others, begin with the premise that the world as we know it has ended or will 
soon be ending—if we do nothing to prevent it, of course. This general fixation on the end by 
gaming culture is not surprising considering the video games emergence from and continued 
engagement with the military-industrial complex. 
 And yet, video games, and by extension other media technologies, are not merely sites 
for thinking through the eschatological feeling of this contemporary moment, however, but are 
rather imbricated within the complex production and consumption of anxiety (and desire) for the 
end itself. To the extent that new media technologies are advanced as technologies of utopian 
possibility, then the construction of our heaven on earth is contingent upon mobilization of 
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particular economic, environmental, and cultural logics. By this, I mean that the instantiation of 
new media technologies, in terms of both infrastructure and contents, are attempts to bring about 
and legitimate a particular configuration of Utopian imagining, and that these actions cut across 
economic, environmental, and cultural concerns: economic circuits of production and 
consumption are reconfigured in accordance to the logic of new information and communication 
technologies (Carey, 1983/2009; Harvey, 1990; R. Williams, 1974/2005); environments and 
populations have been massively transformed in the search of the raw materials (both in terms of 
components and labor) needed for the manufacturing of contemporary media technologies 
(Domoney, et al., 2011; Dyer-Witheford, 2010; GlobalWitness, 2012); and, representation itself 
is never merely about representation, but always embedded within questions of the right to life 
and death (Hall, 1992/2001; Lynch, 1998; Ono, 2009b). In sum, when one speaks of the media, 
one is referencing a complex assemblage of political, economic, environmental, and cultural 
ecologies. And again, gaming practices are deeply implicated in the formation of this 
contemporary global ecology and the complex interplay of anxiety and desire that operate within 
it. 
 So though gaming is not the only technology operating within this larger global ecology, 
it is, I have argued, an important site which must not be overlooked when considering the 
contemporary production and consumption of anxiety and desire. And as part of this larger 
global ecology, one must conceive of digital play as extending beyond the confines of 
conventional gaming, for video games have long served as an important site of new media 
innovation, with implications for the functioning of contemporary capital and military practices. 
Apple, for instance, recently released its list of all-time top paid and free apps, and digital games, 
notably, accounted for 14 and 8 of the top-15 paid apps for the iPhone and iPad respectively 
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(Viticci, 2012)—and thus a notable chunk of the 25 billion apps that have been downloaded 
since the official opening of Apple’s App Store in 2008. Moreover, the U.S. military has taken 
an increased interest in gaming technologies, as evidenced by the creation of America’s Army  
(United States Army, 2009), development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (i.e., drones), and the 
establishment of USC’s Institute for Creative Technologies, which has sought to create 
“engaging, memorable and effective interactive media that [will revolutionize] learning in the 
fields of training, education and beyond” (Institute for Creative Technologies, 2012)—and one 
only need to glance at the Institute for Creative Technologies’ “projects” webpage to see what 
this means (See Figure 5.1). If our contemporary moment is indeed defined by a looming sense 
of the end, then it seems necessary to consider the role of gaming in the articulation of this global 
eschatology. 
Figure 5.1. Projects Webpage for the Institute for Creative Technologies at the 
University of Southern California. 
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To this end, this chapter takes seriously the role of the video game in the production and 
consumption of anxiety and desire in the contemporary moment, both in terms of gaming’s 
material and cultural affects. To undertake this analysis, I organize this chapter as follows: first, I 
discuss the video games industry’s ecological affect upon the environment and various 
populations; second, I look into the history of the Resident Evil series (Capcom, 1996, 1998, 
1999, 2000/2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2005a, 2009) as an exemplary artifact of global anxiety, 
and position it within the outbreak narrative genre; and third, I offer an in-depth analysis of the 
Resident Evil franchise so as to suggest that the series is indicative of the proliferation of 
Western racial logics with Japanese characteristics. Though other games could have been 
selected, most notably the Fallout series (Bethesda Softworks, 2008, 2010; Interplay 
Entertainment, 1997, 1998; Micro Forté, 2001), Resident Evil was selected for it engages with 
the complex circuits of the global production and consumption of anxiety more thoroughly than 
perhaps any other gaming franchise—further justification for this selection will be provided in 
the second section of this chapter. Regardless of the franchise selected for analysis, however, my 
central argument is that contemporary gaming operates as an important site wherein the larger 
global ecology, in terms of environments, economies, populations, and politics, with its 
subsequent anxieties and desires, is being transformed. 
Ecologies of Exception and Exemption 
Jeff Lewis (2011) argues that humanity has long struggled with the entanglement of anxiety and 
desire. Beneath every act of satisfaction is the knowledge that this particular instance of 
fulfillment is contingent upon the selfsame extinguishment of that very source of pleasure 
(Lewis, 2011). And even when a particular act of pleasure is not directly threatened by the fear 
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of an ending—as when engaging with a non-consumable good (e.g., digital media)—all pleasure 
carries with it the threat of its excess, and the displeasure that follows (Gunn & Hall, 2008). 
Societies have historically responded to this tension of pleasure and displeasure through the 
production of cultural codes meant to warn against the excesses of over- and/or premature-
consumption (Lewis, 2011). One only need think of the various rating systems regulating the 
many media systems in operation today—e.g., the Motion Picture Association of America, 
Entertainment Software Rating Board, et cetera—for examples of the continued prevalence, and 
institutionalization of these cultural codes. The production of these cultural codes, however, are 
not innocent in their conception of legitimate pleasure, but rather work to produce particular 
subjects of pleasure and displeasure. As Foucault (1975/1995, 1978/1990) has shown with the 
prison and history of sexuality, discourses of morality function to produce subjects worthy of life 
(i.e., pleasure) and others worthy of carrying the burden of death (i.e., displeasure). The 
distinction between the two, however, is not one of repression, as in do not do that for risk of 
death (e.g., punishment) but rather one of biopolitics, in that someone must be condemned to do 
that so we can experience pleasure (Foucault, 1975/1995, 1978/1990). 
 Though Foucault (1961/2006, 1963/1994, 1975/1995, 1978/1990) focused on the 
production of various subjectivities within the confines of the nation-state, the advent of 
contemporary capital and new communication technologies requires that we analyze the 
circulation of anxiety and desire—and subsequent production of the subjects legitimated as 
worthy of pleasure or displeasure—from a global vantage point. And though Foucault’s 
(1961/2006, 1963/1994, 1975/1995, 1978/1990) analyses have offered significant insight into the 
mechanisms involved in the production of various subjectivities, his focus on the nation-state 
obscures how the production of these subjectivities were already contingent upon the circulation 
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of pleasure and displeasure on the global scale even during his privileged period of analysis (See: 
Lewis, 2011; Said, 1993). Hence, in addition to the national prisons, schools, hospitals, and 
various other sites of contemporary subject formation (Foucault, 1961/2006, 1963/1994, 
1975/1995, 1978/1990), the history of capital can more generally be understood as the 
production of global ecologies of exception and exemption. By global ecologies of exception and 
exemption, I mean that particular environments and populations are deemed exceptional, and 
thus worthy of pleasure, while other environments and populations are deemed exempt, that is, 
functionally excluded from global concern and thus recipients of displeasure. These ecologies 
are produced through what David Harvey (2003) terms as the process of “accumulation by 
dispossession.” That is, the enactment of particular economic policies, such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and China’s Special Economic Zones, demarcate particular 
regions and populations as beneficiaries of and others as subordinates to global capital. 
 The video game industry has long been implicated as an active and important player in 
the production of these ecologies of exception and exemption. Though Apple has been receiving 
a significant amount of criticism—and rightfully so—for its association with the appalling labor 
conditions at Foxconn’s manufacturing plants in Shenzhen and Chengdu, China (Fisher, 2012; 
Palis, 2012), it was Microsoft’s deal to manufacture it’s Xbox gaming consoles with Flextronics 
Inc. that was thought to be the most significant contract for the electronics manufacturing 
services industry at the very moment when these manufacturing companies were transforming 
into huge global corporations (See Markoff, 2001). Though at the time of the contract signing 
Microsoft’s arrangement with Flextronics did not yet compare to the accounts held with 
Motorola or Ericsson, valued at $4b and $5b per year respectively, the deal did result in the 
construction of two new factories in Guadalajara, Mexico and Tab, Hungary, with the capacity 
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for producing roughly two million Xbox consoles in just their first six-months of operation 
(Markoff, 2001; MTI Econews, 2000). Hence, the contract was highly valued, even when 
compared to those of Motorola or Ericsson, because as Michael Marks, CEO of Flextronics at 
the time, noted: “A billion dollars here and a billion dollars there, and pretty soon you’re talking 
about a fairly large business” (qtd. in Markoff, 2001). Indeed, the economic scale of these 
transactions are enough to reconfigure global economies; it was believed, for instance, that the 
economic impact of the Hungarian Flextronics Factory alone would account for 6-7% of 
Hungary’s GDP in 2002, or roughly USD $3b (MTI Econews, 2000). 
 Though the procurement of one of these facilities would appear to be an economic boon, 
especially for impoverished national economies, obtainment is contingent upon a population’s 
ability and willingness to perform a neoliberal subjectivity. When Flextronics first established its 
manufacturing plant in Hungary in 1993, for instance, workers initially rejected the company’s 
policy of performance-linked pay (Wilson, 2001a). The employees had mistakenly believed that 
the presence of an international electronics manufacturing plant meant that the nation’s global 
status was in-line with that of Western Europe, when instead Flextronics saw them as 
comparable to “low-cost, high-tech Asia” (Wilson, 2001a). The presence of Flextronics, and by 
extension transnational capital, then, is not the production of higher standards of living, per se, 
but rather a sign that one’s population is believed to be malleable enough to extract the greatest 
amount of value for the least amount of capital. Indeed, Flextronics’ strategy for producing the 
neoliberal subjectivities necessary for maximum value extraction in Eastern Europe was to 
bypass communist-era workers—who may have seen themselves as citizens first and laborers 
second—in favor of hiring young people “who weren’t embedded in the old system” (Wilson, 
2001a). For populations unable or unwilling to perform these neoliberal subjectivities, the 
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response by transnational capital has been to demonize these economies as relatively 
unimportant participants in the global flow of consumption and production: 
In the Czech Republic they didn’t know about global competitiveness […]. We told them the 
competition was in Asia, and they said don’t compare us with Taiwan—we don’t make plastic 
flowers. That’s how far behind the times they were. (Humphrey Porter, President of Flextronics' 
Eastern European Branch, qtd. in Wilson, 2001b) 
 
Due to this refusal to reimagine themselves as a third-world nation, the Czech Republic lost out 
on any significant investment from Flextronics (Wilson, 2001b). However, considering that 
within a year, Flextronics would move its Xbox line from Hungary to Doumen, China, in favor 
of exploiting cheaper labor markets (Landler, 2004), it would seem as though the performance of 
a neoliberal subjectivity is liable to produce ecologies of exception and exemption one way or 
another; for though Hungary’s manufacturing industry was able to initially rebound after the loss 
of the Xbox line, it was only able to do so by maintaining its status as a low-cost manufacturing 
base, but this time, for Chinese companies looking to export to the European Union (See 
Landler, 2004). Hence, to the extent that capital operates through the production of global 
ecologies of exception and exemption, performing the role of an exceptional or excluded 
population, whether willingly or otherwise, is likely to keep intact the logics of those ecologies: 
the uneven distribution of pleasure and displeasure. Nowhere is this perhaps more explicit than 
that of the uneven distribution of pleasure and displeasure in operation at the outer limits of the 
circuits of production and consumption within the video game industry. 
 Unlike the hybrid ecologies of Hungary, Mexico, and China, which as manufacturing 
ecologies are situated in the middle of global circuits of production and consumption—and thus 
in the midst of a complex circulation of the uneven distribution of pleasure and displeasure—the 
Tantalum rich Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) stands at the far end of the extraction of 
pleasure and accumulation of displeasure. Though the demand for tantalum cannot be pinned 
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exclusively to the desire for video game devices—as the rare metal is a key material for the 
production of many electronic devices—the heavy global demand for Sony’s PlayStation 2 was 
believed to have contributed to the strain on global supply chains, which resulted in the search 
for new sources of tantalum (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; GlobalWitness, 2012; Hayes & 
Burge, 2003; Vick, 2001). Though Australia held the largest known tantalum deposits at the 
time, the DRC proved to be of particular interest due to the presence of an easily exploitable 
labor force and fairly large, and unclaimed, source of tantalum (Coakley, 2000; Dizolele, 2007; 
Hayes & Burge, 2003; Montague, 2002). To put this into perspective, during the height of the 
global surge in demand for new media technologies at the turn of the century, tantalum prices 
increased from USD $40 per pound to as high as USD $300 per pound (Coakley, 2000), while 
DRC miners were paid, at most, only as much as USD $10 for a pound of tantalum (Vick, 
2001).xliii Likewise, a large amount of tantalum is believed to be traded on unmonitored markets 
due to the significant amount of theft that occurs at the mines: miners and venders are often at 
risk of being raided by armed bandits or corrupt soldiers (Hayes & Burge, 2003).  
This initial interest of global capital in the DRC motivated thousands of Congolese men 
to leave less profitable occupations, particularly farming, to take up tantalum mining in the hopes 
of obtaining better pay (Dizolele, 2007; Hayes & Burge, 2003). This has resulted in the 
destabilization of the DRC’s overall ecology, both economically and environmentally, as these 
mining populations have found themselves without an agricultural base from which to obtain 
food; hence, hunting and foraging—which may be sustainable practices for smaller 
populations—has resulted in the massive overhunting of wildlife:  
The wildlife toll is unknown but it is suspected that all 3,700 elephants and most of the 8,000 
eastern lowland gorillas (Grauer’s gorilla) in the [Kahuzi-Biega National Park] have been killed. 
In the highland area still patrolled by park wardens, all 350 elephants and half of its 258 gorillas 
are gone. [….] miners had been eating elephant gorilla, chimp, buffalo and antelope for a year, but 
by March 2001 they were eating tortoises, birds and small animals. Previously, hunting trips had 
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lasted a day, now they lasted a week and often did not catch anything. (Hayes & Burge, 2003, p. 
37) 
 
The point of this environmental impact is not that global demand for new media technologies, 
including gaming, may be leading to the extinction of various species—though this is clearly a 
concern—but rather that the viability of whole ecologies are being threatened because of this 
demand. This point is made evident when considering that after tantalum prices dropped due to 
overproduction, the infrastructure left intact (that is, the assemblage of military personnel 
assigned to protect the mines and corruption that sprung up around this industry) left the 
population in desperate need of work. Without a stable agricultural base—which had been 
decimated to the extent that farming was now considered dangerous due to the threat of being 
raided by hungry bandits, soldiers, or rebels forces—mining, which continues to present its own 
dangers, and now only offers less than a $1 pay per day, is believed to be amongst the few viable 
means of making a living in the DRC (Dizolele, 2007; Domoney, et al., 2011; Hayes & Burge, 
2003). 
 The cultural effect of new media practices, then, cannot be thought apart from the 
ecological impact the development of these technologies have on various environments and 
populations. These connections between various ecologies must be kept intact, for otherwise we 
risk mistaking the only ecology of importance as being that occupied by the end-user; for 
instance, energy efficient devices are of course important and desirable—particularly as new 
media technologies become increasingly smaller and mobile—but the value of this feature is 
complicated if this characteristic is brought about through the exploitation and devastation of 
other ecologies, which may be the case with energy efficient batteries as “tantalum capacitors 
support handset miniaturization and long battery life” (Hayes & Burge, 2003, p. 20; See also 
TIC, 2012). This concern is of increased importance as gaming technologies are becoming 
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increasingly powerful, smaller, and mobile, thereby increasing or at the very least sustaining the 
demand for tantalum at the same time that known Australian (21%) deposits are declining—
thereby increasing the burden placed on those of frequently less protected ecologies, such as 
those in parts of Latin America (40%), Southeast Asia (10%), and Central Africa (9%) (See TIC, 
2012). 
 Hence, without even having touched upon the question of electronics disposal—which 
often involves the shipment of toxic e-waste to dumps around the world, usually in Africa, India, 
or China (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009)—video games are implicated in the 
reconfiguration of global ecologies along the lines of exception and exemption. For those who 
may feel as though I am overstating the case, and that video games constitute a relatively minor 
role in the grand scheme of new media technologies, we must remember that gaming practices 
are no longer confined to gaming consoles. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the 
logics of digital play have pervaded all aspects of society: from the economy (See Chapter 
Three) to the military (See Chapter Four), and, as I have been arguing, our conception of ecology 
as well. Returning to the example at the beginning of this section of Apple and the criticism it 
has received for its involvement with Foxconn, it would appear that the practice of media 
convergence would position this controversy as linked to gaming as well: as the App Store 
download patterns suggest, the iPhone and iPad are as much gaming devices as they are mobile 
phones and multimedia machines (See: Apple, 2012; Viticci, 2012). This is true of other devices 
as well, as digital play is often experienced through Droid and other “unconventional” gaming 
platforms in addition to dedicated gaming consoles, not to mention personal computers—which 
has long possessed an important and enthusiastic gaming culture. And even for those who 
imagine themselves to be beyond implication, untouched by gaming culture, free from both the 
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devices and social groups that have formed around them, the expectations, demands, anxieties 
and desires of digital play have made it so we all are touched by this ecology. Ecologies of 
exception and exemption do not require that their subjects embrace or even acknowledge their 
existence—only that they exist: 
“Do you know coltan is highly prized in America and Europe? [That it] is needed for computers 
and video games […].” “No,” Baruti [a 16-year old miner in the DRC] replies. Their world 
revolves around the open-pits where they make less than 20 cents a day. (Dizolele, 2007; See also 
Vick, 2001) 
 
For those who refuse to believe themselves touched by gaming culture, likewise, we could ask: 
“Do you know that contemporary new media technologies are frequently driven by digital play?” 
“No.” And yet, their world revolves around media technologies imbricated with the political 
economic and cultural practices of digital play (for example, HDTV and Blu-ray adoption rates 
were significantly impacted by gaming consoles [PR Newswire, 2008; Smale, 2008]). 
Whether these ecologies are recognized as being implicated with the practices of digital 
play or not, however, it is clear that the contemporary global moment is entrenched with anxiety 
regarding the future (Baumgartner, 1999; Carey, 2002; Lewis, 2011). Jeff Lewis (2011) has 
noted that many cultures have historically produced eschatological myths so as to properly 
navigate these moments of crisis. It would seem to be that today we are in the midst of an 
upswing regarding the search for secular myths that might translate, compliment, and/or 
supplement (though not replace) the religious explanations of the past in service of the present; 
or, as Stephen O’Leary (1993, 1997) has argued, the point is not whether the eschatological 
narrative is of explicitly religious or secular origin, but rather that they rely upon similar 
rhetorical structures: the near-future struggle of good versus evil.xliv Though these myths are 
produced within and circulate through a variety of mediums, from literature to film, if gaming 
culture is indeed an increasingly important part of our larger global ecology, then it seems as 
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though we are in need of an analysis of the eschatology of digital play. Though I have touched 
upon elements of this logic of the end within the Civilization franchise (See Chapter Three) and 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare series (See Chapter Four), the remainder of this chapter will be 
dedicated to an analysis of Resident Evil and its sequels in order to understand how gaming 
speaks to the crisis of ecologies itself. 
Playing with the Politics of Biohazard 
In the late 1970s, Susan Sontag (1977/1989) recognized the reemergence and increased cultural 
significance of what has come to be called the “outbreak narrative”: the formula of identifying a 
looming epidemic, discussing the means by which it will spread, and then advocating for a 
particular means of containing this potential epidemic (Wald, 2007, p. 2). Sontag (1977/1989) 
noted that particular diseases had a capacity for capturing the cultural imagination of a given 
period. These particular afflictions are taken up and invested with more than just the question of 
death and dying but rather the legitimacy of one’s right to life (Sontag, 1977/1989). The 
investment of a particular disease with the cultural anxieties and desires of a given population 
has an effect upon the actual manifestation of the disease, as well, in terms of: how the 
dissemination of the “outbreak narrative” promotes or mitigates the stigmatization of “groups, 
populations, locales […], behaviors, and lifestyles, and […] change economies,” thereby 
influencing “survival rates and contagion routes” (Wald, 2007, p. 3). This is particularly evident 
in the historical response to AIDS, in which the homophobic discourse that has surrounded the 
transmission of the disease has not only configured the affliction as “punishment for deviant sex” 
(Sontag, 1977/1989, p. 151) but has also obscured the effect it has had on other populations 
(Wald, 2007), particularly African American women (Randolph, 2011).xlv It seems pertinent, 
then, that we look to popular forms of the representation of disease and contagion if we are to 
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understand the conception of various ecologies of exception and exemption; that is, if we are to 
understand how certain populations are marked as worthy of life and others to be expendable. 
 Indeed, since the recognition of Cancer and AIDS as containable, but not necessarily 
curable, in the 1970s and 1980s respectively, narratives of a coming, catastrophic epidemic have 
appeared with increasing frequency (Sontag, 1977/1989; Wald, 2007). These afflictions 
represented an affront to modern medicine’s “central premise […] that all disease can be cured,” 
and thus turned the attention of epidemiology towards conceiving of infection as a sign of a 
given population’s immorality and/or incapacity (Sontag, 1977/1989; Wald, 2007). In truth, 
disease and morality had long been understood in conjunction with one another, as infection was 
often thought to be a visible sign of one’s affliction with sin: Spanish missionaries, for instance, 
believed the spread of disease amongst Native Americans was punishment for their paganism 
(Baumgartner, 1999, p. 122); and, even after epidemiology emerged as a scientific field, 
religious metaphors have continued to govern our understanding of infectious diseases: 
[The] chief source of infection for mankind…. Is mankind itself. Most of the communicable 
diseases from which men suffer are kept in circulation, like original sin, by the human race. 
([italics added] Geddes Smith, qtd. in Wald, 2007, p. 21) 
 
Hence, the contemporary representation of infection operates as an important site of 
eschatological anxiety and desire, whether understood by secular or non-secular populations: in 
terms of desire, illness is imagined to operate as a potential consequence or punishment for living 
a risky or sinful lifestyle, and thus of another’s ineptitude and/or guilt; in terms of anxiety, 
affliction is imagined as the potential threat of tolerating the behavior of risky or immoral 
populations (Lynch, 1998; Wald, 2007). The combination of this eschatological logic is present 
in the production of contemporary outbreak narratives, in that “normal” (hence, moral) 
populations are often represented as under siege from “deviant” (hence, immoral) populations. 
And yet, though much work has been undertaken on the production and consumption of these 
 
 
 195  
 
outbreak narratives (Davis, 2002; Humphreys, 2002; Keränen, 2011; Lynch, 1998; Pernick, 
2002; Sontag, 1977/1989; Wald, Tomes, & Lynch, 2002; Wald, 2007), the scope of analysis has 
often remained limited to U.S. cultural practices at the very same moment that global hegemony 
is undergoing reconfiguration. If we indeed are living in the midst of an epidemic of epidemics 
(Keränen, 2011), then it seems necessary for us to grasp the operation of this epidemic as it 
circulates on a global level.  
It is for this reason that I believe the Resident Evil franchise to be an artifact particularly 
worthy of analysis. Resident Evil warrants our attention for a variety of reasons: (1) the franchise 
emerged in the mid-1990s, at the same time that the outbreak narrative was garnering renewed 
interest and increased significance regarding the Ebola Virus with books such as Richard 
Preston’s (1994) The Hot Zone (See: Lynch, 1998; Weldon, 2001); (2) the franchise has been 
extremely prolific, with over 19 games (if we include ports and remakes, the total jumps to 69 
[Capcom, 2011b]), 6 films, a handful of novels and comic books, as well as toys and other 
cultural products; (3) the franchise is the fusion of transnational cultural anxiety and desire, in 
terms of being produced by a Japanese game company, Capcom, for the intended consumption 
by Japanese, U.S., and other international audiences; and, (4) Resident Evil is unique in that it 
functions as one of the longest lasting outbreak narratives, having existed for over 15 years, pre- 
and post-9/11. For these reasons, the Resident Evil franchise offers a rich archive for 
understanding the cultural work of the outbreak narrative at a global level. 
As stated, the Resident Evil franchise began at a time when the outbreak narrative was in 
the midst of resurgence. The maturation of the outbreak narrative, through the epidemiological 
designation of a Patient Zero and African Origin Theory of AIDS, resulted in a particular 
entanglement of anxiety and desire that marked certain afflictions as more deserving of attention 
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than others (Wald, 2007). AIDS captured our cultural attention because it was believed to 
predominantly infect a derided population, gay men, thereby justifying their being ridiculed, 
while simultaneously threatening to afflict innocent populations due to contaminated blood 
transfusions (See the "Burk Family," in Wald, 2007, pp. 246-248) or closeted men who would 
“‘secretly’ sleep with other men” and then pass the disease to their unknowing family (Randolph, 
2011, p. 79). This is not to suggest that the fear of AIDS or any other disease is illegitimate, but 
rather that the designation of a given affliction as particularly insidious is often imbricated with 
existent social norms governing guilt and innocence (Humphreys, 2002). In the case of 
contemporary outbreak narratives, then, the designation of a Patient Zero and African Origin 
Theory of AIDS granted credence to the conception of the United States as always already under 
siege from foreign agents (whether microbiological or otherwise). Hence, when the Ebola Virus 
erupted in Kikwit, Zaire, in 1994, a readymade narrative existed for cultural exploitation: Ebola 
was of African Origin, and thus particularly insidious, and all that was needed was some future 
Patient Zero to bring the disease to the United States. The cultural potential of this readymade 
narrative were such that, at times, the popular fascination with the Ebola Virus “overshadowed 
the [United States’] continuing but fatigued fascination with AIDS/HIV” (Lynch, 1998, p. 234); 
and thus, provided a timely reinvigoration of the outbreak narrative. And yet, though the original 
Resident Evil (Capcom, 1996) clearly benefited from this heightened fascination with infection, 
the outbreak narrative offered differed significantly from that of other popular sources: science, 
and not the environment (let alone Africa), was the source of affliction; that difference would no 
longer exist, however, after 9/11. 
The difference of focusing on science as opposed to the environment as the source of 
catastrophe did exist at the moment when the Resident Evil franchise first began, however. 
 
 
 197  
 
Though the original Resident Evil (Capcom, 1996) may have benefited from the cultural salience 
of the outbreak narrative in the United States—selling 2.75m copies (with an additional 1.2m 
from the 1998 release of the Director's Cut Edition [Capcom, 2011a])—the generic conventions 
of the game borrowed as much from Japanese Horror as it did Western Epidemiology. As has 
been noted elsewhere, much of the aesthetic and ludic design borrowed heavily from the French 
publisher Infrogrames’ (1992) Alone in the Dark (Fahs, 2009a), with both games emphasizing 
obscure (if not infuriating) puzzle designs, control mechanisms, and purposefully disorientating 
camera angles (See Figures 5.2-3). And yet, though Resident Evil shared aesthetic and ludic 
elements with Alone in the Dark, an overemphasis on these Western elements obscures the 
existence—and significance—of the game’s resonance with that of Japanese post-war horror 
cinema conventions (See "Resident Evil and the Biopolitics of Ecologies of Exception and 
Exemption” below). This is not to argue that the game is more Japanese than Western, or vice-
versa, and that this ought to be recognized, but rather that the Resident Evil franchise is a 
transnational cultural product that operates as an important site for understanding Japanese and 
U.S. barometers of anxiety and desire. Considering the political weight these two countries have 
on not just their respective regions, but the globe as well, it seems even more pertinent to keep 
this artifact’s transnational origins in tension.  
If in the 1970s and 80s, Cancer and AIDS epidemiology were reworking the cultural 
formations of outbreak narratives (Sontag, 1977/1989; Wald, 2007), so too was the economic 
success of Japan reconfiguring the global understanding of cultural transmission (Iwabuchi, 
2002). The parallels between these two historical and global developments ought not to be 
disregarded, for as Priscilla Wald (2002) argues, “the methods bacteriologists developed to track 
the spread of contagious disease [have historically] contributed significantly to the new means 
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Figure 5.2. Alone in the Dark (Infogrames, 1992). 
Figure 5.3. Resident Evil (Capcom, 1996). 
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fashioned by students of culture to study the formation of communities” (p. 655). In other words, 
just as the United States was formulating a mechanism by which to manage its cultural anxiety 
regarding the possibility of national contamination from un-American, foreign agents, so too 
were Japanese cultural producers formulating mechanisms for how to operate on the global 
market without offending various national anxieties about cultural contamination. The practice of 
mukokuseki, “literally meaning ‘something or someone lacking any nationality,’” was designed 
to remove Japanese ethnic markers from international cultural products in favor of universal 
social characteristics; in practice, however, mukokuseki tends to privilege characters “modeled 
on Caucasian types,” thereby suggesting that a “Western-dominated cultural hierarchy governs 
transnational cultural flows in the world” (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp. 28-29).  
Though this attempt at the creation of what Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) calls culturally 
odorless commodities is not always successful, and has become increasingly conspicuous since 
the late 1980s, the practice of mukokuseki reveals much about the cultural anxieties and desires 
involved in the production and consumption of transnational artifacts; the following exchange 
between Scott Jones (a contributor for Crispy Gamer) and Jun Takeuchi (the creative lead for 
Resident Evil 5) regarding the Resident Evil franchise is illustrative: 
Jones: I always feel with Capcom games that there’s a not-so-subtle subtext of making fun of 
Americans. Chris Redfield [one of the major protagonists in the Resident Evil franchise]; he’s kind 
of a dickhead. 
[….] 
Takeuchi: That’s not something we ever really thought about. Now that you say it, I can see where 
you’re coming from. Chris has been in the series a long time, obviously, and we view him as being 
a very serious and straight-laced person. He probably isn’t a nice person to be around. He probably 
isn’t good at dealing with other people because he takes his work so seriously. You can see that in 
a lot of other [Japanese] games, too. Japanese people tend to like those kinds of characters more 
than Americans do. (qtd. in Narcisse, 2009b) 
 
Though he is clearly a fan of Capcom and Takeuchi’s work, Jones’ “misrecognition” of Chris 
Redfield as a parody of American culture illustrates the tenuous nature of transnational cultural 
production and consumption. For though this sort of “mistake” can occur within any circuit of 
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production and consumption, whether transnational or otherwise (Hall, 2006), the stakes are 
significantly higher when communicating across cultures, potentially promoting either: a 
“positive” “techno-Orientalism-consumer-Occidentalism” symbiosis, in which fans (in this case, 
U.S. fans) imagine themselves to be “outside ‘the mainstream’ [and therefore culturally savvy] 
based on their identification with, and of, [an imagined] Japanese cultural identities and 
aesthetics” (Hills, 2005, p. 171); or a negative, yellow peril discourse in which a presumed 
Japanese fluency of Western culture is enabling Japan to take over the United States (Ono, 
2009a). Hence, the production and consumption of transnational cultural commodities, in this 
case the Resident Evil franchise, reveals much not only about Japanese understandings of the 
United States, and by extension global culture, but also how the United States understands itself 
in relation to Japan and others through the consumption of transnational cultural artifacts. 
Transnational artifacts, then, operate as an important site for understanding the circuits of global 
anxiety and desire. In the case of Resident Evil, I argue, the franchise operates as a site for 
understanding the global politics of biohazards, and thus, the conception of various ecologies as 
legitimate sites of exception and exemption. 
Resident Evil and the Biopolitics of Ecologies of Exception and Exemption 
In the mid-1990s, the outbreak narrative had captured the cultural imagination of the United 
States through the circulation of various media: films, such as Outbreak (Petersen, 1995); books, 
such as The Hot Zone (Preston, 1994); journalistic accounts, such as The Coming Anarchy 
(Kaplan, 1994); and, even, videogames, with Resident Evil (Capcom, 1996). Unlike the other 
artifacts, however, the Resident Evil franchise is unique in that not only has the series outlasted 
the cultural appeal of the others—thereby offering a rich archive for documenting the 
permutations of the outbreak narrative across the pre- and post-9/11 generations—the games are 
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not of U.S. origin—thereby offering insight into how the outbreak narrative operates on a 
transnational level.  Though the franchise has been extremely prolific over the years, the series 
can functionally be thought to operate along four separate—but complimentary—lines: the core, 
numbered franchise entries (i.e., Resident Evil 0 to Resident Evil 6 [as of yet, unreleased]); the 
remastered ports (i.e., Resident Evil 1 [GameCube]); direct ports (e.g., Resident Evil: Code 
Veronica X appearing on the Playstation 2 with only minor differences between it and the 
original Dreamcast version); and, complimentary, unnumbered entries, whether canonical or 
otherwise (e.g., Resident Evil: Revelations [3DS]). Though all four lines of the Resident Evil 
franchise are all relevant archives—particularly for understanding the demographic differences 
in terms of consumption—for this analysis, I will focus primarily upon the core, numbered and 
remastered franchise entries; this is because these entries have the largest popular following, and 
are widely understood to be the most significant entries into the franchise. The games are: 
Resident Evil 0 (Capcom, 2002a), Resident Evil 1 (Capcom, 1996), Resident Evil 1 [GameCube 
Remake] (Capcom, 2002b), Resident Evil 2 (Capcom, 1998),  Resident Evil 3: Nemesis 
(Capcom, 1999), Resident Evil: Code Veronica X (Capcom, 2000/2001), Resident Evil 4 
(Capcom, 2005a), Resident Evil 4 [PS2 Edition] (Capcom, 2005b), and Resident Evil 5 (Capcom, 
2009).xlvi It is my contention that through an analysis of this archive, we can witness the 
transformation of the outbreak narrative in accordance with the epochal break offered by 9/11. 
This is not to suggest that 9/11 had a deterministic effect upon the articulation of outbreak 
narratives, but rather I seek to extend the argument of Lisa Keränen  (2011) that “9/11 […] 
provided opportunities for a dramatic and risky expansion of US biodefense” (p. 233). With the 
Resident Evil franchise, we are provided insight into how 9/11 provided opportunities for the 
legitimation of a dramatic and risky expansion of global ecologies of exception and exemption, 
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Figure 5.4. Resident Evil 1 (Capcom, 1996). Jill (left) with Chris (middle) and Wesker (right) 
that is, the construction of Empire. To assist in this argument, then, my analysis is broken into 
three interrelated sections: (1) the anti-capital, pre-9/11 franchise, of Resident Evil 1-3 and Code 
Veronica X; (2) the revisionist, post-9/11, period of Resident Evil 0-1 [remake]; and, (3), the 
contemporary counter-terrorism period of Resident Evil 4-5. 
Resident Evil: The Anti-Capital Era (1996 – 2001) 
This period of the Resident Evil franchise is marked not only by a shared, anti-capital narrative 
thrust, but also common aesthetic and ludic features. For the sake of the reader, then, I will begin 
this (and each subsequent section) with an overview of these shared game design elements so as 
to ground the subsequent analysis. The early games in the Resident Evil franchise were marked 
by a fixed-perspective, surveillance style camera that conspicuously limited the player’s view of 
the field (See Figures 5.4-8). This added to the unsettling atmosphere of the games in that this 
perspective made traversing corners and other blind spots nerve-wracking (for fear of an unseen 
enemy jumping out at the player); moreover, the perspective made combat difficult, and 
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Figure 5.6. Resident Evil 3 (Capcom, 1999). Jill (at the top) shooting a zombie, with Carlos (on the right). 
Figure 5.5. Resident Evil 2 (Capcom, 1998). Leon (at the top) shooting at zombies. 
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Figure 5.7. Resident Evil: Code Veronica X (Capcom, 2000/2001). Claire facing the screen. Note that for Code 
Veronica X, Capcom opted for 3D as opposed to pre-rendered backgrounds (as used for prior games in the 
franchise). However, the fixed camera angles that had been a trademark of the series remained (with the 
exception of some movement). 
combined with the limited access to resources—ammo, health restoration items (e.g., herbs), and 
even the ability to save (via in-game ink cartridges)—these game design choices effectively 
encouraged the player to seek flight over fight. Movement was further restrained by the decision 
to link the avatar to the controller much like that of a radio-controlled car: directional movement 
is always mapped to the physical perspective of the avatar. In other words, pushing “up” on the 
control pad will always move the avatar forward in the direction she is facing; and pushing 
“right,” for example, will likewise always move the avatar towards her right. So in the case of 
Figure 5.7, for example, if the player were to push “up” and “right,” the avatar (Claire) would 
walk towards the screen while turning in the direction of the dead zombie—even though these 
directions, from the perspective of the player, correspond to the opposite directions (due to the 
fixed camera perspective). These three ludic decisions—of fixed perspective, scarce resources, 
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Figure 5.8. Jill interacting with a typewriter in Resident Evil 1 (Capcom, 1996). 
and avatar-centric movement—had the effect of making the early Resident Evil games fairly 
difficult, thereby adding to each game’s atmosphere. To put it more clearly, in most games, death 
is merely an annoyance typically only requiring either that one restart the level or from the last 
save point; however, in the early Resident Evil games, one could only save in specially 
designated locations (rooms with typewriters) and when in possession of ink cartridges (both of 
which were rare) (See Figure 5.8). This prevented players from constantly saving the game as a 
means for anticipating future challenges; this also meant that one could find herself playing for 
hours and unable to save the game for lack of either a nearby or easily accessible typewriter or 
due to an absence of ink cartridges. Hence, the franchise, famously known for having 
popularized the survivor-horror genre, embedded these “horror” conventions not just in the 
narrative, but also in its ludic elements as well: fear stemmed from not just the horror of the story 
and cinematic design, but also the horror of potentially dying—and thus losing one’s progress—
after having played for several hours without saving. These ludic and aesthetic conventions were 
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established in Resident Evil 1, and would be the hallmark of the main series until Resident Evil 4 
(Capcom, 2005a). 
 Resident Evil 1 did more than just establish the ludic and aesthetic conventions of the 
early franchise, however; the game also established an explicitly anti-capital narrative for the rest 
of the series to follow. The game began well-enough like that of any other Western horror:  
[Narrated by Protagonist, Chris Redfield]: Alpha Team is flying around the forest zone, situated in 
northwest Raccoon City, where we’re searching for the helicopter of our compatriots, Bravo 
Team, who disappeared during the middle of our mission. 
[….] 
Bizarre murder cases have recently occurred in Raccoon City. There are outlandish reports of 
families being attacked by a group of about 10 people. Victims were apparently eaten. Bravo 
Team went to the hideout of the group, and disappeared. (Capcom, 1996) 
 
The back cover of the game’s jewel case reinforces this use of easily recognizable Western 
horror conventions: “Unstoppable zombies. Monstrous spiders. Mutated snakes and other 
unknown horrors…” (Capcom, 1996). This has led many commentators to emphasize the 
influence of Western horror cinema, particularly the films of George Romero (Casamassina, 
2002; CVG Staff, 2009; Fahs, 2009a), at the expense of Japan’s horror tradition. And yet, though 
the game begins in conventional mukokuseki style—complete with White Protagonists, settings, 
and other familiar Western horror conventions—the narrative takes a twist midway through the 
game that exposes the franchise’s reliance upon Japanese horror conventions. The game, players 
come to learn, is not about Zombies, but the production of biological weapons by the fictional 
Umbrella corporation, a large scale pharmaceutical company based in Raccoon City (See 
Capcom, 1996). It is revealed via in-game dialogue and other plot devices that the 
pharmaceutical corporation had been conducting experiments in the attempt to manufacturer 
biological weapons, which appear in Resident Evil 1 as functional zombies, giant spiders, and 
other—often previously human—creatures (See Capcom, 1996). Keeping in line with the 
daikaiju eiga (giant monster) and other Japanese horror traditions, the enemy in Resident Evil 1 
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is never really the zombie or these monsters, but rather the scientific-military community run 
amok (See: Anisfield, 1995; McRoy, 2005b; Napier, 1993).  
The monsters, zombies particularly, then, are not necessarily meant to be demonized, but 
rather sympathized with as potential subjectivities we might ourselves occupy had our luck 
turned out otherwise; indeed, the game goes through great lengths to provide glimpses of the 
zombies former humanity: 
[From the “Keeper’s Diary” in Resident Evil 1] 
May 9, 1998 
Played poker tonight with Scott and Alias from Security, and Steve from Research. Steve was the 
big winner, but I think he was cheating. Scumbag. 
[….] 
May 11, 1998 
At around 5 A.M., Scott woke me up. Scared the shit out of me, too. He was wearing a protective 
suit. He handed me another one and told me to put it on. Said there’d been an accident in the 
basement lab. 
I just knew something like this would happen. Those bastards in Research never sleep, even on 
holiday. 
 
[From “Researcher’s Will” in Resident Evil 1] 
June 3, 1998 
My dearest Alma. 
[….] 
I sit here trying to think of where to begin, of how to explain in a few simple worlds all that’s 
happened in my life since we last spoke, and already I fail. 
[….] 
The entire story would take hours for me to tell you, and time is short, so accept these things as 
fact: last month there was an accident in the lab and the virus we were studying leaked. 
All my colleagues who were infected are dead or dying, and the nature of the disease is such that 
those still living have lost their senses. This virus robs its victims of their humanity, forcing them 
in their sickness to seek out and destroy life. 
[….] 
Alma, I have tried to survive only to see you again. But my efforts have only delayed the 
inevitable; I am infected, and there is no cure for what will follow—except to end my life before I 
lose the only that that separates me from them. (Capcom, 1996) 
 
This sympathy is in stark contrast to conventional Western horror films, in that in the United 
States monstrosity in and of itself is often conveyed as evidence of one’s moral and/or individual 
failings (Balmain, 2009; Boon, 2007; Dendle, 2007; Wee, 2011).xlvii In contrast, monstrosity, in 
the Japanese horror tradition, is often attempted to be understood, as a means of illustrating not 
just how someone becomes a monster, but rather why the existence of monsters is punishment 
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for the failings of society; in other words, in Japanese cinema, the monster exists not as a sign of 
the individual’s punishment, but rather as a symbol of society’s punishment for producing the 
monster (Balmain, 2009; McRoy, 2005b; Sharrett, 2005; Wee, 2011). This does not mean that 
Japanese horror cinema is any more or less progressive or conservative than Western horror 
cinema, but rather that the onus is on explicitly social—as opposed to interpersonal—institutions, 
such as the family (e.g., Ju-On: The Grudge [McRoy, 2005a]) or masculinity (e.g., Freeze Me 
[Lafond, 2005]). The difference, hence, is that in the U.S. horror tradition, one learns of the 
origins of a monster often for the sake of not becoming one, whereas in the Japanese horror 
tradition, one learns of the origins of a monster for the sake of not producing one.xlviii In the case 
of Resident Evil 1, then, the game establishes that the pursuits of science for the sake of capital 
carries with it consequences for society, and that consequence is the potential threat of biological 
contamination. 
 Though Resident Evil 1 (Capcom, 1996) established an element of anti-capitalist critique 
regarding the collusion between the pharmaceutical industry and the military-industrial complex, 
however, the game also established a certain logic of exception and exemption that would govern 
whom was to garner sympathy for biological contamination and whom was to be demonized for 
being always already contaminated in the first place—and this logic would only become more 
pronounced as the series progressed. The use of the mukokuseki style, with its typical practice of 
conceiving of a universal subject as being a Western subject (Iwabuchi, 2002; See also Prieler, 
2010), tempers Resident Evil’s anti-capitalist narrative thread along racial, classed, and gendered 
lines. So though Japanese horror has a popular tradition of critiquing Western capital, 
particularly in the daikaiju and apocalyptic cinema traditions, which often works to critique 
Western science in favor of Japanese cultural approaches—which carries its own nationalist 
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politics (Napier, 1993)—the mukokuseki style collapses this transnational ecology onto an 
exclusively U.S. national space. In essence, the Raccoon City of Resident Evil 1 is positioned as 
an innocent, quite town—the traditional, small town “every city”—and, along with its 
protagonists, who are conceived as universal subjects, configured as legitimate sites and subjects 
of exception; the world of Resident Evil 1 does articulate an anti-capitalist narrative, but so too 
does it articulate a framework of whiteness in that the victims are either predominantly White 
(e.g., Joseph Frost, Richard Aiken, Enrico Marini) or unmarked (and hence, presumed to be 
White), and likewise so too are the protagonists (e.g., Chris Redfield and Jill Valentine) 
(Capcom, 1996). This particular articulation of whiteness in relation to the outbreak narrative is 
significant, for, as Priscilla Wald (2007) argues, the discourse embedded within epidemics 
carries with it suggestions as to how to understand who suffers from and what must be done in 
the face of potential epidemic. So though biopolitics operates unevenly and at the transnational 
level (See “Ecologies of Exception and Exemption” above), the Resident Evil franchise 
established a particular configuration of the White, gendered, classed, and heterosexual subject 
as the primary population of concern, as well as primary agents of action. 
 The linking together of whiteness and the outbreak narrative in Resident Evil, by virtue of 
the game’s mukokuseki aesthetics, has the effect of foreclosing the possibility of rethinking anti-
capitalist politics outside of the selfsame cultural systems that benefit from the existence of 
contemporary capital—and thus, lays the foundation for revitalizing the series in the service of 
transnational capital in the post-9/11 franchise. This is made clearer by looking to the generic 
conventions established in terms of the primary protagonists in Resident Evil 1 and expanded 
upon throughout the series. Resident Evil 1 establishes the franchise conventions of placing the 
player within a White, middle-classed (e.g., law enforcement personnel), and gendered, 
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heterosexual subject position. In the first game, the player is offered the role of either: Chris 
Redfield, the “tough guy who possesses both a strong mentality and great vitality”; or, Jill 
Valentine, the female compliment to Redfield, with her “strong moral convictions” and 
comparatively lower vitality (Capcom, 1996) (See also Figure 5.9). And Resident Evil 2 follows 
suit by granting the player the roles of either: Leon Kennedy, “an idealistic rookie cop,” who 
“burns with the need to protect and to serve”; or, Claire Redfield, the “light-hearted, articulate 
modern woman” (Capcom, 1998) (See also Figure 5.10). The emphasis on this heterosexual 
pairing offers insight into the ideal gendered subject positions offered by the Resident Evil 
franchise for thinking through the possibility of an epidemic. If Chris Redfield and Jill Valentine 
established the convention of White, middle-classed, heterosexual men and women as both 
victims of and agents against the coming epidemic, then Leon Kennedy and Claire Redfield 
further cement these ideals as intrinsic within the subjectivity of this particular population; for 
unlike Chris and Jill, Leon and Claire are not yet matured subjectivities, as it is Leon’s first day 
on the job and Claire does not yet appear to have an occupation (Capcom, 1998). This has the 
effect of advocating for a particular biopolitical system that is capable of producing subjectivities 
Figure 5.9. In-game profiles for Chris Redfield and Jill Valentine in Resident Evil 1 (Capcom, 1996). 
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Figure 5.10. Leon Kennedy and Claire Redfield from Resident Evil 2 (Capcom, 1998). 
such as Claire, Leon, Chris, and Jill—thereby redeeming the very system that produced the 
epidemic in the first place, because, as Cheryl Harris (1993) argues, Whiteness cannot be thought 
apart from the economic system in which it is invested. 
 In essence, the early Resident Evil franchises’ reliance upon two Japanese cultural 
practices, the mukokuseki and daikaiju eiga traditions, results in the entanglement of two 
competing narrative threads, Whiteness and anti-capitalism. On one hand, the early franchise is 
fairly consistent in its positioning of corporate capital as being antithetical to civil society. In-
game documents from these early games are particularly damning of the effect finance capital 
has on local governments: 
[From the “Federal Police Dept. Internal Investigation Report” file in Resident Evil 2] 
Mr. Irons [chief of Raccoon City Police Dept.] has allegedly received large sums of funds in 
bribes from Umbrella Inc. over the last 5 years. He was apparently involved in the cover up of the 
mansion lab case along with several other incidents in which Umbrella appears to have direct 
involvement. (Capcom, 1998) 
 
[From the “City Guide” file in Resident Evil 3: Nemesis] 
Thanks to the kind and generous people of Umbrella Inc., this is a peaceful and friendly city. The 
vast donations from Umbrella Inc. have been used for welfare work, the construction of public 
utilities, and to help maintain public peace. (Capcom, 1999) 
 
Through the course of these early games, the player learns that the financial donations made by 
the Umbrella Corporation to Raccoon City resulted in the corruption of local and even state and 
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federal governments. At one point, in Resident Evil 3: Nemesis, the protagonist, Jill Valentine, 
even reprimands another (supporting) character for recklessly seeking out revenge on the 
zombies: 
Jill Valentine: Mikahil, do you have some kind of death wish? 
Mikhail Victor: My People… they were wiped out by these monsters! I can’t stop just because I’m 
wounded! 
Jill Valentine: But can’t you see those monsters are also the victims of Umbrella? 
 
And yet, the conflation of whiteness as being equated with the universal, in the tradition of the 
mukokuseki style, lends the early Resident Evil franchise a “not in my back yard” narrative 
thrust. For the game makes it clear that the Umbrella Corporation is not just in the business of 
pharmaceuticals but also the trafficking (whether sanctioned or not) of biological weaponry 
(Capcom, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000/2001). The moral focus of the early franchise, however, is not 
that of the production of biological weaponry in and of itself, however; it is rather that an 
outbreak could happen here. What damns the Umbrella Corporation, then, is its failure to 
adequately respond to the leakage.  
 If the production of outbreak narratives offer resources for making sense of the anxieties 
of global epidemics, then, the early narrative thrust of the Resident Evil franchise, does position 
capital as a potential site of outbreak; however, this critique is limited to the instance of crisis, 
that is, a presumed aberration in capital—when an accidental leak happens. As Resident Evil 3: 
Nemesis makes clear, the outbreak was never meant to happen (Capcom, 1999). But what then of 
those sites and locations wherein outbreak is supposed to happen? For surely the development of 
biological weapons carries with it the intention of their usage. This question remains unanswered 
in the early games of the Resident Evil franchise. Though some may argue that one game (or 
story) cannot touch upon everything, this silence across four games speaks much to the 
conception of exception and exemption already in operation in the early Resident Evil franchise: 
 
 
 213  
 
outbreaks should not happen here; outbreaks may or may not be happening out there, but we do 
not care enough to know. The events of 9/11 would compel us to know, however—if not for 
their sake, than for our own. Hence, the outbreak narrative of Resident Evil would need to be 
updated. 
Resident Evil: The Revisionist Period (2002–2004) 
At the turn of the century, Capcom, the developer of the Resident Evil franchise, was looking to 
capitalize upon the outbreak narrative it had produced. The ludic elements that had been the 
franchise hallmark, however, were beginning to feel dated by both fans and critics alike (Fahs, 
2009a; Fielder, 2001; Perry, 2001). Attempts at reinventing the ludic elements of the franchise, 
however, were met with limited success; Resident Evil: Survivor  (Capcom, 2000), for instance, 
which attempted to blend the franchise mythos with the gameplay style of a first-person shooter, 
was widely panned and poorly received (Fahs, 2009a; Perry, 2000; B. Stahl, 2000). This failure 
may have been due to the conflicting signals between the ludic and narrative elements, for as 
Irene Chien (2007) argues, the horror aspect of the “survivor-horror” video game genre may 
stem from the ability to reproduce anxieties of fragmentation through ludic conventions: 
Rather than gliding into a room towards a cabinet in the corner in a single continuous shot, you 
first see the doorway to the room from an exterior perspective, then cut to a long shot of one side 
of the room’s interior as you enter, and then cut to another, medium shot of the cabinet as you 
approach it […]. As in horror cinema, a sense of paranoia unsettles every step forward. Navigating 
through the game becomes a highly anxious experience; the gameplay is hesitant rather than fluid 
and assertive. (p. 65) 
 
Though operating within the same symbolic universe, the outbreak narrative reproduced through 
these attempts at expanding the Resident Evil series failed to capture the sense of dread that made 
the franchise so compelling and successful. As a result, Capcom opted to refocus the franchise 
by returning to its roots with the next installment in the series: 
The Biohazard series has slowly moved away from its origin of horror. What our users have 
supported over the years was this feeling of horror. After much thought, we have decided to return 
to the beginning and start from one again. (Capcom Press Conference, qtd. in IGN Staff, 2001)xlix 
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This next installment, then, would be the prequel, Resident Evil 0 (Capcom, 2002a). 
Furthermore, as part of a deal entered into with Nintendo, wherein the next few entries into the 
franchise would appear exclusively on Nintendo’s GameCube, Capcom opted to re-release 
Resident Evil 1-3 and Code Veronica as both a moneymaking opportunity and as a means for 
introducing new fans to the Resident Evil mythos (IGN Staff, 2001)—as the prior games had all 
been on other platforms. What is most interesting for our concern, however, is that the re-release 
of the original games were accompanied by several revisions to the existing Resident Evil 
outbreak narrative. This was, perhaps, of course to be expected with Resident Evil 0; however, 
the most significant revisions were those that accompanied the remake of Resident Evil 1. 
 As argued in the previous section, the early Resident Evil franchise’s conception of the 
Umbrella Corporation fit squarely within the logic of Japan’s daikaiju eiga and apocalyptic 
cinema traditions. In these genres, the pursuit of scientific knowledge in and of itself is always 
fraught with the possibility of bringing about the destruction of civil society (McRoy, 2005b; 
Napier, 1993); similar to the romantic writers of the Western literary tradition, the daikaiju eiga 
and Japanese apocalyptic cinema traditions tend to conceive of science as playing god with tools 
beyond our comprehension. Resident Evil 1-3 and Code Veronica operate within this tradition in 
that disease spread by the outbreak is consistently noted to be the result of biological 
engineering; in these early games, the actual origin of the virus (e.g., common cold, smallpox, 
etc.) is never explored outside of Umbrella’s involvement. This would change, however, with the 
development of Resident Evil 0 (Capcom, 2002a) and the remake of Resident Evil 1 (Capcom, 
2002b). 
 Though the Umbrella Corporation is still held front and center as antithetical to the 
interests of civil society, the origins of outbreak were rewritten in Resident Evil 0 and the remake 
 
 
 215  
 
of Resident Evil 1. This was done by placing more emphasis on the natural origins of the virus 
responsible for the epidemic.  Meant to operate as a promotional primer for the upcoming release 
of Resident Evil 0 (Fahs, 2009a), the re-release of Resident Evil 1 included new elements that 
foreshadowed the narrative revisions that would take place in the prequel. Most significantly, in 
conjunction with the re-release of Resident Evil 1, Capcom produced a promotional document 
entitled “Wesker’s Report II.” The document was intended to synthesize the outbreak narrative 
established in the early Resident Evil games in preparation for the prequel. Included in the 
“Wesker’s Report II,” however, is a significant treatise on the uses of the Ebola virus as a 
biological weapon: 
What if a person infected with the Ebola virus could stand up and walk around? And that infected 
person would have a disrupted chain of thought, and would infect others that weren’t infected? 
[….] 
The person would be dead from a human’s point of view, but would still go around as a human 
bio-weapon spreading the virus around? 
It’s fortunate that the Ebola may have features like this. (Capcom, 2002c) 
 
This conception of the Ebola virus as having the innate potential to transform the infected subject 
into a “virus bomb” links this revised outbreak narrative with that produced by other cultural 
artifacts a decade earlier, in the mid-1990s (See Lynch, 1998); for instance, note the parallels in 
language  between the above passage from “Wesker’s Report II” and Richard Preston (1994) The 
Hot Zone: 
He [Monet] doesn’t seem to be fully aware of pain any longer because the blood clots in his brain 
are cutting off his brain flow. His personality is being wiped away by brain damage. [….] It could 
be said that the who of Charles Monet has already died, while the what of Charles Monet 
continues to live . . .  Monet has been transformed into a human virus bomb. (qtd. in Lynch, 1998, 
p. 237) 
 
Like these other outbreak narratives, then, so too does Resident Evil introduce the conception of 
Africa as the home of biological danger (See Lynch, 1998); for even though the Umbrella 
Corporation is responsible for the production of biological weapons, the “Wesker’s Report II” 
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makes it clear that within the Resident Evil outbreak narrative these biological weapons may 
already exist within the natural environment.  
If the Resident Evil remake introduced the African Origin Theory of Disease to the 
Resident Evil franchise, then Resident Evil 0 subtly crystalized the production of what Lisa 
Lynch (1998) calls “the neo/bio/colonial hot zone”—that is, the legitimation of international 
intervention upon African territories as a means of combating the threat of global pandemic. 
Premised with the objective of offering insight into how the virus of the Resident Evil franchise 
was made, Resident Evil 0 offers parallels between what one of the characters, Billy Coen, has 
seen during his military service in “Africa” and the effects of the disease upon U.S. populations 
(Capcom, 2002a). It is never fully articulated within Resident Evil 0, however, whether the 
bodies he saw in Africa were afflicted with the same condition as those he has seen within the 
United States—though the game makes this suggestion via a brief flashback sequence (See 
Figures 5.11-12). Whether the African subjects suffered from the same affliction or not, the link 
between the experiences is consistently made within the game via not just this flashback but that 
of another of Billy’s as well. In essence, the connection is this: the Umbrella virus induces 
madness and suffering; and Africa is a site of madness and suffering as well.  
In conjunction with the revisions made with the rerelease of Resident Evil 1, then, the 
Resident Evil franchise repositions the source of outbreak as ultimately stemming from natural 
causes—Africa. And yet, even at this point, it was not yet clear what direction the franchise 
would take. The introduction of the African Origin Theory of Disease did connect the Resident 
Evil outbreak narrative with the Western tradition that had been popular in the 1990s (and 
continues to be popular); however, the Umbrella Corporation continued to be emphasized as 
well. The series, then, contained the narrative flexibility to push forward in any number of 
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Figures 5.11-12. (top-bottom). In Figure 11, we see the reaction Billy Coen (with Rebecca Chambers behind 
him) has to seeing a pile of skeletal remains. The player is then immediately provided with a flashback detailing 
the reason for his reaction (Figure 12). This flashback resonates with the one that had previously been witnessed 
of Billy’s military service in Africa. 
directions, most notably: further exploring the consequences of finance capital and biological 
manipulation or continuing to emphasize the natural origins of pandemics. Narratives, however, 
are never self-contained things—as the influences sited throughout this chapter attest (e.g., the 
mukokuseki style)—and the essence of horror had begun to shift in the period after September 
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11th (Balmain, 2007). So though many narrative possibilities existed regarding the future of the 
Resident Evil franchise, the constraints of the historical time and place of production made it so 
that some possibilities were deemed more compelling than others. As the producer of Resident 
Evil 4, Hiroyuki Kobayashi, would note, regarding an early version of the game: 
The footage that we all saw last year at E3 was pretty much the same Resident Evil that everybody 
has already played. We wanted to the change image of the franchise. We wanted to turn that all 
around. (qtd. in IGN Staff, 2004a) 
 
Or, as Travis Fahs (2009a), explains: “The usual playbook had grown predictable, and Studio 4 
was looking for a new way to terrify.” In the aftermath of September 11th, terror had come to be 
redefined as terrorism; in 2005, the Resident Evil franchise would follow suit with the release of 
Resident Evil 4. 
Resident Evil: The Counterterrorism Years (2005 – The Present) 
If Irene Chien (2007) is correct in that the sense of terror experienced within the “survivor-
horror” video game genre stems as much from the ludic elements of gameplay as from the 
narrative, then what ludic elements are capable of capturing the shift in the essence of horror that 
had been underway post-9/11? This was the challenge faced by the producer for Resident Evil 4, 
Shinji Mikami, for as Travis Fahs (2009a) wrote: “If Resident Evil [4] was to be scary, it would 
have to surprise people. A zombie dog jumping through a window just couldn’t work anymore.” 
This search for a ludic solution to the shifting definition of terror, however, would affect the 
narrative thrust of the Resident Evil franchise beyond whether a zombie dog jumped through the 
window or not. This is not to suggest that gameplay determines the narrative, or vice-versa, but 
rather that the two elements are intertwined. An early attempt at “updating” the series’ ludic 
elements to be more in-line with that of modern gaming conventions, for instance, failed so 
drastically to capture the sense of eschatological anxiety associated with the genre of the 
outbreak narrative that the project was rebranded as the Devil May Cry franchise (Capcom, 
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2001) (Fahs, 2009a; See Figure 5.13). Likewise, later attempts to extend the franchise’s narrative 
arc, while retaining the ludic conventions of the earlier games, felt unable to adequately speak to 
the anxieties of the present moment: they felt dated, at best (IGN Staff, 2004a); or spoke to a 
different sense of anxiety than that captured by the outbreak narrative, at worst (Fahs, 2009a; See 
Figures 5.14-15).  
The implications of this entanglement between ludic design and narrative thrust would 
become clearer with the final, acceptable, version of Resident Evil 4 (and later, Resident Evil 5). 
The reimagining of the game would show that the ludic elements are not merely narrative 
Figure 5.13. Devil May Cry (Capcom, 2001). Notice the much more open and expansive shot used for Devil May 
Cry, in contrast to the more fragmented shots used in the Resident Evil franchise. In addition, in the middle of 
this image, you can see the protagonist, Dante, flipping through the air, thereby demonstrating far greater 
flexibility and mobility than that of the Resident Evil protagonists. 
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Figures 5.14-15. (top-bottom).  In Figure 5.14, known as the “Fog Version,” this early build of Resident Evil 4 
showed footage of Leon Kennedy exploring a gothic-style environment in search of the origins of the 
“Progenitor Virus”—the key virus in the Resident Evil franchise. Though this version never came to fruition, this 
build of the game suggests that the virus is of European origin, as opposed to the African Origin Theory offered 
in Resident Evil 0 and the Resident Evil 1 remake; an early trailer for the game specifically mentions this 
location as being: “The Cradle of the Progenitor Virus” (See Stanford, 2010). The bottom image, from the 
“Hookman Version,” seemed to deemphasize the outbreak narrative itself in favor of supernatural sources of 
horror. Each version was scrapped, though some character models and environments may have been reused for 
the final build of the game (Stanford, 2010). 
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architecture, the scaffolding upon which the game’s narrative is built (Jenkins, 2003), but rather 
deeply influenced by and imbricated within the logics of historical time and place. For in contrast 
to the arguments of Eric Freedman (2012) and Alexander Galloway (2006), identity is not a data 
type, an easily adjusted mathematical variable (Galloway, 2006, pp. 102-103; Freedman, 2012, 
pp. 288-289), but rather the construction of an identity speaks to the anxieties and desires of 
particular populations—and even more so when this history of anxiety and desire embedded 
within the process of identity construction is effaced by the suggestion that identity is an 
ephemeral data type (Mejia, 2012). The narrative and ludic thrust of Resident Evil 4 (Capcom, 
2005a) and Resident Evil 5 (Capcom, 2009) would show that the abstract categories of “the boss 
[…], or the horde of regenerating enemies” are not “generalized character positions that drains 
[marginalized representations] of their abject status,” as Freedman (2012, p. 288) argues, but 
rather symbolic anchors, suggesting whom we ought to be weary of (narrative) and how to 
respond to them (ludic), when confronted with the possibility of pandemic. 
 The ludic framework of the early and middle Resident Evil franchise games called upon a 
definition of pandemic horror that had lost some dominance in the aftermath of September 11th. 
Affliction had once meant the transformation of an individual into an unassuming agent of 
infection (at best) or catatonic “human virus bomb” (at worst) (Lynch, 1998). The zombie, the 
iconic figure of the early and middle Resident Evil franchise, had captured this sense of anxiety 
well, with its image of a lumbering, passionless—and highly contagious—walking corpse (Boon, 
2007; Dendle, 2007). The ludic fragmentation of the early and middle Resident Evil franchise, 
with its constant cinematic cutting and reframing of the action (See Figures 5.4-8), captured the 
sense of paranoia in operation within this particular logic of horror (Chien, 2007). Though this 
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form of horror (i.e., paranoia) clearly continues to resonate with audiences, today it seems 
relegated to the realm of psychological and/or supernatural horror: 
In light of the events of 9/11, it is no surprise that the apocalyptic horror film has emerged as the 
dominant trend in American horror cinema within two distinct strands: the post-modern “urbanoid 
horror film” […] and the monstrous-child horror film. (Balmain, 2007, p. 135) 
 
It is within the mold of the “post-modern ‘urbanoid’ horror film” that the image of the zombie 
was rearticulated to capture this recent shift in cultural anxiety: 
No longer deadpan, stolid, and unfeeling, the zombie is not an image of humanity stripped of 
passion, soul, or spirit. The zombie has become enraged, feral, frantic, and insatiable: it is a gutted, 
animalistic core of hunger and fury. It is not homogeneity—not the leveling of individuality—that 
scares us anymore, then […]: it is rather the lack of control, dignity, direction that scares us. The 
contemporary zombie embodies a wanton, unfettered pursuit of immediate physical cravings, a 
fear of raw power. (Dendle, 2007, p. 54) 
 
Though off-screen movement continues to be an effective tactic for this form of horror as well, 
this emphasis on absolute terror, in addition to paranoia, calls for the extensive use of long- and 
medium-shots so that viewers are always aware not just of the horror that remains off-screen, but 
also the horror that is explicitly on-screen as well (See Figure 5.16). Likewise, as had the 
Resident Evil franchise before, Resident Evil 4 would articulate this sense of fear through the 
implementation of particular ludic conventions; most significantly, through the use of an over-
the-shoulder tracking-shot (See Figure 5.17). 
 The use of an over-the-shoulder tracking-shot as the primary point of perspective for the 
player had the effect of radically reconfiguring the outbreak narrative that had been produced 
through the Resident Evil franchise. In the early games, the zombies were relatively 
indistinguishable from one another, and this resonated with the sympathy the player was 
expected to have with those who had become infected; in other words, there was a clear 
distinction between being human and being infected—being infected had no weight upon the 
prior character of the individual. In Resident Evil 4, however, one is forced to confront the face 
of the other, and in doing so, cannot help but notice that even prior to infection, these populations 
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were never like us. The infected, then, do not garner sympathy, for in being unlike us, it is 
unclear at what moment they came to stand against us; in other words, when did infection begin? 
Figures 5.16-17. (top-bottom). Contemporary horror films and video games, particularly those featuring zombies 
and monsters, have featured hordes of raging monsters, as in these images from 28 Weeks Later (top) and 
Resident Evil 4 (bottom) illustrate. 
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This ambiguity had the effect of revitalizing the terror embedded within the experience of the 
survival horror: 
They weren’t zombies; they could run, talk, and use tools. But they weren’t human anymore, 
either, and they could scare the crap out of anyone. (Fahs, 2009a) 
 
You’re trapped here. There are crazy characters out there. You don’t know what they might do or 
how they’ll react to your presence. The sun is shining and yet you don’t feel at all safe. [….] The 
enemies steam out and fights are never far off. [….] We encountered no old-style scare scenarios 
where foes would sneak unto our character and frighten us. Instead, the play elements are in your 
face. And believe us when we state that it’s every bit as intense. (IGN Staff, 2004b) 
 
The ambiguity, however, also had the effect of requiring the addition of a narrative thread 
capable of explaining away the reason one could not distinguish between whom was infected and 
whom was not (if such a thing existed). This plot device would, conveniently, be Religion and 
Terrorism. 
 Though the enemies of Resident Evil 4, referred to as Los Ganados (Spanish for “The 
Cattle”), are not marked as Muslim, as the faith they follow is referenced as that of the cult of 
Los Illuminados (Spanish for “The Enlightened Ones”) (Capcom, 2005a), this plot device 
resonates strongly with the discourse surrounding the global War on Terror. Indeed, the premise 
of the game is as follows: Leon Kennedy (from Resident Evil 2 fame) has gone on to become 
part of the U.S. Secret Service; the President’s daughter, Ashley, has been kidnapped by an 
extremist religious cult; and, this cult is looking to overthrow the United States by infecting 
Ashley, and then returning her to her father: 
[Leon:] What do you want to do? 
 
[Osmund Saddler, the religious leader of Los Illuminados:] To demonstrate to the whole world, 
our astounding power of course. No longer will the United states think they can police the world 
forever. So we kidnapped the President’s daughter to [infect her] then send her back. [….] When 
the [infection matures], you’ll become my pupets. Involuntarily, you’ll do as I say. I’ll have total 
control over your mind. Don’t you think this is a revolutionary way to propagate one’s faith? 
 
[Leon:] Sounds more like an alien invasion if you ask me! (Capcom, 2005a) 
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Leon’s words ring true in more ways than one; for not only is infection conceived as a foreign 
body afflicting a host body, within Resident Evil 4, the disease is of foreign origin as well. This 
foreign disease, the effect of ancient parasites indigenous to the region, Las Plagas, moreover, is 
conceived as more insidious than the virus that had been associated with the Umbrella 
Corporation of the earlier Resident Evil games. This was emphasized both through ludic and 
narrative conventions. In terms of gameplay, whereas the zombies of old were relatively 
mindless and would wonder aimlessly towards the player, the Ganados of Resident Evil 4 would 
coordinate attacks and relentlessly hunt down the player (Capcom, 2005a). Though some may 
argue that this distinction is merely the result of advances in artificial intelligence and computer 
processing power, which could allow for not just more compelling enemy coordination but also 
the presence of an increased number of enemies more generally, the game developers felt 
otherwise; for though it is clear that the Ganados of Resident Evil 4 (Capcom, 2005a) are 
afflicted with a form of zombification (See Boon, 2007), Capcom consistently emphasized that 
the infected villagers were not zombies (Fahs, 2009a; IGN Staff, 2004a, 2004b). As Hiroyuki 
Kobayashi, producer for Resident Evil 4, noted: “They look like zombies, but they are not. That 
being said they are not humans either” (IGN Staff, 2004b). How, then, are we to understand the 
function of this subject? A subject, whose, all-too-human monstrosity “could scare the crap out 
of anyone,” when conventional monstrosity no longer could (Fahs, 2009a)?   
The reinvigoration of the outbreak narrative through an infusion of post-9/11 
counterterrorism discourse suggests that what is most frightening today is not that infection 
might produce monstrosity, but rather that monstrosity might not need infection. For though 
Resident Evil 4 makes it clear through the course of the game that the Ganados are infected with 
a zombie-like affliction, the distinction between monstrosity and normality is unclear. Near the 
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beginning of the game, for instance, the player as Leon Kennedy observes a scene not unlike that 
from the Texas Chainsaw Massacre (Nispel, 2003), in which the backwardness of the villagers is 
associated with the monstrosity of the situation (See Figure 5.18). The non-zombie, zombie-like 
status of the villagers, then, speaks to the politics of subject formation embedded within 
representations of monstrosity. If the historical conception of “the monster and the person to be 
corrected are close cousins” (Puar & Rai, 2002, p. 119), then, the contrast between the 
protagonists and antagonists of Resident Evil 4 speaks to contemporary anxieties regarding Islam 
and bioterrorism. More to the point, Resident Evil 4 operates as one site in which the eschatology 
of the outbreak narrative is rearticulated in accordance with the discourses surrounding 
contemporary terrorism, in which terrorist populations are always already suffering from 
affliction (Puar & Rai, 2002). The warning embedded within the definition of the non-zombie, 
zombie-like villagers as Los Ganados (“the cattle”) is that living the life of a cultural zombie is 
Figure 5.18. Leon Kennedy observing the villagers shortly after the beginning of Resident Evil 4 (Capcom, 
2005a). Notice the juxtaposition between the villagers going about their daily routine and the police officer 
burning at the stake. This iconography is similar to that of the Texas Chainsaw Massacre, in which a modern 
subject stumbles upon a backward group of people. 
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synonymous with becoming a “real” zombie itself; or rather, the fear for those who believe that 
national and/or global culture has come to be decadent is that a real zombie apocalypse may be 
right around the corner (Dendle, 2007; Farnham, 2012).l And yet, though Resident Evil 4 
introduced the concept of the cultural zombie to the outbreak narrative of the Resident Evil 
franchise, it would not be until the production of Resident Evil 5 that the implications of this 
entanglement of culture, contagion, and terrorism would raise concern (See: Brock, 2009, 2011; 
Freedman, 2012; Hutchinson, 2009; John, 2008c; Mastrapa, 2008; Narcisse, 2009a, 2009b). 
Resident Evil 5 (Capcom, 2009) revealed the extent of the cultural logic behind the 
entanglement of the mukokuseki style with that of the outbreak narrative and counterterrorism 
discourse. If the mukokuseki style had meant the conception of the Western subject as being 
synonymous with the universal subject (Iwabuchi, 2002), the infusion of this aesthetic with that 
of the outbreak narrative and counterterrorism discourse meant that so too would these latter 
concepts be imagined from the experience of the subject position of these Western subjects. This 
requires clarification, in that I am not suggesting that the game, Resident Evil 5—a game 
developed in Japan by a Japanese corporation—unambiguously articulates the cultural logic of 
whiteness, but rather that the racial imagining of the mukokuseki style proposes an idealized 
universal subject that links up with the cultural logic of whiteness, with Japanese characteristics 
of course. To take a page from David Harvey (2007), if China’s contemporary economic system 
can be understood as Western neoliberalism “with Chinese characteristics” (p. 120-151), then 
might we not understand the global proliferation of racism to operate within a similar logic; that 
is, might the cultural logics embedded within the Resident Evil franchise be indicative of the 
proliferation of Western racial logics with Japanese characteristics?  
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Indeed, I am not the first to suggest that Japan’s contemporary racial politics ought to be 
understood in relation to its history with the West (B. Armstrong, 1989; Nanta, 2008; Prieler, 
2010; Robertson, 2002; J. Russell, 1991; Yamashiro, 2011). As Jennifer Robertson (2002) 
argues, Japan’s contemporary racial politics operates as a fusion of Western Eugenics and 
Japan’s history of “strategic endogamy”: “the transaction of marriages exclusively among and 
within certain categories of people defined by social status and geographical location” (p. 201).li 
This historical practice of “strategic endogamy” operated as a racialized logic to the extent that 
marriage within one’s local population was believed to be more “stable […] in that they were 
free from disruptive anxieties” associated with marrying foreign populations (Robertson, 2002, 
p. 201). The introduction of Western Eugenics—which was translated into Japanese as yûseigaku 
(“science of superior birth”)—extended the racialized logic of Japan’s history of “strategic 
endogamy” through the conception of “eugenic endogamy”: the replacement of “one type of kin 
group endogamy with another system […], which basically amounted to the introduction of 
‘universal endogamy’ among theoretically pure-blooded Japanese” (Robertson, 2002, p. 207; See 
also Yamashiro, 2011). This conception of ethnicity has the effect of conceiving of the ethnic 
body as an always already national body, regardless of whether or not a given population resides 
within the “appropriate” national border (Yamashiro, 2011). The measure of a nation, from this 
perspective, then, is tied to the ethnic integrity of the nation’s rightful population (Nanta, 2008; 
Robertson, 2002). Hence, Mukokuseki speaks not necessarily of the United States, or the West, 
but rather the Japanese imagination of whiteness as an obtainable state of racial purity that brings 
with it certain global privileges (See: Iwabuchi, 2002; Prieler, 2010; Robertson, 2002). If 
whiteness is associated with modernity and the universal subject (Iwabuchi, 2002; Prieler, 2010), 
however, the contemporary formation of whiteness also serves as an allegory for Japanese racial 
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anxieties: in the mid-1980s both former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhio and 
prominent Liberal Democrat Michio Watanabe each, on separate occasions, suggested that the 
economic struggles of the United States was due to the presence of “blacks, Puerto Ricans, and 
Mexicans” (J. Russell, 1991, pp. 3-4).  
The point of this aside on the racial politics of Japan is not to paint Japan as more or less 
racist than the United States—as this would ignore the affect Western hegemony has had on the 
global circulation of race (Nanta, 2008; J. Russell, 1991)—but rather to situate the Resident Evil 
franchise as a transnational text embedded within the global anxieties and desires of racial purity. 
The flexibility of the mukokuseki aesthetic means that both Western and Japanese audiences can 
read themselves into the outbreak narrative presented within the Resident Evil franchise; and 
hence, it serves as a site for thinking through global biopolitical anxiety and desire: 
Chris [is] a very serious and straight-laced person. [….] He probably isn’t good at dealing with 
other people because he takes his work so seriously. [….] Japanese people tend to like those kinds 
of characters more than Americans do.(Jun Takeuchi, producer for Resident Evil 5, qtd. in 
Narcisse, 2009b) 
 
Personally when I see someone (a zombie if you will) with blood coming from the corners of their 
mouth/eyes/anus with the intent of causing me bodily harm, no matter their color or gender, I am 
going to kill them in any way I can. (trueb7ue, see comment section of Sterling, 2009) 
 
These two examples, one from the producer of Resident Evil 5, Jun Takeuchi, and the other from 
a presumably Western subject, under the alias of trueb7ue, illustrate how various populations can 
read themselves into the text and to what effect (particularly regarding the latter). The linkage of 
the mukokuseki style with that of the outbreak narrative and contemporary War on Terror 
discourse within Resident Evil 4 (Capcom, 2005a) and Resident Evil 5 (Capcom, 2009) brings to 
the surface the underwriting logics of race that had been present throughout the Resident Evil 
franchise. For though it was not until Resident Evil 5 that the franchise became a lightning rod 
for representations of race within video games (See: Brock, 2009, 2011; Freedman, 2012; 
Hutchinson, 2009; John, 2008c; Mastrapa, 2008; Narcisse, 2009a, 2009b; Schiesel, 2009; 
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Figure 5.19. This early scene from Resident Evil 5 (Capcom, 2009) shows a group of African villagers beating a 
human-sized sack in the middle of the day. At this point it is unclear whether these particular villagers are 
infected (as infection typically is signified by the afflicted individual(s) immediately attacking the player). In 
addition, note the White villager sitting near Chris Redfield (bottom-left). Early trailers of the game did not have 
these white figures included within these scenes, thereby suggesting that they were later added to help quiet 
criticism regarding racism. 
Sterling, 2009), the conception of whiteness as the organizational logic of the franchise had long 
been present within the series: the citizens of Raccoon City, in Resident Evil 1-3 (Capcom, 1996, 
1998, 1999) were represented as deserving of sympathy only to the extent that they were 
racialized as White subjects; in Resident Evil 4 and 5, though this sympathy is still there, one 
cannot help but feel that the rural Spanish (Resident Evil 4) and African populations (Resident 
Evil 5) are marked as always already suspect (Brock, 2009, 2011). This is most clearly 
represented by an early scene in Resident Evil 5 of three African villagers beating a large human-
sized sack with wooden clubs (See Figure 5.19; See also Figure 5.18 regarding Resident Evil 4). 
 Though both the developers of Resident Evil and many of the fans of the franchise would 
argue that the situating of Resident Evil 5 in Africa was the result of the logical outcome of the 
narrative (See: Freedman, 2012; Gametrailers, 2008; comments section of Hutchinson, 2009), as 
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I have sought to argue throughout this section, these defenses ignore the ideological investment 
of the mukokuseki style within the production of this particular narrative. Within the daikaiju 
eiga and apocalyptic film traditions of Japanese cinema, unbridled scientific research is 
condemned to the extent that it results in the production of unnatural bodies. When those bodies 
are already marked as socially and/or physically aberrant or inferior, however, the history of 
Japan’s racial politics, like that of the West, conceives of these populations as not a population to 
be protected but rather one to be managed, for fear of infecting the rest of us (Nanta, 2008; 
Robertson, 2002). The ease in which the Resident Evil franchise was able to reposition rural 
populations and Africa as the original site of infection, moreover, speaks to the cultural logics at 
play in global narratives of outbreak. Far from the ludic conventions of gameplay draining the 
abject status of race (Freedman, 2012), then, it would seem that the articulation of ludic 
conventions is itself infused with the politics of biopolitical anxiety and desire. The Resident Evil 
franchise could have been, and indeed has been, otherwise. In Resident Evil: Outbreak (Capcom, 
2003), for instance, the player takes control of one of several civilians and can cooperatively play 
with another as they attempt to make it out of the growing pandemic in Raccoon City. Infection 
did not mean instant death or condemnation, as the premise instead is that this fairly diverse 
group (in terms of race, class, and gender) is already infected, and instead they must work 
together to both escape the site of pandemic (the city) as well as search for a cure along the way 
(Capcom, 2003). Though this entry into the Resident Evil franchise did garner a sequel, the 
overall series had already moved on, and hence the outbreak narrative and its ludic conventions 
failed to resonate with global audiences (Fahs, 2009a). In the post-9/11 world, terrorism offered 
a more compelling narrative thread in which to understand the source of outbreak. In this world, 
infection needed to be understood in terms of unambiguous evil: in contrast to Resident Evil: 
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Outbreak, wherein one could be both afflicted and retain one’s sense of humanity, and 
potentially be cured, within the logic of the War on Terror, infection is tantamount to guilt. 
Though the Umbrella Corporation continues to operate in the shadows throughout the later 
games in the Resident Evil franchise, the real source of affliction, as explained narratively 
throughout Resident Evil 4 and Resident Evil 5 is that participating in a false religion (Resident 
Evil 4) and/or possessing anti-Western sentiment (Resident Evil 5) opens one’s self up to 
infection.lii The later Resident Evil franchise, then, operates as an apologia for contemporary 
Empire, in that the articulation of global ecologies of anxiety and desire is ultimately pinned 
upon those populations which refuse to and/or are unable to operate within the transnational 
logic of Empire; the corruption of global capital is not to be found within the logic of capital, but 
rather those countries which do not embrace the benevolent ways of Empire, and thus fall victim 
to corporations that operate outside the purview of capitalism proper—never mind that global 
capital is often only able to procure pleasure through its extraction from third- to first-world 
countries. 
Conclusion: Conversations worth Having 
In a thoughtful and compellingly written piece, video game journalist Evan Narcisse (2009a) 
wrote that questions of race and racism in video games are never easy conversations, but they are 
ones, nevertheless, worth having. Dismissing these conversations as politically correct nonsense 
(See: comments section of Hutchinson, 2009; Schiesel, 2009) and/or “retarded” (Sterling, 2009), 
however, has the effect of reproducing the racial logics underwriting the production and 
dominant consumption of digital play (C. R. King, 2012; Narcisse, 2009a). That is, these quick 
and often aggressive dismissals of these conversations speak to the desire by some populations to 
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keep existing regimes of pleasure intact, and to not acknowledge the substructures of displeasure 
in which these regimes of power are built upon (C. R. King, 2012).  
Though I have spent a significant portion of this chapter discussing the racial logics 
embedded within the history of the Resident Evil franchise, particularly as articulated through the 
mukokuseki style, the truth of the matter is that one does not even need to go that far to 
understand the racial politics of contemporary digital play. The political economic circuits of 
global production and consumption already suggest that the experience of contemporary digital 
pleasure operates according to racial, classed, and gendered logics, in terms of how labor and 
leisure are organized. National and international ecologies are being reconfigured so as to satisfy 
the desire for certain populations to experience pleasure while experiencing minimal displeasure. 
This is articulated through the global supply chain of contemporary digital play: tantalum and 
other raw materials increasingly being extracted under extremely harsh conditions in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Dizolele, 2007; Domoney, et al., 2011; Dyer-Witheford; 
Hayes & Burge, 2003; Montague, 2002); consoles and computers nearly universally 
manufactured in China and other “developing economic zones” (Bjorhus, 2000; Dyer-Witheford, 
2010; Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kerr, 2006; Kline, et al., 2003; Markoff, 2001); rote 
programming being undertaken in China, Eastern Europe, and South America, as well (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009); with even the comparatively well-paid “knowledge workers” in 
the United States, Australia, and Europe (and to a lesser extent Japan) frequently under duress 
due to unpaid crunch-time and uncertain job security (Bonds, et al., 2004; Dyer-Witheford, 1999; 
EA Spouse, 2004; McMillen, 2011). This circuit of racialized, classed, and gendered production 
that undergirds contemporary ecologies of pleasure and displeasure continues within the game 
world as well, when considering the history of call centers, game testers, and contemporary 
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“gold farmers” in online games (Nakamura, 2009). Hence, one does not need to go far to 
understand how digital play is not just entrenched within these circuits of production and 
consumption, but also actively invested in their continued production. 
Why then the analysis of the Resident Evil franchise? What might it add to our 
understanding of these global circuits of anxiety and desire? What this analysis of the Resident 
Evil franchise does, I believe, is to illustrate how we must understand how the contemporary 
experience of anxiety and desire operates through transnational circuits of production and 
consumption. The eschatological anxiety and desire that others have recognized as endemic to 
our historical moment (Baumgartner, 1999; Carey, 2002; Keränen, 2011) is inflected with the 
raced, classed and gendered (amongst other) interests of not just Western, but increasingly other 
capitalist populations as well. This is not cause for celebration, as in the destabilization of 
Western hegemony, and the birth of a new era of a more egalitarian platform for the expression 
of global anxiety and desire, however; rather, it calls for the increased scrutiny of increasingly 
global artifacts with a sensitivity to the complex circuits of production and consumption at play 
in the transnational circulation of these artifacts. What I have attempted to show through this 
analysis of the Resident Evil franchise, then, is that the fusion of the Western outbreak narrative 
with that of Japan’s daikaiju eiga and apocalyptic horror traditions, via the use of the mukokuseki 
style, operates as an important site in which video game players engage with contemporary 
discourses regarding global terrorism; this particular configuration, as articulated within the 
Resident Evil franchise, presents a global ecology in which racially pure (i.e., that is White, and 
by extension Japanese) subjects are to be vigilant against the possibility of cultural 
contamination from others, whether they be corrupt corporations (e.g., Resident Evil 1-3) or 
always already suspect, foreign, populations (e.g., Resident Evil 4-5). Hence, the Resident Evil 
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franchise contributes to the conception of the world as organized according to naturalized 
ecologies of exception and exemption, in that these regional differences are explained as being 
due not necessarily to economic exploitation, but rather intrinsic racialized characteristics. 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
xliii The miners are actually paid for procuring coltan—an ore rich in the element tantalum (Vick, 2001). 
xliv As Stephen O’Leary (1997) makes clear, the point is not whether a given apocalyptic warning—whether 
emerging from secular or religious origins—is more plausible than others, but rather that we ought to “recognize the 
forces at work in public evaluation of these discourses, whether they possess scientific merit or are completely 
spurious” (p. 311). In essence, it is the rhetorical form in terms of production and reception that matter most in the 
circulation and effect of apocalyptic narratives. 
xlv Clearly, African American Women can take on a variety of sexual orientations, as can other populations as well. 
However, to the extent that homosexuality is typically associated with White, Middle-Class, Men, then other 
populations, LGBT or otherwise, are obscured when a phenomena is considered to be an exclusive Gay 
experience—regardless of whether the experience is interpreted through conservative or progressive frameworks 
(Hocker, 2011; Manalansan, 2005) 
xlvi As of this writing, Resident Evil 6 is in development but has not yet been released. 
xlvii Even in Western horror cinema, when the zombie is understood as part of a cultural phenomenon, the conception 
is that the “contemporary zombie embodies a wanton, unfettered pursuit of immediate physical cravings, a fear of 
raw power [or rather animality]” (Dendle, 2007, p. 54). This is the fear that others will not be able to keep in check 
their consumptive desires, and thus the becoming of a cultural zombie is a sign of one’s individual failure—hence, 
the demeaning practice of calling someone a zombie. 
xlviii In this case, Japanese postwar cinema shares with it a similar concern as that of the English romantics, such as 
Mary Shelley’s (1818/2003) Frankenstein: or, The Modern Prometheus. 
xlix Though merely a coincidence, it is fascinating to note that this announcement of returning to its origins was 
announced on September 11th, 2001. 
l Even the Centers for Disease Control (2012) has sought to capitalize upon this cultural fascination with the zombie, 
with the center producing a guide to the zombie apocalypse: “It can be tough to get people thinking about 
emergency preparedness before disaster strikes. We’ve created these zombie posters to spark some attention and get 
people involved before its too late.” 
li As Jennifer Robertson (2002) continues to note, “in Japan, [these practices of strategic endogamy] were not limited 
to elites” (p. 201). 
lii Indeed, in Resident Evil 5 (Capcom, 2009), the player learns through in-game memos that anti-government rebels 
were one means by which the Umbrella Corporation was able to get a foothold in Africa. Moreover, the game 
includes footage that was directly inspired by Black Hawk Down (Scott, 2001), and thus equates anti-western 
sentiment as being motivated by biopolitical corruption. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION: CHOOSING TO LISTEN 
 
This dissertation has been driven by the premise that it is time for game studies to move beyond 
studying and theorizing the artifact of gaming itself—whether conceived of as audience, text, or 
platform—and toward grasping the totality of digital play as it operates throughout the larger 
circuits of global culture and political economy. As I have tried to show, the efficacy of game 
studies is limited to the extent that digital play remains concerned only with the analysis of 
audiences, texts, platforms, and even political economies that are explicitly marked as being a 
part of the proper domain of gaming. Influenced by the work of continental theorists, such as, 
Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger, and Paul Virilio, and cultural theorists, such as James Carey, 
Stuart Hall, and Raymond Williams, I have tried to show how the logics of digital play have 
come to be dispersed throughout various global political economic and cultural circuits; that is, if 
digital play operates as the quintessential game of Empire (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009), 
and is hence paradigmatic of neoliberalism (Redmond, 2012), then it seems to me that digital 
play should not be conceived any longer as operating solely within the confines of conventional 
gaming. Rather, as I have argued, digital play is not a sideshow to the machinations of 
contemporary Empire, a distraction for the masses, but rather an important engine and archive 
documenting the historical and transnational rearticulation of Empire as it has spread across the 
globe. To the extent this attempt has been successful, then, I offer this dissertation as an 
incomplete model upon which future transnational and historical studies of digital play—writ 
large—can build upon.  
 This of course was not the initial expectation I had for this project, for when I began my 
aspirations were much more humble; I had begun with the feeling that gaming had something to 
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say about our contemporary moment, which seemed to me at the time to have something to do 
with the playing out of our anxieties and desires. This premise did not appear to be too 
controversial in that a cursory glance at some of the most popular gaming franchises would 
suggest that the anxieties and desires of the moment have often worked their way in as major 
plot devices. Indeed, the names Missile Command, Biohazard / Resident Evil, Fallout, amongst 
others, would seem to suggest as much. I could not shake the feeling, however, that I would get 
every time someone would hear of the topic of my dissertation, and respond, “Oh! That must be 
fun!” Sure, I could think of worse topics, for me at least, but the thought of fun had not been a 
factor when choosing this project. My first choice, in fact, had been to explore the rhetoric of 
religion as a structural form as opposed to a belief system, perhaps in the mold of Stephen 
O’Leary’s (1993, 1997) work. liii That seemed like fun! And yet, I imagine that had I selected 
that topic, no one would have commented about the inherent pleasure that drives most academics 
to engage in scholarly work (See Weed, 2010). Fun, then, seemed to me to be a way—whether 
intentional or not—of diminishing the political significance of this project. Perhaps due to this, I 
felt an obligation to treat this subject matter with the seriousness that it deserved. If others were 
going to judge this dissertation against other topics of legitimate scholarliness (i.e., the unmarked 
fun research), then it seemed as though I had an obligation to show them why video games 
matter to their research; that is, why their ignorance of this topic, bracketed off as fun, was their 
loss so to speak.  
To this end, I have sought to write and research the best dissertation given the constraints 
of time and place, and have poured through hundreds of documents and, yes, games, as well. 
And I have enjoyed it.liv I have no regrets for choosing to write upon a topic that has enabled me 
to learn how the circulation of digital play has transformed global economic circuits of 
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production and consumption, from the flexible knowledge economies of first-world countries to 
the inflexible manufacturing and mining economies of second- and third-world nations (See 
Chapter Three). I have no regrets for choosing to write upon a topic that enabled me to learn how 
the circulation of digital play has transformed the operation of modern warfare, in terms of 
legitimation, recruitment, training, and combat as well (See Chapter Four). And, I definitely have 
no regrets for choosing to write upon a topic that has enabled me to learn how these circuits of 
anxiety and desire operate on a global level, and thus work to legitimate the life and death of 
some over others (See Chapter Five).  
Through the course of exploring the linkages between digital play and global economies, 
militarism, and ecologies, I have learned that sometimes the text in itself is a red herring (See 
Chapter Two). That is, the content of the games can matter significantly (as I indeed have spent 
significant time undertaking their analysis) but also ought to be situated within the context of 
their production and consumption. And yet, this approach forced me to move beyond a 
conventional political economic analysis as well, in that my study was never concerned with 
gaming as it manifests within the video game industry. This was a concern, of course, but my 
primary objective was to search out those patterns of consumption and production that enable us 
to understand how the logic of digital play extends beyond, as well as sometimes originates 
outside of, the site of conventional gaming itself. This conclusion, then, is dedicated to: (1) 
crystalizing the contributions I believe this dissertation has made to our understanding of 
contemporary global politics and culture; and (2) point towards directions that future research 
motivated by this project may be interested in addressing. 
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The Digital Game of Life 
Digital play has long been embedded in what Hardt and Negri (2001) term the three pillars of 
contemporary Empire: “the bomb, money, and ether” (p. 345). The industry emerged from 
within the shadows of the military-industrial complex (Halter, 2006), then through the careful 
production of a counter-cultural ethos based upon White male privilege (See Kent, 2001, pp. 51, 
56-57), sought to gain entry into the middle-class without experiencing the rigidity associated 
with the bureaucracy of Fordist era capitalism (Dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Kline, et al., 
2003). Though today it is popularly thought that Apple, by way of Steve Jobs, proved that “you 
could not only have fun at work, but that pursuing a capitalist dream could be hip” (O'Grady, 
2009, p. x), this lesson was taught to Jobs by way of his time at Atari in the mid-1970s (See: 
Cifaldi, 2011; Kent, 2001). Indeed, as I argued in Chapter Three, the emergence of the video 
game industry in the early 1970s operated as an electronic engine of economic transition 
modeling the virtues and appeal of flexible capital prior to the widespread adoption in the 1980s 
(See: Harvey, 2007; Sennett, 1998). And to this day, the video game industry has continued to 
work hard to maintain its image as the proper home of the post-Fordist creative class: from 
naming projects after attractive female employees and the prospect of playing free games in the 
1970s (Kent, 2001; See also Cifaldi, 2011) to hiring “booth babes” to work at major industry 
conventions today (See Figure 1.1, p. 7). And, though the benefits of belonging to this creative 
class are unevenly distributed—and hence working as part of this knowledge economy is (1) not 
all it is made out to be and (2) functionally foreclosed for those subjects whose desires do not 
properly align with that of patriarchal desire (Bonds, et al., 2004; EA Spouse, 2004)—this image 
of post-Fordist capital continues to be an attractive prospect for many populations (Dyer-
Witheford & de Peuter, 2009; Sennett, 1998). 
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The emergence and ongoing popularity of digital play has transformed the contemporary 
configuration of modern warfare as well, in terms of both legitimation and operation. Many of 
the most popular, early video games, from SpaceWar! (S. Russell, 1962) to Missile Command 
(Atari, 1980b), for example, resonated thematically with the Cold War politics of the era. And 
indeed the popularity of military-themed video games has been a constant throughout the history 
of digital play: Combat (Atari, 1977), Battlezone (Atari, 1980a), the Metal Gear franchise 
(Konami, 1987, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2008), Wolfenstein 3D (id Software, 1992), Doom (GT 
Interactive, 1993), the Command & Conquer franchise (Electronic Arts, 1999a, 2000a, 2003a, 
2008a; Virgin Interactive, 1995, 1996), and the Call of Duty series (Activision, 2003b, 2005, 
2006, 2007a, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011b), to name a few of the more iconic examples. This 
ongoing relationship between the military-industrial complex and the contemporary video game 
industry is even more pronounced when one moves beyond the quantity of military-games 
produced and consumed to a consideration of the feedback loop in operation between these two 
institutions: with technologies, consultants, and even audiences (e.g., gamers/soldiers) regularly 
flowing back and forth between the military and gaming industries.  
For this reason and more, as I argued in Chapter Four, we ought to understand the 
contemporary form of the video game—again, writ large—to operate as an important site of 
military ballistics; that is, the anxieties and desires embedded within the feedback loop in 
operation between the military-industrial complex and the video game industry and culture has 
operated—and continues to operate—as an important force affecting the trajectory of 
contemporary military endeavors. This relationship, I believe, will only grow stronger as the 
United States military and those of other nations are reconfigured for the use of drones and other 
forms of “unmanned” combat, which will require the ability to “extract three-dimensional 
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situational awareness from a two-dimensional screen” (Col. Michael McKinney, qtd. in 
Cantwell, 2009), skills that are already being highly refined via contemporary gameplay, as 
former President Ronald Reagan (1983) noted years earlier. In this regard, video games operate 
not only as a site for imagining the near-future scenarios of modern warfare, but through the 
technological, political, and cultural overlap with the military-industrial complex, also operates 
as a site wherein this near-future reality is actively being manufactured. 
 Imbricated throughout these twin pillars of capitalist accumulation and (inter)national 
security is the sense that we are in the midst of a planetary crisis. Procurement of the raw 
materials needed to enable the pleasures and comfort of first- and (increasingly) second-world 
populations (See Redmond, 2012) is dramatically impacting the sustainability of both the 
regional ecologies of third-world countries and by extension global ecologies as well. The 
exploitation of mining populations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for 
instance, has destabilized the agricultural base of various local economies within the nation, so 
that unsustainable hunting practices have taken hold near the mines, thus decimating and 
drastically transforming these regional ecologies (Hayes & Burge, 2003). Though video games 
cannot account for the totality of mining interests present in the region, considering that much of 
new media technologies are imbricated with the economies and cultures of digital play, then it 
would seem as though concern for the ecological effects of transnational capital must include an 
account of gaming, as I argued in Chapter Five.  
Moreover, digital play is not just an engine for the active reconfiguration of global 
politics and economies towards what Nick Dyer-Witheford (2010) calls the construction of a 
planetary factory—“a regime that subsumes not just production, consumption, and social 
reproduction (as in Fordism), but life’s genetic and ecological dimensions” (Dyer-Witheford, 
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2010, p. 485)—but rather operates as I have argued throughout this dissertation as an important 
site wherein this attempted reconfiguration of the globe along these lines is legitimated and 
actively taken up. That is, it is not just that the substructures of contemporary digital play are 
built upon the backs of populations ranging from the miners of the DRC to the console 
manufacturer sweatshop workers in Mexico, China, and elsewhere, but also that the content of 
these games often works to actively encourage and discourage certain anxieties and desires 
associated with this recognition over others. Popular games such as Resident Evil 4 (Capcom, 
2005a) and Resident Evil 5 (Capcom, 2009), for instance, simultaneously represents 
marginalized populations as victims of transnational capital, while also suggesting that these 
populations became victims due to their commitment to non-Western and/or explicitly anti-
Western practices (See Chapter Five). This helps to alleviate any anxiety associated with our 
culpability in the extraction of pleasure from these various regions, as the lesson is that even 
were our involvement to be removed, the commitment of these populations to strange, non-
Western religions and practices would ultimately lead to the same end of suffering—as it is this 
indigenous culture itself that is conceived as the true source of the local population’s suffering. 
And yet, because we are aware of the global consequences of ecological instability, this problem 
that we have helped to create—but subsequently effectively removed ourselves from its 
making—becomes reconceived as our problem, thereby justifying our continued presence within 
these various regions, not as equals invested in the search for a common solution, but often rather 
as experts seeking to uncover a solution that is acceptable for our needs.  
The significance of digital play for our understanding of legitimation, I argue, however, is 
not that it is a popular form of entertainment that operates across various domains of anxiety and 
desire—for clearly the justification of contemporary global politics operates across a variety of 
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mediums (See: Keränen, 2011; Lynch, 1998; Ono, 2009b; Said, 1993)—but rather that the much 
touted interactive interface of the medium creates, sustains, transforms, and mobilizes the 
political economic and cultural logics necessary for the functioning of contemporary Empire. 
Communication technologies have long played significant roles in the cultural reconfiguration of 
society, from the printing press (Starr, 2004) to the telegraph (Carey, 1983/2009), sound 
recording technologies (Sterne, 2005), film (Virilio, 1984/2009), and television (R. Williams, 
1974/2005), and this is no less true of the digital media technologies of today. Though some 
would argue, reasonably, that the defining medium of our age is the internet or computer, it 
seems to me that the political economic, cultural, and ecological gravity of digital play must be 
held within the same conversation. This is for the most significant technological development of 
our era is not necessarily the pervasiveness of communication—for then our moment would be 
merely a difference of quantitative degree—but the ever accelerating trend towards the 
expectation of action within virtual-space and -time. Let me clarify, it clearly is a matter of 
importance of whether or not one is saturated with the possibility of communication, however, in 
an environment oversaturated as such, the only means of managing such a possibility is through 
the widespread adherence and integration of society with simulation: the speed of financial 
markets is such that real economies can no longer be distinguished from speculative (i.e., 
simulated) economies (Dyer-Witheford, 2010; Harvey, 2007); and, the militaristic desire to 
merge “seeing and foreseeing” so as to have the “fastest possible access to pictures of the 
enemy’s forces and reserves” (Virilio, 1984/2009, p. 4), have made it so that the “combined 
video output [from Iraq and Afghanistan in the year 2010 alone] would take one person four 
decades to watch” (The Economist, 2010). ; and, in social life as well, it has become increasingly 
untenable to operate without the assistance of the avatar, whether it be conceived as the 
 
 
 244  
 
Facebook profile or some other form of digital assistance (Mejia, 2012). What these examples 
point to is the increasing inability for various sectors of contemporary society to operate without 
the aid of artificial intelligence, of which the video game is perhaps the most prominent 
ambassador (Manovich, 2001). Video games are not just sites wherein cultural anxiety and desire 
circulate, but rather the logic of digital play also operates as the engines of these affective 
manifestations. In other words, to the extent that the contemporary manifestation of Empire 
operates across the virtualization of the bomb, money, and even social space itself, then digital 
play operates as the privileged mechanism by which the subjects of contemporary Empire are 
produced; if the barracks and schoolhouses of discipline operated as the privileged site of 
governance in the past, today it is the biopolitics of pleasure and play. 
It is this dual nature of digital play, moreover, that demands our attention; for if digital 
play simultaneously functions as an archive and engine of contemporary political economic and 
cultural politics, then the fact that this medium has long operated on the transnational level offers 
us insight into the anxieties and desires associated with the operation of contemporary capital on 
the global level. Many of the most popular video games either take up transnational subject 
matter and/or are produced through the creative energies of transnational developers. As my 
analysis of the Resident Evil franchise suggested, an examination of the content and practices of 
digital play—in terms of production and consumption—can offer insights into how cultural 
politics operate at the global level, while also maintaining insight into the various regional, 
national, and transnational interests embedded within the artifact. My analysis of the Resident 
Evil series, for instance, suggested that the franchise operates as an archive documenting the 
ongoing entanglement of U.S. and Japanese racial politics. The particular expression of the 
cultural politics embedded within the series were not necessarily top-down impositions onto 
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gaming populations, however, for rather so too was the developer, Capcom, caught up within the 
transnational flows of anxiety and desire: in the post-9/11 environment, the series initially 
foundered as it sought to rebrand itself as culturally relevant for an era marked by the 
reconfiguration of terror as terrorist. 
Must Everything Be Fun? 
That the cultural logic of digital play cannot be thought to exist solely within the conventional 
site of gaming—that is, those sites explicitly associated with video games—then it seems as 
though the possibilities for the future of game studies is not just rich and plentiful, but urgently in 
need of other studies looking to make connections between the operations of digital play—in 
terms of aesthetics, contents, economies, infrastructure, logics, producers, and consumers—and 
other forms of local, national, and global politics. To the extent, however, that much of game 
studies remains confined to the analysis of a particular domain of digital play, always already 
defined in advance as conventional gaming, even when seeking to move beyond this definition 
as such (Boellstorff, 2008; Castronova, 2006; Galloway, 2006; Montfort & Bogost, 2009), then 
we risk missing out on the significance of the proliferation of digital play in the larger 
geopolitical context (at best) or prematurely valorizing the political possibilities of digital play 
(at worst).  
For instance, much energy has been directed toward the pedagogical possibilities of 
educational gaming, with much optimism being pronounced (Gee, 2001; Kee, et al., 2009; Squire 
& Jenkins, 2003; K. Weir & Baranowski, 2011). The arguments advanced in favor are that 
games make learning fun, and therefore promote eager and creative engagement with the 
assignment. The question rarely posed, however, is whether education ought to be fun at all—or 
rather, whether the purpose of education should be that of maximizing pleasure. As Dennis 
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Charsky and William Ressler (2011) note, the effectiveness of educational games diminishes 
when the subject matter is not fun; however, the recommendation embedded within their caution 
ought to give us pause: 
This study carries with it a warning for educators who adopt game based learning approaches: Do 
not dilute the potential effectiveness of games by taking away the one distinct attribute that gives 
them their advantage—play. Like the games they complement, scaffolds [i.e., supplemental 
educational materials] must first engage students in order to enhance learning and motivation by 
seamlessly integrating learning with play. A number of frustrated students from the pre-generated 
map group wrote this in their journals. Their sentiments were captured succinctly in the words of 
one student—“Games are made for one purpose: fun.” (Charsky & Ressler, 2011, p. 614) 
 
What are we to make of this recommendation that the expectation of play ought to be the 
dominant logic of education? Or rather, what subject matters and topics risk being whitewashed 
for the sake of keeping the lesson pleasurable? This is an area in significant need of future 
research. 
 Taking up the above question, or that of any other, however, must always be informed by 
the technological form of digital play that I sought to outline in this dissertation, specifically in 
Chapter Two. That is, we remain unable to grasp the essence of digital play unless we consider 
its operation throughout the circulation of its various mechanisms: producers, consumers, 
content, infrastructure, political economies, and ecologies. If we are to understand and intervene 
upon the contemporary operation of digital play, then we must aim to engage with this 
technology in its totality. It is not enough, for instance, to advocate for the increased presence of 
women as content producers in the video game industry, if the addition of women in and of itself 
does nothing to change the often sexist and racist content of contemporary digital play (Lalley, 
2005). As James Green, art director for Titan Studios, wondered in response to the criticism his 
company’s game, Fat Princess (Sony Computer Entertainment, 2009a), received regarding the 
sexist and problematic body images found within the game (the premise is to fatten one’s 
princess so as to make it difficult for opposing players to kidnap her; see Figure 6.1): “Does it 
 
 
 247  
 
make it better or worse that the concept artist (who designed the look, characters, everything) is a 
girl?” (qtd. in R. Nelson, 2008). Likewise, I would suggest, that it is not enough to advocate for 
the virtues of educational gaming without also considering the totality of digital play. We must, 
in other words, seek to understand not just the content of educational gaming—nor even how the 
form of digital play effects the pedagogy of the subject matter selected—but also the various 
substructures that allow for educational gaming to come into existence in the first place; that is, 
we must hold educational gaming accountable for its connection to the maquiladoras of Mexico, 
the sweatshops of China, and the mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This subject  
of educational gaming, hence, is in significant need of future critical cultural analysis, of the kind 
I have advocated for here.  
Figure 6.1. Fat Princess. In this screenshot a player is fattening up the princess so as to make it more difficult for 
opposing players from kidnapping her. 
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 I wish to conclude with a note explicitly acknowleding my own anxieties and desires for 
the future of digital play, and, by extension, game studies. Those who read this dissertation 
without knowing me will be surprised, perhaps, for I am what most people would consider an 
avid gamer. I was born in 1982, and came of age at the moment when Nintendo and Sega were 
actively working to produce the precursors of today’s hardcore gamer. Some of my fondest 
memories are playing games, such as Earthbound (Nintendo, 1994/1995) and Final Fantasy VI 
(Square, 1994). I believed then, and I continue to believe now, that those games were works of 
art, masterpieces even, that would hold up well against the works produced in other, more 
established media.  
Why then, so much pessimism? Why then, have I opted not to touch upon those moments 
of hope that are to be found within the domain of digital play? For surely, as I have argued, 
gaming has something to say to the anxieties and desires of contemporary society; and thus, the 
fact that digital play resonates so strongly with so many across the globe, might it not also hold 
out some promise for those who engage with it? Perhaps, and I remain hopeful that it does. And 
yet, if it indeed does, it must do so throughout the totality of its operation. We cannot smile at the 
pleasures afforded for us through the experience of digital play and simultanously remain 
ignorant of the significant suffering undertaken on our behalf. Players the world over are noted to 
have cried when witnessing Aerith Gainsborough die in Final Fantasy VII (Square, 1997) (IGN 
Staff, 2012a). This says something. Players the world over are not noted to have cried nor even 
cared when reports of the kidnappings, rapes, and deaths associated with working at the 
Maquiladoras of Mexico and elsewhere first broke news in the mid-1990s. This says something 
too. For the sake of the future of digital play, in its totality, I have chosen to listen. 
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Notes: 
 
liii This initial dissertation proposal was rejected by my department. Portions of it, however, live on in Chapter Five, 
when I discuss the cultural influence of Christian eschatology on contemporary secular society. 
liv Though not always, for just as overtime one comes to dread turning the next page of a book, so too does one learn 
to dread the beginning of another level of a game. 
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